The court upheld the validity of notifications for land acquisition and the invocation of Section 17 (1) and Section 17 (4) of the Act for the planned development of Delhi.

( 1 ) I had the advantage of reading the judgment authored by my esteemed and learned brother Madan B. Lokur wherein the rudiments governing the law of acquisition have been exhaustively dealt with and applied to the facts and circumstances of the present case. It is neither necessary nor even expected of me to refer to the facts and/or the law applicable to the bunch of writ petitions dealt with in the said judgment at any length. Suffices it to say that in paragraph 7 of the judgment, 5 grounds on the basis of which the notifications in question have been challenged are noticed. As far as the first four contentions raised on behalf of the petitioners for impugning the notification are concerned, they have found no favour with the court and were rejected. For the reasons stated in this judgment by my learned brother as well as the reasons recorded by me in the judgment given in w. P. (C) No. 4789/1995, titled as Vasant Kunj Enclave Housing Society and Ors. vs. Union of India and Ors. , I would respectively concur with the view taken and without any reservation reject these contentions raised on behalf of the petitioners.

( 2 ) IN relation to ground no. 5, with great hesitance, I beg to differ with the view taken by my brother, that too to a limited extent.

( 3 ) GROUND No. 5, as noticed in the judgment reads as under:- there was no reason for invoking the provisions of Section 17 (1) and Section 17 (4) of the Act in respect of the acquisition of 1337 bighas and 04 biswas of land thereby denying to the Petitioners a valuable right of filing objections under Section 5-A of the Act followed by a hearing that was required to be given. Alternatively, even if there was some urgency and the respondents rightly invoked Section 17 (1) of the Act, there was no application of mind at all to the provisions of Section 17 (4) of the Act, which enabled the Respondents to dispense with the provisions of Section 5-A of the act. In view of the decisions of this Court, which were upheld by the Supreme Court, there should have been a specific application of mind by the Lt. Governor to the provisions of 17 (4) of the Act.

( 4 ) THERE cannot be any dispute that the provisions of Section 17 (1) of the act were invoked by the authorities concerned, after due application of mind. The supreme Court as well as this Court has repeatedly held that planned Development of delhi , particularly in relation to residential colonies or staff quarters would be an emergent public purpose . The principle enunciated by the Supreme Court in Aflatoon and Ors. vs. Lt. Governor of Delhi and ors. 9 (1998) 6 SCC 1, has been followed with approval by the Supreme Court in its subsequent decisions. Furthermore, this Court has expressed a definite view that planned Development of Delhi would be a public purpose for which the provisions of Section 17 (1) could be invoked. In fact, in the case of Bhagat Singh vs. State of u. P. and Ors. (1999) 2 SCC 384 and all other controversies related thereto were put to an end and the petitioners can hardly challenge the notification under Section 4 and 17 (1) of the Act, particularly in the facts and circumstances of the present cases.

( 5 ) THE Lt. Governor of Delhi had duly and effectively applied his mind for invoking the provisions of Section 17 (4) of the Act, which of course, was subsequent to the issuance of the notification under Section 4 of the Act, but prior to the declaration made under Section 6 of the Act by the competent authorities. The provisions of the Land Acquisition Act empowers the competent authorities to issue direction/order under Section 17 (4) of the Act, even subsequent to the notification under Section 4. In the present cases, the parties were put at notice by issuance of the notification under Section 4, itself, that the Government intends to invoke the provisions of Section 17 (1) as well as 17 (4) of the Act. Whatever lacuna remained was duly provided for and there was due applicati