SANJAY KISHAN KAUL, J.

( 1 ) THE petitioner was awarded the contract by the respondent-DDA for construction of 168 houses of mig category, pocket A-13, Kalkaji Extension, New Delhi in pursuance to agreement no. I/hd/xxi/a/81-82. Disputes arose between the parties and in view of clause 25 of the terms and conditions of the agreement, providing for settlement of disputes by arbitration. Sh. A P Paracer was appointed sole arbitrator by the appointing authority being the engineer-member DDA vide a letter dated 22. 04. 1987. The counter claims were also referred for adjudication vide a letter dated 10. 10. 1988. The arbitrator made and published the award dated 24. 06. 1989. The respondent-DDA aggrieved by the same has filed the present objections.

( 2 ) IT has to be kept in mind that while scrutinising the objections u/s 30 and 33 of the Act, it is not the function of this court to sit as a court of appeal against an original decree. This court is not to re-appreciate the evidence and an award would not call for interference on the ground that this court may come to a different conclusion than what has arrived at by the arbitrator on the basis of material placed before him. It is only when the findings are perverse or there is misconduct in law or there is personal misconduct of the arbitrator, would this court be called upon to interfere with the same. In this behalf a judgment of the Division bench in DDA v. Bhagat Construction Co. (P)Ltd. and anr. ,2004 (3) Arb. LR 481 and of the apex court in Food corporation of India v. Joginderpal Mohinderpal and Anr. , (1989) 2 SCC 347 and Gujarat Water Supply and Sewerage Board v. Unique Erectors (Gujarat) (P) Ltd. and Anr. , AIR 1989 SC 973 may be referred.

( 3 ) IN view of the aforesaid principle, learned counsel for the respondent fairly stated that some of the claims would actually require re-appraisal of evidence. This is not permissible within the scope of section 30 and 33 of the Act. In this behalf claims no. 1 and 2 may be referred which relate to refund of rebate for regular monthly payment. It is only when the payments have been made within the time can the respondent be entitled to the rebate. A similar position is also there in case of claim no. 3 regarding over weight of steel which is based on appraisal of evidence.

( 4 ) CLAIM no 4 arises from the price escalation clause 10-C. It is not in dispute that the amount under this clause would be payable on account of statutory increase if during the progress of the work the price of any material incorporated in the work and of wages of labour increase more than ten per cent. The grievance of the respondent is that the arbitrator has erroneously relied upon the CPWD cost index which does not amount to a statutory increase. It is thus contended that the cost escalation made on the basis of the CPWD cost index could not form the basis of awarding an amount under clause 10-C of the conditions of the contract.

( 5 ) A reading of the award shows that these cpwd tabulations were contested on the ground that they were not binding on the respondent-authority and further the CPWD rates of escalation do not reveal the basis on which the escalation has been worked out. The arbitrator found that the building cost index circulated by the cpwd is rightly recognized method of working out the cost escalation and the respondent had given no convincing reason why this methodology should not be adopted for purposes of objection under clause 10-C. I find no infirmity in the approach of the arbitrator. The CPWD rates are not private rates but are rates of escalation of statutory authorities which have been relied upon for purposes of arriving at the escalation figure. It is not as if the respondent has produced some other material to come to the conclusion that a different figure of escalation should have been awarded under clause 10-C. I thus find no merit in the objections.

( 6 ) THERE is a serious contest about the award of claim no. 5 on account o

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