1. Right to life includes right to livelihood, which has illuminatingly been highlighted by Y.V. Chandrachud, CJ, speaking for the Supreme Court, in the matter of Olga Tellis and others v. Bombay Municipal Corporation and others, (1985) 3 SCC 545 in the following manner: -

“... An equally important facet of that right is the right to livelihood because, no person can live without the means of living, that is, the means of livelihood. If the right to livelihood is not treated as a part of the constitutional right to life, the easiest way of depriving a person of his right to life would be to deprive him of his means of livelihood to the point of abrogation. ... Deprive a person of his right to livelihood and you shall have deprived him of his life. ...”

2. The above-stated statement of law applies to the facts of the present case as under: -

(2.1) This petition is mainly directed against the impugned order of the Chhattisgarh Environment Conservation Board, Raipur (as well as the consequential order of the Municipal Corporation, Raipur), by which the slaughter house run by the Municipal Corporation has been directed to be closed.

(2.2) The Municipal Corporation, Raipur has established slaughter house in the year 1962 under the provisions contained in Sections 257 and 258 of the Chhattisgarh Municipal Corporation Act, 1956 at Sanjay Nagar, Tikrapara, Raipur.

3. Mr. Kishore Bhaduri, learned counsel for the petitioner, would submit that the Municipal Corporation, Raipur, had established a slaughter house in the year 1962 and established a place for slaughter of animals for sale and accordingly, distributed license to meat sellers for sale of meat and others and since then, it is being used regularly, but suddenly in May, 2016, the Municipal Corporation has shut down the slaughter house without notice to any member or the petitioner Association and without showing any cause contending that in absence of permission from the Pollution Control Board, the slaughter house cannot be permitted to run and as such, abruptly and suddenly, closure of slaughter house by the respondent Board is in violation of their constitutional right guaranteed under Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution of India. Therefore, the impugned order passed by the respondent No.3 Board deserves to be quashed.

4. Mr. Pankaj Agrawal, learned counsel appearing for the Municipal Corporation, would submit that the Municipal Corporation established such a slaughter house in the year 1962 and no objection is required for continuance of slaughter house as it is duly and regularly maintained, and air pollution and water pollution are being controlled effectively. He would further submit that since it is a residential area, the Board has not granted any consent/permission under the relevant provisions under various Acts regulating water and air pollution, therefore, it has been closed. He would also point out that proposal for renewal has been rejected by order dated 21-7-2015 and alternative place has been selected at Village Sondongri and requisite land has been requisitioned from the Collector, Raipur which is under consideration and for establishment of plant, the expression of interest has already been floated and entire process of establishing will be completed expeditiously.

5. Mr. Arun Sao, learned Deputy Advocate General, on instructions from the Collector, Raipur, would submit that the land as requisitioned by the Municipal Corporation for establishment of setting up of slaughter house will be granted to the Corporation at Village Sondongri within a month from today by giving advance possession.

6. Mr. Sudhir Kumar Bajpai, learned counsel appearing for respondent No.3 – Chhattisgarh Environment Conservation Board, would submit that pursuant to the direction of the Supreme Court in the matter of Laxmi Narain Modi v. Union of India and others, (2014) 2 SCC 417 a State Level Monitoring Committee has been constituted for the purpose as assigned by the Supreme Court and t