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1998 Supreme(SC) 1209

1998(9) Supreme 361
Supreme Court of India
(From Allahabad High Court)
S.B. Majmudar and M. Jagannadha Rao, JJ.
Bhagat Singh etc. -Appellants
versus
State of U.P. & Ors. -Respondents
Civil Appeal No. 6226 of 1998
(@ SLP (C) No. 14512 of 1997)
With
Civil Appeal No. 6227 of 1998
(@ SLP (C) No. 14513 of 1997)
With
Civil Appeal No. 6228 of 1998
(@ SLP (C) No. 14848 of 1997)
With
Civil Appeal No. 6229-6230 of 1998
(@ SLP (C) Nos. 14921-14922 of 1997)
With
Civil Appeal Nos. 6231-6235 of 1998
(@ SLP (C) Nos. 17203-17207 of 1997)
Decided on 8-12-1998
Counsel for the Parties :
For the Appearing Parties : Raju Ramchandran and O.P. Rana, Sr. Advo­cates, R.K. Khanna, Surya Kant, A.D. Vaishnav, Vinay Kumar Garg, Pradeep Misra, T. Mahipal and Ms. Niti Dikshit, Advocates.

Important Points
1. Where existing market yard is in congested area without any scope for expansion and land is acquired to establish market yard, invoca­tion of provisions of Section 17(4) and dispensing with enquiry pro­ceedings under Section 5A could not be found fault with.
2. Delay between 4(1) notification and Section 6 declaration cannot vitiate subjective satisfaction arrived at when orders dispensing with Section 5A inquiry was passed earlier.
3. Acquisition cannot be invalidated merely because the land proposed to be acquired is for a purpose other than the one permitted by the Master Plan or Zonal Plan applicable to the locality.

Headnote:(i) Land Acquisition Act, 1894 -Sections 5A and 17(4)-Hearing of objec­tions-Dispensing with of-Justification for-Land acquired for market yard-Existing market yard situated in congested locality-No scope for expansion-Devoid of any amenities-Provision for formers not possible-Subjective satisfaction for dispensing with inquiry u/s 5A based on sufficient material-Cannot be faulted with-Later delay between Section 4(1) notification and Section 6 declaration cannot have any great impact on subjective satisfaction arrived at earlier.

       Held : On the question of urgency, the following facts and contentions emerge from the Counter affidavits. The establishment of a Market Yard is not merely one of mere urgency but one which makes it necessary to dispense with inquiry under Section 5-A. The existing market yard is situated in a very congested locality having no scope for expansion and the place where the Market is now located is not sufficient to cater to the growing needs of its constituents. There is no adequate space for free movement and parking of trucks/bullock carts etc. nor for providing necessary shelter for those who come to the market. The existing market is also devoid of any amenities necessary for hundreds of people who visit the market every day or for the bullocks which are being used to draw the carts. During rainy season it becomes well-high impossible to find out suitable shelters for the farmers and producers of vegetables. It has become necessary to provide amenities and also construct roads in a planned manner. In our view, the subjective satisfaction for dispensing with inquiry under Section 5-A is based on sufficient material and cannot be faulted. The photographs as to the filthy state of the present Mandi with garbage and stray cattle and pigs show that the place is so loathsome that it will be precarious and perhaps hazardous to store vegetables or foodgrains in the existing market. We are, therefore, of the view that the urgency clause was rightly invoked by the govern­ment. When in such circumstances market yards are proposed to be established, it is, in our view, permissible to invoke the provisions of Section 17(4) and dispense with Section 5-A inquiry. (Paras 9, 10 & 12)

       That there was a delay of full one year between the Section 4(1) notification and Section 6 declara­tion and this showed the lethargy of the Government and this would reveal that Government would not have lost anything if only a hearing under Section 5-A was given to the owners so that they could place their grievances before the Government. In this connection, we may state that the respondents have explained the delay as having been caused inasmuch as of various steps were required to be taken to finalise the proceedings. It was necessary to issue newspaper publications and also make local publication of the substance of the Section 4(1) notification. There was also delay on account of following other administrative procedures. In view of the above expla­nation We are not prepared to hold that the latter delay between Section 4(1) notification and Section 6 declaration has any great impact on the subjective satisfaction arrived at when orders dispens­ing with the Section 5-A inquiry were passed earlier. (Para 17)

       (ii) Land Acquisition Act, 1894 -Sections 4 and 6 - Land earmarked for one purpose in Master Plan-Acquisition for a different purpose - Permissi­bility of-Acqui­sition will be valid if it is for a public purpose even if it is not for the type of user permitted by Master Plan or Zonal Plan.

       Held : There is no need that the land proposed to be acquired by the Government for a particular public purpose should be for the same purpose or use mentioned in the Master Plan or Zonal Plan for the said area. Nor will the acquisition be invalid merely because the land proposed to be acquired is for a purpose other than the one permitted by the Master Plan or Zonal Plan applicable to that locality. Acquisition will be valid if it is for a public purpose even if it is not for the type of user permitted by the Master Plan or Zonal Plan in force at the time the acquisition is made. It will be for the beneficiary of the acquisition to move the competent authority under the Development Act and obtain the sanction of the said authority for suitable modification of the Master Plan so as to permit the use of the land for the public purpose for which the land is acquired. In fact, it may be difficult for the beneficiary of the acquisition to move the competent authority under the Development Act seeking permission to change of land use even before the land is acquired or before possession is given to the beneficiary. On the principle stated in Aflatoon’s case, it is clear that acquisition for a public purpose and obtaining permission from competent authority under the concerned Development Act for change of land use are differ­ent from one another and the former is not dependent upon the latter. (Para 22)

       

Judgment

M. Jagannadha Rao, J.-Leave granted.

2. The appeals all arise out of the common judgment of the Allahabad High Court dated 24.4.1997. By that judgment, the writ petitions filed by the appellants questioning the validity of land acquisition pro­ceedings were all dismissed.

3. The following are the facts common to all the matters. On 25.9.1991, the District Magistrate, Agra sent proposals to the U.P. Government for acquisition of 10.175 hectares of land in village Bainpur, U.P. for construction of a market yard for fruits and vegeta­bles. Various plots of land were included in the notification. The Section 4(1) notification was issued under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinunder called the Act) on 5.10.1993 for acquisition of 7.334 hectares. The notification stated that the provisions of Section 5-A were being dispensed with in view of the urgency of the matter and this was being done in exercise of powers under Section 17(4) of the Act. The notification insofar as it related to urgency, and dispensing with Section 5-A inquiry read as follows:

“Being of the opinion that the provisions of sub-section (1) of Sec­tion 17 of the said Act are applicable to the said land inasmuch as the said land is urgently required for the construction of Fruits and Vegetables Market Yard in District Agra and that in view of the pressing urgency it is as well necessary to eliminate delay likely to be caused by an inquiry under Section 5-A of the said Act, the Government is further pleased to direct under sub-section (4) of Section 17 of the said Act, that the provisions of Section 5-A of the Act shall not apply.

For what purpose Required-For the construction of Fruits and Vegeta­bles Market Yard in District Agra.

Note-A: Site plan of the land may be inspected in the office of the Collector, Agra.”

4. Thereafter, Section 6 declaration was issued on 6.10.94 acquiring the land for the above market yard under a planned development scheme and the notification directed the Collector to take possession of the land in 15 days under Section 9(1) of the Act.

5. It was this acquisition that was questioned in the batch of writ petitions in the High Court. The writ petitions raised two general issues, namely, that there was no such urgency which required dispens­ing with the inquiry under Section 5-A of the Act and that, that the land of the petitioners which was sought to be acquired was marked in the Master Plan for Agra for the use of ‘light industries’ and later as ‘green belt’ and it was therefore not permissible to acquire the same for locating the Fruits and Vegetables Market Yard for that would amount to violating the Master Plan. Some special points were raised in some of the writ petitions.

6. The High Court of Allahabad, in an elaborate Judgment rejected the above contentions and referred to the reasons given by the respondents in their respective Counter affidavits as sufficient for dispensing with the Section 5-A inquiry. The High Court also held, following rulings of this Court and of the Allahabad High Court that even if the user for a market yard was not one of the permissible uses of the land as per the Master Plan, still once the land was acquired, the Market Committee could take steps to have the Master Plan suitably amend­ed. The High Court also rejected the special points raised in some of the writ petitions.

7. In these appeals we have heard the arguments of Shri Raju Ramachan­dran, learned senior counsel appearing in the Civil Appeals arising out of SLPs 14921-22 of 1997, Sri R.K. Khanna in appeals arising out of SLPs 14512/97, 14513/97 and 14848 of 1997 and Mr. Vinay Kumar Garg in the appeals arising out of SLPs 17203-17207 of 1997 and in Contempt Petition No. 381 of 1998. For the respondents, the Mandi Market was represented by Senior Advocate Shri O.P. Rana and the State of U.P. was represented by Ms. Niti Dikshit.

8. Learned counsel for the appellant Shri Raju Ramachandran urged that there was no such urgency as required dispensing



































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