2002 Supreme(Del) 1095
High Court Of Delhi
RAJ SUDHA TOWERS - Appellant
Versus
MUNICIPAL CORPORATION OF DELHI - Respondent
Decided On : 08/07/2002
Headnote:a) The case dealt with the definition of owner under Section 2(37), 116 (2), 487(2), 119, 120, 122, 126 and 128(4) of the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957 – It was ruled that the person having the right over the property that may be used as per his wish except as restricted by law or agreement, would be termed as owner b) In the instant case that dealt with liability over property tax under Section 116, 120 and 122 of the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957, it was ruled that non-availability of essential services would not be a ground for refusal to pay the property tax under Section 41(h) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 c) The case debated on whether the property tax could be levied on any vacant land – It was ruled that the property tax could be levied on any vacant land or in the land where building was in the process of being erected or had been erected – Accordingly, the plea that there could be no levy of vacant land by the authorities, was without any merit under by virtue of Section 41(h) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 d) In the present case, the plaintiff had purchased two plots in open auction from the President of India and the perpetual lease deed was executed by the Union of India in favor of the plaintiff – The plaintiff had claimed exemption from tax on the ground that the properties were owned by the Union of India – It was ruled that Section 119 of the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957 would not be applicable to the properties in question in respect of which a perpetual lease deed was executed e) The case debated on whether the plaintiff was liable to pay both vacant land tax and the property tax – In the present case, a flat was transferred to the owner but no notice was given to the commissioner intimating the said transfer – The plaintiff after construction of building in the lease hold land, transferred some of the plaintiff to the commissioner – On the question as to liability to pay tax, it was ruled that the plaintiff would be liable to pay both vacant land tax and also the property tax under Section 41 (h) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963
( 1 ) THE present suit is filed by the plaintiff against the defendant praying for a decree of permanent injunction restraining the defendant from in any manner recovering any property tax from the plaintiff in respect of the buildings raised on the suit property or on any other rateable value and also to pass a decree of mandatory injunction directing the defendant to withdraw the warrant of attachment dated 22nd october, 1988, in respect of the suit property, namely buildings Nos. 29 and 30, Community Centre, wazirpur Industrial Area, New Delhi.
( 2 ) THE case of the plaintiff as pleaded in the plaint is that the plaintiff purchased the aforesaid two plots bearing No. 29 and 30, Community centre, Wazirpur Industrial Area, New Delhi, from the President of India through Delhi Development authority in an open auction and that the leases in respect of the said two plots were executed in favour of the plaintiff by the President of India through the Delhi Development Authority. It is also stated that possession of the aforesaid two lots No. 29 and 30, were obtained by the plaintiff on 28th February, 1983 and 8th August, 1983, respectively. It is also urged that the plaintiff applied for sanction of the plans for both the aforesaid plots and with respect to plot No. 29, the plan was sanctioned on 27th April, 1983 and in respect of plot No. 30, the plan was sanctioned on 3rd January, 1984. It is also alleged that construction on both the plots was started simultaneously on 13th February, 1985 and completion certificates in respect of both the plots were applied on 9th January, 1986 and were granted on 3rd April, 1986. It is also alleged that although the completion certificates were granted on 3rd April, 1986 in respect of both the plots but, the amenities were not provided for as no electricity was provided till December, 1989 and only temporary electricity connections in both the plots were provided on 20th October, 1987. It was also stated that neither water connection nor any sewage amenity was provided in the aforesaid two plots. The contentions of the plaintiff are that no vacant land tax and property tax could be levied from the lessee till constructions is made by the said lessee on the land and that after construction is complete and the flats are sold out, it is the responsibility of the flat buyers to pay the property tax, if any, and therefore, the plaintiff has no liability at all.
( 3 ) THE aforesaid contentions raised in the plaint were refuted by the defendant, who filed a written statement contending, inter alia, that the plaintiff is the owner of both the plots in question and, therefore, liability to pay vacant land tax and property tax is of the plaintiff. It was also stated that the rateable value in the case of plaintiff was fixed as per the provisions of section 116 (2) of the Delhi Municipal Corporation act and other relevant provisions. It is also stated that the plaintiff did not submit any deed or document indicating transferring the various flats to different owners in accordance with the statutory requirements and, therefore, the liability of the plaintiff to pay the property tax continues.
( 4 ) ON the pleadings of the parties, the following issues were framed on 10th April, 1996:-
"1. Whether the suit is barred by section 41 (h) of the Specific relief Act and Section 478 (2) of the D. M. C. Act?
2. Whether the suit is not maintainable, as alleged in the preliminary objections?
3. Whether the suit has not been properly valued for the purposes of court fee and jurisdiction?
4. Whether the plaintiff is not liable to pay vacant land tax and the property tax, as alleged in the plaint?
5. Relief. " the suit was, thereafter, listed for recording evidence of the parties. At that stage it was stated by the counsel for the plaintiff that all the issues are legal issues and, therefore, no evidence was required to be led by the plaintiff. The said contention was not opposed by the counsel for the defen