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1998 Supreme(Del) 909

High Court Of Delhi
KALYAN CHAND GOYAL - Appellant
Versus
DELHI DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY - Respondent
Decided On : 11/03/1998

Headnote:Arbitration Act, 1940 - Section 30 & 33 — Objections — Denial of rebate — Delay in payment of final bill — Conclusion of Arbitrator denying rebate cannot be reopened by the court on re-appreciation of evidence.

       

       Section 30 & 33 — Objections — Recovery on account of consumption of material supplied in excess to the permissible limit — No proof of actual loss — Award denying the levy, upheld.

Dr. M. K. Sharma, J.

( 1 ) THE respondent awarded a work contract in favour of the petitioner for construction of 1088 Janata Houses at Raghubir Nagar. While executing the aforesaid works certain disputes arose between the parties and the same were REFERRED TO for arbitration in terms of clause 25 of the arbitration agreement. The arbitrator appointed by the persona designata, entered upon the reference, received evidence and thereupon published and made his award on 14/15. 1. 1992. The aforesaid award was filed in this court as against which an objection has been filed by the respondent which is registered as IA 13759/1992. The petitioner, on the other hand seeks for making the award a Rule of the Court.

( 2 ) IN respect of the aforesaid, I heard Mr. G. N. Aggarwal, appearing for the petitioner and Mr. V. K. Sharma, appearing for the respondents at length and I give my decision on the same claim wise in the following manner:

( 3 ) A preliminary objection has been raised in the objections contending inter alia that the claims of the claimant are time barred in terms of provisions of clause 25 of the agreement. Clause 25 provides that the Contractor is to make a demand for arbitration within 90 days of receiving the intimation that the final bill is ready for payment. According to the respondent the final bill in the present case was ready and accepted by the petitioner on 25. 1. 1989 on the bill form whereas the petitioner invoked the arbitration clause only on 6. 5. 1989 which is after expiry of 90 days limitation period. The aforesaid preliminary objection was also raised before the Arbitrator and the said arbitrator, upon evidence on record held that the limitation period of 90 days in the facts and circumstances of the present case should be counted from the date of last payment in April, 1989 and when so computed the claim is within the period of limitation. Thus the arbitrator rejected the preliminary objection raised by the respondent. Limitation for putting up a claim for reference to arbitration by invoking the arbitration clause is governed by the provisions of Section 137 of the Limitation Act. The period prescribed therein for raising the claim and for invoking the arbitration clause is provided as 3 years from the date when the right to apply first accrues. In State of Orissa Vs. Damodar Dass, reported in 1996 (1) Civil Law Times 294, it was held that no right to apply would accrue until there is a clear and unequivocal denial of that right by respondent. My attention was also drawn to the notification dated 8. 1. 1997 notifying the Indian Contract (Amendment) Act, 1996 amending the provisions of Section 28 of the Contract Act which provides thus:-

"every agreement: (a) By which any party thereto is restricted absolutely from enforcing his rights under or in respect of any contract, by the usual legal proceedings in the ordinary tribunal, or which limits the time within which he may thus enforce his rights; or (b) Which extinguishes the rights of any party thereto, or discharges any party thereto from any liability, under or in respect of any contract on the expiry of a specified period so as to restrict any party from enforcing his rights, is void to that extent. "

( 4 ) PRESCRIBING that an agreement by which a party thereto is restricted absolutely from restricting his rights under or in respect of any contract, which limits the time within which he may thus enforce his rights, is void to that extent. However, I need not enter into the aforesaid aspect of the matter in view of the fact that the Arbitrator in the present case on consideration of the evidence on record found that the claim of the petitioner is within the period of limitation of 90 days and thus even the limitation prescribed under clause 25 of the agreement has not expired. The arbitrator, on consideration of the evidence on record came to the conclusion that the limitation period of 90 days should be counted from the date of last payment in April, 1














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