PRADEEP NANDRAJOG, J.

( 1 ) SHOULD this court, exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, bring to an end the disciplinary proceedings at the threshold by quashing the charge-sheet? This is the issue which squarely arises for my consideration in the present writ petition and the connected batch.

( 2 ) BEFORE I set out the sequence of the essential facts with consequences, culminating in the filing of the writ petition, it would be appropriate we have a birds eye view of the legal position.

( 3 ) IN the judgment reported AIR 1990 SCC 1308 State of Madhya Pradesh Vs. Bani Singh in Para 4 the Hon ble Supreme Court held as under:-

"the appeal against the order dt. 16-12-1987 has been filed on the ground that the Tribunal should not have quashed the proceedings merely on the ground of delay and laches and should have allowed the enquiry to go on to decide the matter on merits. We are unable to agree with this contention of the learned Counsel. The irregularities which were the subject-matter of the enquiry is said to have taken place between the years 1975-1977. It is not the case of the department that they were not aware of the said irregularities, if any, and came to know it only in 1987. According to them even in April,1977 there was doubt about the involvement of the officer in the said irregularities and the investigations were going on since then. If that is so, it is unreasonable to think that they would have taken more than 12 years to initiate the disciplinary proceedings as stated by the Tribunal. There is no satisfactory explanation for the inordinate delay in issuing the charge memo and we are also of the view that it will be unfair to permit the departmental enquiry to be proceeded with at this stage. In any case there are no grounds to interfere with the Tribunal s orders and accordingly we dismissed the appeal. "

( 4 ) IN (1994) 2 SCC 746, Registrar of Co-operative Societies Madras Vs. F. X. Fernando, it was noted that the respondent had functioned as Joint Registrar since 1984. Complaints were received. The Vigilance and Anti-Corruption Department was requested to complete the enquiry on or before December 31, 1987. No progress was made. Report was filed towards end of 1988. On 20. 12. 1988 decision was taken to take disciplinary action against the respondent. Charge memo was issued on 20. 3. 1989. Enquiry officer was appointed. Respondent appeared and participated in the inquiry. On 20. 3. 1990, respondent made complaint that enquiry officer was biased. Complaint was rejected. Another complaint was made to same effect. It too was rejected on 8. 5. 1990. Respondent was directed to appear before the enquiry officer. The order dated 8. 5. 1990 was challenged before Tamil Nadu Administrative Tribunal on the ground that the Registrar Co-operative Societies was not competent to even issue the charge sheet. Respondent succeeded. Matter reached by way of appeal before the Hon ble Supreme Court. Order of the Administrative Tribunal was set aside. Argument was raised that due to delay in initiation of proceedings, they be not revived. It was rejected on the ground that the department cannot be faulted. The department was always prompt. Inaction which caused delay was that of the Vigilance and Anti Corruption. This judgment would, therefore, be an authority on the point that if the delay is not attributable to the department and has been occasioned due to external factors, the enquiry must go on. On facts, I may note that between the date of the alleged offence and issuance of charge memo, time lag was 5 years.

( 5 ) IN the judgment reported as (1995) 2 SCC 570, State of Punjab Vs. Chaman Lal Goyal, Hon ble Supreme Court, considering the issue as to what was the effect of delay vis-a-vis the disciplinary proceedings held:-

"now remains the question of delay. There is undoubtedly a delay of five and a half years in serving the charges. The question is whether the said delay warranted the quashing of

Click Here to Read the rest of this document