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1979 Supreme(Del) 139

High Court Of Delhi
JAGAT TARAN BERRY - Appellant
Versus
SARDAR SANT SINGH - Respondent
SECOND APPEAL 92 of 1977
Decided On : 05/25/1979

Advocates Appeared:
H.S.VADHVA, HARSH ARORA, R.L.TANDON

The absence of a registered instrument for a lease implies a contract to the contrary under section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, overriding the requirement of a registered instrument under section 107, and the monthly payment of rent supports the presumption of a month-to-month tenancy.

Headnote:

NOTICE TO QUIT - MANUFACTURING PURPOSE - SECTION 106 AND 107 OF TRANSFER OF PROPERTY ACT - INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION - VALIDITY OF NOTICE TO QUIT - LEASE DURATION - CONTRACT TO THE CONTRARY - IMPLIED CONTRACT - MONTHLY RENT PAYMENT - PRESUMPTION OF TENANCY CHARACTER - SUMMARY DISMISSAL OF APPEAL WITH COSTS.

Fact of the Case:

In a dispute over the validity of a 15-day notice to quit issued to a tenant, the court examined whether the lease was for manufacturing purposes and the applicability of sections 106 and 107 of the Transfer of Property Act. The tenant contended that a six-month notice was required due to the manufacturing purpose of the lease, while the landlord argued that the notice was valid as the lease was deemed to be from month to month in the absence of a registered instrument.

Finding of the Court:

The court held that the two sections of the Transfer of Property Act, section 106 and section 107, should be reconciled to avoid creating an invalid lease under section 107. The court interpreted that when a lease is not created by a registered instrument, as in the present case, the parties have opted out of the first paragraph of section 107, which requires a registered instrument for leases of certain durations. This implies a contract to the contrary under section 106, which provides for the duration of leases in the absence of a contract.

Issues: 1. Whether the lease was for manufacturing purposes, and if so, whether a six-month notice to quit was required under section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. 2. Whether the absence of a registered instrument implied a contract to the contrary under section 106, overriding the requirement of a registered instrument under section 107.

Ratio Decidendi: The court reasoned that section 106 and section 107 of the Transfer of Property Act should be harmonized to avoid creating a conflict. When a lease is not created by a registered instrument, the parties are deemed to have agreed upon a lease of a duration that can be created without such an instrument. This implies a contract to the contrary under section 106, which prevails over the requirement of a registered instrument under section 107. The court further held that the monthly payment of rent also supported the presumption of a month-to-month tenancy, constituting a valid contract to the contrary under section 107.

Final Decision: The court concluded that the notice to quit was valid as the lease was deemed to be from month to month due to the absence of a registered instrument and the monthly payment of rent. The appeal was dismissed with costs.

T. P. S. CHAWLA, J

( 1 ) THIS second appeal under the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 raises an intricate question as to the validity of a notice to quit. An order for recovery of possession has been made by the Additional Rent Controller and confirmed by the Rent Control Tribunal. The notice to quit was of 15 days. The tenant contends that as the lease was for manufacturing purposes the notice ought to have been of six months. There was no written lease deed executed by the parties; at least, none has been brought on record.

( 2 ). The only other fact that need be mentioned is that for the few months that rent was paid, the payments were monthly. This is proved by the counterfoil of a receipt signed by the tenant. It shows that Rs. 400 was paid as rent for November, 1966. Admittedly, nothing was paid thereafter. The order for recovery of possession was sought and obtained on the ground that arrears of rent had not been paid since 1st December, 1966. In the course of the proceedings before the Additional Rent Controller, the defence of the tenant was struck out as he did not deposit the arrears of rent pursuant to an order under section 15 (1) of the Act. That is why no argument has been advanced on the merits, and only the validity of the notice to quit has been questioned.

( 3 ). The orders made below are not concurrent as to whether the lease was for a manufacturing purpose. The Additional Rent Controller held that such a purpose was neither alleged nor proved. But, the Rent Control Tribunal seems to have inferred that the premises were let for a manufacturing purpose from the fact that they were so used. Without so deciding, I will proceed on the assumption that the lease was for a manufacturing purpose. The problem is to reconcile section 106 and section 107 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882. Logically, section 107 should be read first because it states how leases are made, whereas section 106 prescribes by fiction the duration of various kinds of leases In the absence of a contract or local law or usage to the contrary .

( 4 ). Each paragraph of section 107 yields a distinct proposition. The first paragraph says that :

a lease of immovable property from year to year, or for any term exceeding one year, or reserving a yearly rent, can be made only by a registered instrument. the remaining classes of leases are governed by the second paragraph. It says:

all other leases of immovable property may be made either by a registered instrument or by oral agreement accompanied by delivery of possession. the third paragraph is not relevant to the present question. Nor is the proviso which follows.

( 5 ). Now the point to observe is that a lease falls under the first or second paragraph depending on its duration. The purpose for which the lease is granted is wholly immaterial under this section. Thus, for example, a lease granted for a manufacturing purpose can be made only by registered instrument if its duration is that stated in the first paragraph. But, a lease for the same purpose of a lessor duration can, under the second paragraph, be made either by a registered instrument or by oral agreement accompanied by delivery of possession . I now turn to section 106. Its relevant part reads as follows :

IN the absence of a contract or local law or usage to the contrary, a lease of immovable property for agricultural or manufacturing purposes shall be deemed to be a lease from year to year, terminable on the pan of either lessor or lessee, by six months notice expiring with the end of a year of the tenancy ; and a lease of immovable property for any other purpose shall be deemed to be a lease from month to month, terminable, on the part of either lessor or lessee, by fifteen days notice expiring with the end of a month of the tenancy. here, the classification of leases is according to their purpose. The object of this section is to determine the duration of leases when the parties have left a lacuna. If the parties have themselv

























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