The modification of a legislative order, such as an exemption notification, can be in public interest and not subject to constitutional or legal challenge. The judiciary has a limited role in matters of tax levies and must presume legislative decisions to be in the interest of the general public.

( 1 ). In these aforesaid petitions, common questions of law arise and we deem it appropriate to dispose of these petitions by a common judgment.

( 2 ). The petitioners have challenged the legality and constitutionality of Notification No. 205 dated 16. 10. 1980 issued by the respondents purporting to nullify or supercede the earlier notification dated 15-3. 1979 by virtue of which Polyvinyl Chloride resin (PVC) was exempted from the whole of the customs duty leviable on import into India and the said notification was in force till 31. 8. 1979. The said exemption was extended from 31. 8. 1979 to 31. 8. 1980 and thereafter again extended upto 31. 3. 1981 by another Notification No. 37 of 25. 3. 1980.

( 3 ). In the writ petitions it is prayed that imposition of the said duty is without the authority of law and such levy is violative of the petitioners rights as conferred under Article 19 (1) (g), 301 and 301a of the Constitution. It is mentioned in these petitions that imposition of the Customs Duty is violative of the petitioners rights under article 19 (1) (g) of the Constitution. It is also mentioned that the public interest which had prompted the respondents to pass an exemption cannot acquire an altogether contrary dimension in the absence of any new, compelling and/or supervening circumstances.

( 4 ). The petitioners also submitted that the respondents have given assurances and promises to the petitioners and they had acted upon the same. The respondents cannot be permitted to take a total somersault. It is also submitted that the respondents are estopped under the principles of promissory estoppel. It is prayed that the respondents be directed to withdraw the notification imposing the customs duty.

( 5 ). The question regarding the levy of customs duty on pvc resin was examined with minute details and depth by a Division Bench judgment of this court reported as Jain Shudh Vanaspati Ltd and Another vs. Union of India and others (1983 E. L. T. 1688 (Delhi), The Division Bench observed that the PVC resin is classified under Chapter 39 of the 1st schedule to Customs Tariff Act,1975. It falls under heading No. 39. 01/0. 6 and the rate of duty indicated therein is 100%. However, in exercise of powers Section 25 (1) of the Customs Act, Central government had issued a notification dated 15. 3. 1979 exempting the PVC resin when imported into India, from the whole of the duty of customs leviable thereon which is specified in the First schedule. The notification was stated to remain in force upto and inclusive of 31. 3. 1981. On 16. 10. 1980 another notification was issued under sub-section (1) of Section 25 of the Customs Act in supersession of the earlier notification of 15. 3. 1979 which exempted PVC resin from the customs duty. The Division Bench while deciding the writ "petition filed by Jain Shudh Vanaspati examined the plea of promissory estoppel. The plea of promissory estoppel was earlier examined by a division Bench of our Court in M/s. Super Traders vs. Union of India (1983) ELT 258 ). In Super traders (supra) this Court observed as under :-

"in the matter of import and export no party can claim any vested right to compel the Government or the legislature to refrain from making any changes during the financial year. This is because the position of foreign exchange varies so much and the requirement and the considerations of national economy are so urgent that it would be trespassing on the legislative and administrative field if courts were to hold that a rate of duty or tax was immutable for any particular period. "

( 6 ). The question of public interest in issuing the same notification was also examined in the case of Jain shudh Vanaspati (supra ). The Court observed that an order under Section 25 (1) of the Customs Act is legislative in character and there can be no estoppel against the statute. If that be so, how can the Court be asked to examine the question of public interest. The argument of lack of