The court emphasized the strict timelines for filing a written statement under the CPC and the applicability of CPC provisions to proceedings under the Hindu Marriage Act, unless provided otherwise.

1. The petitioner has preferred this writ petition under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India being aggrieved by the order dated 27-8-2004 passed by the 3rd Additional District Judge, Bilaspur in petition No. 50-A/2004 whereby the learned Additional District Judge has rejected the prayer of the petitioner herein for giving further opportunity for filing written statement on the ground that since summons were served upon the petitioner herein on 7-5-2004 and 90 days' time has expired on 7-8-2004, therefore, further time cannot be granted to the respondent to file written statement.

2. Brief facts leading to filing of this writ petition are that the respondent herein filed a divorce petition under Section 13 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 against the petitioner herein. The summons for appearance and filing reply was issued to the petitioner herein and same was served upon the petitioner and she appeared before the Court first time on 7-5-2004. The petitioner herein appeared before the trial Court, the matter was fixed on 25-6-2004 and on that day an application under Section 24 of the Hindu Marriage Act was filed on behalf of the petitioner therein and next date was fixed for filing the reply of the application. On 27-7-2004 another adjournment was sought for filing the reply and on that, next date i.e. 24-8-2004 was fixed for filing the reply. On 24-8-2004, the matter was also fixed for reconciliation as provided under Section 23(2) of the Act and on the said date reconciliation proceedings were also taken up, but settlement could not be arrived, therefore, the matter was fixed for 27-8-2004 for arguments on the application under Section 24 of the Hindu Marriage Act. On 27-8-2004, arguments were heard and the application was decided. Simultaneously the time for filing written statement of the petition was also asked for which was declined by the trial Court.

3. I have heard learned counsel for the parties.

4. Learned counsel for the petitioner argued that since beginning the matter was fixed for reply and arguments of the application under Section 24 of the Hindu Marriage Act and the matter was not fixed for filing written statement, therefore, the petitioner was under the impression that the matter is fixed for arguments on the application under Section 24 of the Hindu Marriage Act, therefore, written statement could not be filed. The application was decided on 27-8-2004 and on that day, time was sought and the same was refused, therefore, in the circumstances, the impugned order is contrary to the provisions of the Act. Learned counsel while relying upon the decision of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in the matter of Mithumal and others Vs. Kavita and others argued that in exceptional cases time can be extended.

5. On the other hand, learned counsel for respondent submitted that in no circumstances time beyond 90 days can be extended. Even the Court is not entitled to extend the time, therefore, the impugned order is in consonance with the provisions of Order 8 Rule 1 of the CPC. Learned counsel for respondent relied upon a decision of the Allahabad High Court in the matter of Dr. Nanda Agrawal Vs. Matri Mandir, Varanasi and another and also relied upon a decision of Karnataka High Court in the matter of Smt. Savitha Gupta Vs. Smt. Nagaratha and others.

6. Having heard learned counsel for the parties, I have perused the records and relevant judgments. In this connection, sub-rule (1) of Order 8 of the CPC envisages that the defendant shall, within thirty days from the date of service of summons on him, present a written statement of his defence; provided that where the defendant fails to file the written statement within the said period of thirty days, he shall be allowed to file the same on such other day, as may be specified by the Court, for reasons to be recorded in writing but which shall not be later than ninety days from the date of service of summons. Therefore, plain reading of this provision makes it c