Back
2026 Supreme(Chh) 13
IN THE HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR
PARTH PRATEEM SAHU, J.
Kesar Yadav W/o Late Shreeram Yadav – Appellant
Versus
The State of Chhattisgarh – Respondent
WPS No. 1936 of 2026
Decided On : 23-02-2026
Important Points
Subject
Employment Law - Termination of Service
Headnote
(B) Writ Jurisdiction - Reasonable period - The court highlighted that an approach to writ jurisdiction must be within a reasonable timeframe to prevent the disruption of the administrative setup. (Paras 6, 12)
Facts of the case:
The petitioner’s service was terminated on allegations of providing forged documents. Despite other similarly situated employees getting relief, the petitioner delayed filing the present writ for over a decade, lacking justification for such delay.
Findings of Court:
The petition was dismissed due to inordinate delay and laches, emphasizing that lengthy silence implies waiver of rights and the necessity for vigilant claimants.
Issues: The main issue was the delay in filing the writ petition and its implications on the petitioner’s right to challenge the termination order.
Ratio Decidendi: The court found that the absence of a reasonable explanation for the inordinate delay warranted dismissal of the claim, adhering to established principles regarding timeliness in legal claims. The petitioner’s eligibility for relief did not justify the substantial delay. (Paras 12, 14)
Result: Petition dismissed.
For the Appellant : Shalvik Tiwari
For the Respondent: Vivek Verma
| Table of Content |
|---|
| 1. petitioner's appointment and subsequent termination. (Para 1 , 2) |
| 2. arguments presented by state and petitioner. (Para 3 , 5) |
| 3. importance of timely approach in writ jurisdiction. (Para 6 , 7) |
| 4. principles of delay and laches in claims. (Para 8 , 10) |
| 5. court's decision based on delay and laches. (Para 12 , 13) |
| 6. final dismissal of the petition. (Para 14) |
ORDER :
1. Petitioner has filed this petition seeking following reliefs:-
“10.1. That, Hon’ble Court may issue an appropriate writ or direction to quash the impugned termination order dated 30/10/2014 (Annexure P/4) passed by Chief Executive Officer, Janpad Panchayat, Dhamdha, District Durg (CG).
10.2. That, Hon’ble Court may direct the respondents to reinstate the petitioner and grant her all consequential benefits.
10.3. The Hon’ble Court may grant any other relief as this Hon’ble Court may deem fit and proper in the nature and circumstances of the present case in the interest of justice”
2. Learned counsel for petitioner submits that petitioner was appointed as Shiksha Karmi Grade-III vide order dated 27.6.2007. Petitioner was regularized in service on 03.10.2011. However, service of petitioner was terminated vide order dated 30.10.2014 on the ground that documents/certificates submitted by him were found to be forged upon verification. He submits that the impugned order has been passed without conducting any enquiry or affording opportunity of hearing to petitioner, hence, termination of petitioner is bad in law. He submits that writ petitions filed by other terminated employees challenging their termination order were allowed, they have been reinstated in service and therefore, petitioner is also entitled to the same benefits.
3. Per contra, learned State Counsel would submit that petitioner was appointed on the basis of documents/ certificates produced by her. However, upon verification, it was found that appointment was secured by the petitioner on the basis of forged documents/certificates, therefore, after providing opportunity of hearing, she was terminated from service. He submits that if an appointment is found to be based on forgery, the authority has right to recall such appointment and hence, the impugned order does not call for any interference. He further submits that termination order was passed in the year 2014 and writ petition is admittedly filed in the year 2026, after an unexplained inordinate delay of about 12 years. Approaching the Court at such a belated stage is clearly impermissible and such a petition is liable to be dismissed on the ground of delay and laches.
4. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the documents available in record of writ petition.
5. From the pleadings of writ petition it is appearing that petitioner was terminated from service way back on 30.10.2014. Present writ petition has been filed on 10.2.2026 i.e. after more than 11 years, to set aside termination order of petitioner. Perusal of Para-3 of writ petition, which relates to ‘delay in filing of writ petition’, would show that no explanation has been offered for not approaching the Court for a period of 11 years, but for mentioning that petitioner has been terminated without inquiry.
6. It has been repeatedly held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court that against an impugned order, if a person wishes to approach the Court invoking writ jurisdiction, he should approach the Court within a reasonable period. The reasonable period cannot be stretch to the extent of more than a decade.
7. In the case of Bhoop Singh v. Union of India , (1992) 3 SCC 136 it was held as under:-
"7. It is expected of a Government servant who has a legitimate claim to approach the Court for the relief he seeks within a reasonable period, assuming no fixed period of limitation applies. This is necessary to avoid dislocating the administrative set-up after it has been functioning on a certain basis for years. During the interregnum those who have been working gain more experience and acquire
