The court established the voidness of the marriage and agreement under relevant sections of the Hindu Marriage Act and the Indian Contract Act.

JUDGMENT :

1. Since both the second appeals arise out of a common judgment, they are heard and disposed of together.

2. The instant appeals arise out of the common judgment dated 11.10.2021 passed by 2nd Additional District Judge, Rajnandgaon, whereby the first civil appeal, i.e., Civil Appeal No.13A of 2020 moved by Mahesh Ganjeer has been allowed and the cross-appeal, i.e., Civil Appeal No.12A of 2020 filed by Smt. Manti Sahu has been dismissed. Civil Appeal No.12A of 2020 and Civil Appeal No.13A of 2020 arise out of the common judgment and decree dated 6.3.2019 passed by the Additional Judge to the Court of 1st Civil Judge Class-II, Rajnandgaon in Civil Suit No.66A of 2013.

3. Facts of the case, in short, are that plaintiff Mahesh Ganjeer filed a civil suit, being Civil Suit No.66A of 2013 before the Trial Court for declaration of agreement dated 21.1.2009 to be null and void. It was pleaded by him that due to family relation between him and the defendant and due to poor economic circumstances of the defendant, he employed the defendant in his clinic as a nurse and also availed her a rented house in Dongargaon. Since the defendant used to commit misbehaviour with the patients as also she was negligent towards her work, she was removed from the work and also asked to vacate the rented house. On this issue, a dispute arose between them. Thereafter, the defendant made a false and fabricated report against him alleging commission of rape with her. To save himself and his reputation, he executed an agreement dated 21.1.2009 and signed it before the Notary. Since the agreement was executed due to undue pressure created by the defendant, it is not binding upon him. It was further pleaded that as he is already married, the agreement dated 21.1.2009 is null and void.

4. Defendant Manti Sahu filed her written statement and also filed her cross-objection before the Trial Court. It was pleaded by her that virtually plaintiff Mahesh Ganjeer performed a marriage with her and, therefore, he executed the agreement dated 21.1.2009 in this regard. At the time of marriage and prior to that also, the plaintiff told her that he was unmarried and he performed marriage with her. Later on, she came to know that the plaintiff was already married. When a legal notice was sent by her to the plaintiff, he, admitting performance of marriage with her, executed the agreement dated 21.1.2009. In the agreement, the plaintiff also agreed that he will pay her Rs.2,000 per month towards her maintenance. He also agreed that he will arrange a house and household articles for her or else, in lieu thereof, he will pay her Rs.5,000 per month.

5. The plaintiff filed his written statement to the cross-objection of the defendant and denied her all the allegations.

6. The Trial Court framed four issues. After recording of evidence of both the parties and hearing their arguments, vide judgment dated 6.3.2019, the Trial Court dismissed the suit preferred by Mahesh Ganjeer and partly allowed the cross-objection moved by defendant Manti Sahu and granted Rs.2,000 per month as maintenance in her favour.

7. Being aggrieved by the judgment and decree passed by the Trial Court, both the parties preferred their appeals. Vide the common impugned judgment dated 11.10.2021, the First Appellate Court allowed the appeal of plaintiff Mahesh Ganjeer and dismissed the appeal of defendant Manti Sahu. Hence, the instant second appeals before this Court by defendant Manti Sahu.

8. On 3.3.2022, Second Appeal No.326 of 2021 was admitted for hearing on the following substantial question of law:

“Whether the learned first appellate Court was justified in reversing the finding recorded by the learned trial Court, who has recorded a finding that the plaintiff has failed to prove that the agreement has been executed in violation of Section 23 of the Contract Act?”

On 3.3.2022 itself, Second Appeal No.327 of 2021 was admitted for hearing on the following substantial question of law:

“Whether the l