2003 Supreme(Del) 537

High Court Of Delhi
GLITTER BUILDCON PRIVATE LIMITED - Appellant
Versus
SANJAY GROVER - Respondent
I.T.A. 2578 of 2002
Decided On : 05/30/2003

Headnote:Civil Procedure Code, 1908 - Order 39 Rule 1, 2, 4 — Interim injunction — Suit for specific performance of agreement to sell tenanted premises — Property alleged agreed to be sold to plaintiff by late grandmother S of defendants — Agreement containing signature of S as witness, quite unusual — Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) stated to be signed by S and her son B — In the meantime S executing Will and gift deed in favor of one of the defendants — Signatures on MOU and Will not similar — Genuineness of documents doubtful — No prima facie case in favor of plaintiff — Balance of convenience also in favor of defendant — Ex parte ad interim injunction vacated.

       Held:

       As a witness is indeed significant and for this reason I compared them with those available on the registered Will dated 6.7.1998, which also appears to contain the signatures of Defendant No. 2. The signatures on the MoU are not similar to those on the Will, thereby casting further doubt on the genuineness of this document. They are also dissimilar to those appearing on the Agreement to Sell dated 22.5.1999, which document has been filed by the Plaintiff.

       What Section 20 of the Specific Relief Act enunciates is that when the equitable relief of the specific performance of an Agreement to Sell is asked for, this prayer is not to be declined merely because the Court is of the opinion that the market price was more than what was agreed upon by the parties. This is in a situation where the Agreement to Sell stands admitted. But this does not preclude the Court from keeping the sale consideration in its perspective when it has to determine the genuineness of an agreement or a document. There is appreciably a vast difference between the two situations. Where one party disputes the genuineness of an Agreement to Sell relied upon by the Plaintiff, the fact that the sale consideration mentioned therein is absurdly low may indicate that the document itself is fabricated. The Court, thereforee, may decline to take the agreement into consideration not because the consideration is inadequate, but because the document/Deed relied upon does not inspire confidence and acceptance by the Court. By no stretch of imagination can the sale consideration relied upon by the Plaintiff reflect any proximity with the market price, even after giving due weightage to the payment of conversion charges by the Plaintiff. Ironically, the Plaintiff has filed a photocopy of the aforementioned Agreement for Sale dated 22.5.1999 accompanying an Affidavit of a Director of the Plaintiff Company. This document dated 22.5.1999 mentions the sale consideration as Rs. 3,75,00,000/-. It also contains signatures purported to be that of Shri B.D. Singh and a comparison with the signatures on the MoU, relied upon by the Plaintiff, prima facie, discloses vast differences. This document also shows similarity in the signatures of Defendant No. 2 with those on the Will dated 31,1.1995. The fact that the annual rental of the said property is almost twice that of the sale consideration in the MoU and the Agreement to Sell makes the sale consideration not just "inadequate", but absurd. This is sufficient reason for coming to the prima facie conclusion that the MoU and the Agreement to Sell etc. cannot be given credence to. The fact that the MoU contains the signatures of Late Sita Singh on cuttings/insertions is not of unsurmountable significance. So far as the Agreement for Sale dated 10.4.1999 filed by the Plaintiff is concerned, I find it wholly unacceptable that Late Sita Singh, the undisputed owner of the suit property, should sign as a witness and not as the first party. Barely two months had elapsed between the execution of the MoU and this document and I, thereforee, cannot accept the Plaintiffs version that she signed as a witness, whilst Defendant No. 1 signed on her behalf, in order to avoid the need for her to make several signatures. The argument of learned counsel for the Plaintiff in respect of the MoU renders the argument in respect of the Agreement to Sell as mutually contradictory. It lends acceptability to the argument that blank papers containing signatures of Late Sita Singh may have been misused by the Plaintiff and Defendant Nos. 1 and 2 in conspiracy with each other. It also appears to me to be a convenient coincidence that the purported signatures of Shri B.D. Singh are on the MoU since he is now not available to elucidate. Reliance has also been placed on the Receipts signed by Late Sita Singh. Keeping in view the suspicious characteristics of the documents mentioned above, I am not persuaded that these are genuine documents.

       So far as documents of Defendants are concerned, there is a consistency in the bequests made by Late Sri Singh in her Wills dated 31.1.1995 and 6.7.1998 in respect of the suit property, which has been left to Defendants No. 3 and 4. I cannot ignore the existence of the registered Gift Deed on which stamp duty of Rs. 35,00,000/-has been paid. There may be some technical irregularities in the fact that the Deed of Gift has not been typed on the stamp paper itself, which are over 100 sheets in number, but this would not convince me not to give effect to it. It would mean that but a few Words would have to be typed on each page. Keeping the astronomical increase in prices of property in perspective, larger denomination papers should be made available in the Treasury. The Deed of Gift whereby the other property in West End was settled in Trust for Defendant No. 2 and her son are similarly typed.

       The Plaintiff has failed to disclose the existence of a prima facie case in their favor. The documents relied upon by them are of suspicious nature. The documents filed on behalf of Defendants No. 3 and 4 are contemporaneously registered documents and show a continuity and consistency which is compelling. It is not that Late Sita Singh had disinherited Defendant No. 2. Instead, she has created a security/trust to provide for her future. It also appears, prima facie, that Late Sita Singh harboured suspicion against Defendant No. 2 and her husband, Defendant No. 1 and it is unacceptable that she would have executed a General Power of Attorney in favor of Defendant No. 1. All these facts cannot be ignored. I do not expect the Plaintiff to conclusively prove its case at this stage of the proceedings, as laid down in Tek Chands case (supra). However the preponderant case has, in my thinking, prima facie been established by Defendant Nos. 3 and 4, and not by the Plaintiff.

       Apart from the absence of a prima fade case, the balance of convenience is also not in favor of the Plaintiff. The possibility of creation of third party rights, which would obviously be subservient to those of the Plaintiff in the event of its succeeding in the present suit, are not so significant as to annihilate and override the rights of the owners of the suit property, i.e., Defendants No. 3 and 4.

       The ex-parte ad interim injunction passed is recalled.