High Court Of Delhi
SAMIR MUKHERJI - Appellant
Versus
DAVINDER KUMAR BAJAJ - Respondent
REGULAR FIRST APPEAL 325 of 1997
Decided On : 01/23/1998
Transfer of Property Act, 1882 - Section 106 & 107 — Manufacturing purpose — Oral lease — The lease can not be said to be yearly lease — In the absence of registered contract, lease shall be deemed to be month to month.
Held:
Admittedly, no written lease deed or agreement was executed. The premises were let out orally. A lease of immovable property from year to year or for a term exceeding one year, under Section 107 can be made only by a registered instrument and any lease of this kind would be void unless it is created by a registered instrument. All other leases of immovable property may be made either by a registered instrument or by an oral agreement accompanied by delivery of possession. Whose Section 106 of the Act refers to the duration of certain leases in the absence of written contract or local usage, Section 107 lays down the mode how the leases are to be made. An oral lease for manufacturing purposes cannot be deemed to be a lease from year to year for the purposes of notice of termination, in view of the provisions contained in Section 107 of the Act. In the case of a lease for manufacturing purpose, the absence of registration itself would imply that parties entered a contract to the contrary and without any registered instrument, tenancy would be deemed to be from month to month and not from year to year, for which 15 days notice will be a valid one.
( 1 ) THIS appeal by the defendant/appellant is against the decree passed on 4. 9. 1997 by Ms. Manju Goel, Additional District Judge, Delhi in favour of plaintiff/respondents by allowing their application under Order 12, Rule 8, Code of Civil Procedure
( 2 ) THE suit was filed by the plaintiff/respondents against the appellant for grant of decree for recovery of possession by eviction from premises measuring 6359. 85 sq. ft. forming part of property bearing No. 71/2, Industrial Area, Najafgarh Road, New Delhi, shown as red in the plan attached with the plaint and for recovery of Rs. 3,51,000. 00. In addition decree for recovery of damages/mesne profits from 1. 5. 1995 till such time the premises are vacated was also prayed. It was alleged that the premises were let out to the appellant at a monthly rent of Rs. 9,500. 00. The tenancy was terminated through registered notice dated 16. 3. 1995 w. e. f the close of 30. 4. 1995. Despite service of notice, the premises are vacated and even rent from 1. 3. 1992 till 30. 4. 1997 had not been paid. In addition to claiming decree for possession, decree for arrears of rent and for future mesne profits, as aforementioned was prayed.
( 3 ) THE suit was contested by the defendant/appellant on a number of grounds. While admitting the plaintiffs to be the owner and that the premises had been let out on a monthly rent of Rs. 9,500. 00 , it was stated in the written statement that the intention of the parties at the time of creation of the tenancy was to grant tenancy permanently and not for any temporary period because lease was granted in favour of the appellant for manufacturing purposes and since the inception of tenancy, the appellant has been carrying on his business of manufacturing Transmission Towers and Railway Electrification Fittings. As such lease would be deemed to be from year to year as per the provisions of Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. While admitting the receipt of notice dated 16. 3. 1995, it was pleaded that the said notice was not in accordance with Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. The notice ought to have been for six months expiring on the last day of the year of tenancy.
( 4 ) IN view of the pleas taken by the defendant in his written statement, the plaintiff filed an application under Order 12, Rule 6 of the Code of Civil Procedure stating that there was a clear admission in the written statement on the part of the defendant. As such, decree for possession was liable to be passed on such admission. The said application was also contested by the defendant.
( 5 ) THROUGH the impugned judgment dated 4. 6. 1997, the Trial Court proceeded to hold that there was no material dispute. The defendant had admitted itself to be a tenant in respect of the suit property. The validity of notice of termination stood established. The plaintiff admittedly was the landlord and thus was entitled to recover possession from the defendants on termination of tenancy. It was also held that all conditions necessary for judgment under Order 12, Rule 6, Code of Civil Procedure were fulfilled. Accordingly, the Trial Court proceeded to pass decree for eviction directing the defendant/appellant to hand over peaceful vacant possession to the plaintiff/respondents. The question of quantum of arrears of rent and mesne profits, which was in dispute was kept pending for trial.
( 6 ) WE have heard learned Counsel for the parties at length at the admission stage. Having considered the submissions, we are of the view that the judgment of the Court below calls for no interference.
( 7 ) LEARNED Counsel for the appellant has vehemently contended that though the receipt of notice dated 16. 3. 1995 was admitted but the same was not in consonance with law. The admission of the defendant had to be taken as a whole and could not have been split in parts. There was a plea raised by the defendant in the written statement that the intention of the parties, at the time of c
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