JUDGMENT :

Uday Kumar, J.

1. This is an application under Section 401 read with Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, preferred by the petitioner, Ms. Anindita Ghosh. The petitioner seeks the indulgence of this Court for the quashing of proceedings in connection with G.R. Case No. 6728 of 2015, currently pending before the Learned Judicial Magistrate, 1st Class, Municipal Court, Howrah. The said proceedings arise out of Golabari P.S. Case No. 1033 of 2015 dated September 10, 2015, and have culminated in Charge Sheet No. 12 of 2016, filed under the aegis of Sections 420, 406, and 506 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC).

2. The bedrock of the prosecution's case lies in a written complaint lodged by Opposite Party No. 2, Smt. Veena Jain. The allegations, as carved out in the First Information Report (FIR), suggest that the petitioner, representing herself as the lawful owner/allottee of a property situated at 27, Moulana Abdul Kalam Road, entered into an Agreement for Sale dated June 29, 2011. The agreement pertained to the transfer of a flat measuring 1000 sq. ft. for a total consideration of Rs.25,00,000/-. It is the complainant's case that after the payment of an earnest money deposit amounting to Rs.1,62,000/-, the petitioner failed to deliver possession within the stipulated 24-month period. It is further alleged that the petitioner diverted the land to a third-party developer, refused to refund the advance, and issued criminal threats, thereby exhibiting a dishonest intent from the inception of the contract.

3. Mr. Subhasish Panchhal, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, submits with considerable emphasis that the impugned criminal proceeding is a textbook example of a civil and commercial dispute being dressed up in the garb of a criminal offense. He contends that the "Agreement for Sale" was never intended by either party to be acted upon as a conveyance of property. On the contrary, it was executed as a security document for a private loan arrangement of Rs.6,50,000/-.

4. To substantiate this claim of a financial transaction rather than a property sale, the learned counsel points to the fact that the petitioner has already repaid a staggering sum of Rs.12,90,000/- to the complainant. He argues that the execution of the agreement was done under financial "coercion" (misstated as 'portion' in earlier records) to serve as collateral. Furthermore, he highlights a significant development during the hearing of the anticipatory bail application before this Hon’ble Court (CRM No. 10050 of 2015), where the petitioner, to demonstrate bona fides, refunded the entire earnest money of Rs.1,62,000/- via a pay order in open Court. He submits that the subsequent affidavit filed by the de facto complainant, acknowledging receipt of payments toward "interest," effectively demolishes the theory of a "dishonest sale agreement" and proves the existence of a pure money-lending transaction.

5. Per contra, Mr. Dipankar Pramanick, learned counsel for the State, supported by the records of the Investigating Agency, submits that the filing of the Charge Sheet is indicative of a prima facie case that warrants a full-dressed trial. He argues that a mere refund of money at the post-FIR stage or during bail proceedings does not "wipe out the criminality" of the act. The State’s primary contention is that the petitioner’s act of entering into a sale agreement and subsequently diverting the property to a developer—without the knowledge or consent of the complainant—establishes a dishonest intention at the inception, which is the sine qua non for an offense under Section 420 of the IPC. He further characterizes the "loan security" argument as an "afterthought" and a matter of defense that must be tested during the trial, rather than in a quashing proceeding under Section 482.

6. Upon thorough consideration of the rival contentions and the materials on record the following questions that fall for determination are;

i. whether the present disput