The central legal point established in the judgment is the interpretation of the term 'accident' in the context of murder and its applicability to compensation claims under the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923.

( 1 ) THIS case brings into light the twin tragedies suffered by Respondent Nos. 1 and 2. The first tragedy was the murder of their son, the driver of a truck, on 28th January 1993; the second tragedy is the gross delay that has occurred in settling their claim for compensation under the provisions of the Workmen s Compensation Act, 1923 (for short the Act ). Nothing can be done to mitigate the first, but surely some thought needs to be given to speed up the disposal of cases involving compensation for death.

( 2 ) THE Appellant, an insurance company, seeks to find fault with an order dated 15th May 2001 passed by the Commissioner under the Act awarding compensation to the parents of the deceased, Sohan Lal Verma.

( 3 ) SOHAN Lal was working as a driver with M/s Manoj Roadlines. As a part of his duties, he was taking a truck from Delhi to Hyderabad alongwith a second driver Jeet Singh. It appears that somewhere in Rajasthan, he was murdered. The truck was missing for a few days and when the police located it during investigations, it was revealed that some of the goods that were being transported in the truck were stolen. Investigations also revealed that Jeet Singh had committed the murder.

( 4 ) RESPONDENT Nos. 1 and 2 filed a claim for compensation before the Commissioner in Rajasthan but on their request the application was later transferred to Delhi. The owner of the truck (Manoj Roadlines) raised an objection that even though the truck was insured with the Appellant, it was not made a party to the proceedings. Accordingly, the claimants moved an application and the Appellant was impleaded as one of the Respondents to the claim and an amended memo of parties was filed on 28th December 1995. The Appellant did not deny that the truck was insured with it, or that it was a necessary party to the proceedings.

( 5 ) ON these broad facts, the Commissioner framed the following issues:-

"1. Whether the suit is maintainable in view of preliminary objections? 2. Whether the accident occurred out of and in the course of employment? 3. Amount of compensation payable? 4. Any other relief. "

( 6 ) THE facts of the case are not disputed by anybody, but there are two contentions raised by learned counsel for the Appellant. It is firstly contended that because the deceased was murdered, the Appellant has no liability to pay any compensation, the argument being that the death was not an accident. The second contention of learned counsel is that the Appellant is not liable to pay any interest on the compensation awarded, assuming that compensation is due and payable to the parents of the deceased. The amount of compensation is itself not in dispute.

( 7 ) WHAT is an accident, and when can it be said that a murder is an accident?

( 8 ) NISBET v. Rayne and Burn, [1910] 2 KBD 689 is a leading case on this subject. A cashier was traveling in a train with a large sum of money intended for payment to his employer s workmen. He was robbed and murdered and the Court of Appeal held the murder was an accident from the point of view of the cashier and, therefore, it was an accident within the meaning of that term in the Workmen s Compensation Act, 1906.

( 9 ) SIMILARLY, in Board of Management of Trim Joint District School v. Kelly, [1914] A. C. 667, an assistant master at an industrial school was assaulted and killed by two pupils while he was performing his duties. The House of Lords held that for the purpose of the same statute, his death was caused by an accident. Viscount Haldane, L. C. pointed out that the meaning of the term "accident" would vary according as the context varies, and as instances mentioned criminal jurisprudence where crime and accident are sharply divided by the presence or absence of mens rea and the law of marine insurance where the maxim: In jure non remota cause sed proxima spectatur (In law the proximate, and not the remote, cause is to be regarded) applies.

( 10 ) IN Clover, Clayton and Co. , Ltd. v. Hughes,