2004 Supreme(Del) 542
High Court Of Delhi
ENGINEERING PROJECTS (INDIA) LIMITED. - Appellant
Versus
GREATER NOIDA INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT - Respondent
O.M.P. 221 of 2004
Decided On : 07/29/2004
C.M.CHOPRA
Headnote:Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1966 - Section 9-Territorial Jurisdiction of Court to entertain the application -Relief of injunction sought against encashment of bank guarantee — Dispute arising out of contract to be executed at Greater Noida — Some part of cause of action arose in New Delhi — Cause of Action wholly arose in Noida in the State of U.P. — Some litigation also pending in the Courts of U.P. — Held that the petitioner should approach the Court having territorial jurisdiction over the matter.
( 1 ) THE question that arises in the present case is whether this Court should exercise territorial jurisdiction in respect of the present application under Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. The facts in brief, as per the narration in the Petition, are that the Petitioner has its Registered and Head Office at New Delhi with Regional and Branch Offices in many other parts of India. The Greater Noida Industrial Development Authority (G. Noida in brief) engaged the Petitioner for the construction of 60 M wide road in Greater Noida, at the contract value of Rs. 5. 37 crores. For reasons that need not be dilated in detail, including an increase in the price of store ballast, the Petitioner had sought a Revision of rates, which was not acceded to. Consequently, a demand for the appointment of an Arbitrator was made by the Petitioner. Certain Fixed Deposits Receipts (FDRs) are stated to have been encashed in the interregnum. Pursuant to their Agreement, the Petitioner has furnished a Bank Guarantee of Syndicate Bank, New Delhi in regard to which it apprehended an invocation by G. NOIDA. An injunction has accordingly been prayed for.
( 2 ) ON the first date of hearing I had disclosed to learned counsel for the Petitioner my opinion that this Court ought not to exercise territorial jurisdiction since the substantial part of the cause of action had arisen in Greater Noida, where the subject matter of the contract was to be performed and where the contesting Defendant had its concerned office. The matter has been extensively argued on 12th July, 2004, 22nd July, 2004, 26th July, 2004 and 27th July, 2004.
( 3 ) MS. CHOPRA, learned counsel for the Petitioner has relied on M/s Matanhella Brothers and others Versus M/s Shri Mahabir Industries Pvt. Ltd. , AIR 1970 PATNA 91 for the proposition that the communication of a breach of the contract or its cancellation would be indicative of the arising of a part of a cause of action. M/s Gulati Construction Co. , Jhansi Versus Betwa River Board and another, AIR 1984 DELHI 299 has been referred to for the purposes of overcoming the term in the Arbitration Clause reposing the power of an appointment of an Arbitrator. Reliance has also been placed on State of Maharashtra and others Versus M/s. Ranjeet Construction, AIR 1986 BOMBAY 76; Vindhya Telelinks Ltd. Versus Mahanagar Telephones Nigam Limited and Anr. , 2002 II AD (DELHI) 778; Jagson Airlines Ltd. and Anr. Versus Bannari Amman Exports (P) Ltd. and Anr. , 2003 (62) DRJ 490; Larson and Toubro Ltd. Versus Maharashtra State Electricity Board and Others, (1995) 6 SCC 68 and M/s Mowmore Pvt. Ltd. Versus National Thermal Power Corporation Ltd. and Anr. , 1995 (1) ALR (DELHI) 88.
( 4 ) THERE is no quarrel with the proposition articulated in these decisions and I shall assume for the present that a part of the cause of action has arisen in New Delhi. However, in my view this is of no avail to the Petitioner since the fundamental inquiry is now to be directed towards determining the place where the substantial or predominant part of the cause of action has arisen. My observation in Cement Corporationof India Versus M/s. S. Sultan and Another, bearing Suit No. 2357-A/1997 is not in context for the reason that I had to consider in that case the legality and legitimacy of the ouster/restrictive Clause reserving jurisdiction to Courts in New Delhi. There can be no gainsaying today that parties cannot agree to have disputes adjudicated at a place which does not otherwise enjoy jurisdiction.
( 5 ) ASSUMING for the sake of arguments that a part of the cause of action has arisen in New Delhi, I am still of the considered opinion that this Court should abjure from exercising jurisdiction since there are other Courts which are better suited to entertain the disputes that have been raised in this Petition (see Mrs. Gupta Sanitary Stores Versus Union of India and another, AIR 1985 Delhi 122 ). The decision of the M/s. Patel