Back
1993 Supreme(Del) 305
High Court Of Delhi
RAM JAWAI - Appellant
Versus
SHAKUNTALA DEVI - Respondent
Interim Application 561 of 1981
Decided On : 05/20/1993
Anil Nag, ANIL PAVAR, B.P.GUPTA, I.S.MATHUR, MAEHSVAR DAYAL, R.K.MAKHIJA
Headnote:a) It was adjudged that under Order 21 Rule 92 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908, the sale could become absolute only when the application for quashing the sale or appeal or revision therein would be disposed of b) It was adjudged that the limitation for application filed under Order 21 Rule 95 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908, would be governed by Article 134 of the Constitution of India, that is, one year from the date when the sale becomes absolute c) In the instant case, an application was filed by the auction purchaser under Order 21 Rule 95 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908, regarding possession of the suit property – In this view, the objectors failed to prove their possession prior to the sale – Hence, the objections so raised were dismissed – Hence, the Court issued warrants of possession the property d) The case discussed the limitation for the application filed under Order 21 Rule 95 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908, for the delivery of possession – It was held that under Article 134 of the Limitation Act, 1963, the period of limitation would be one year after the sale had become absolute
Based on the provided legal document, the key points are as follows:
-
The application filed by the auction purchaser for delivery of possession was within the prescribed limitation period, as the sale became absolute on 8th July 1980, and the application was filed on 18th February 1981, which is within one year of that date (!) .
-
The objections raised by the respondents, claiming they were in lawful possession as tenants since 1967, are unsubstantiated. The evidence produced by the respondents, including rent receipts, statements, and other documents, was either not properly proved, was not examined from the original authors, or was found to be fabricated or forged (!) (!) (!) (!) .
-
The respondents' claim to have been in possession prior to the auction sale in 1973 was contradicted by the evidence showing that the premises were vacant until at least 1978, and their alleged possession before that time was not supported by credible or admissible evidence. The sale of the property in 1973 was to a different entity, and the respondents could not have lawfully been tenants prior to that sale (!) (!) (!) .
-
Certain documents, such as the alleged letter Ex AW8/10 and the application for the sales tax department, were determined to be forged or fabricated, and their contents were not proved to be genuine or reliable (!) (!) .
-
The evidence of witnesses who claimed prior possession or tenancy was discredited due to inconsistencies, lack of proper cross-examination, or procedural deficiencies, such as the absence of the original authors for examination (!) (!) .
-
The court emphasized that documents cannot speak lies, but in this case, the documents presented by the respondents were found to be fabricated, and their claims of possession since 1967 were not credible or supported by admissible evidence (!) .
-
The court held that the respondents did not prove their possession as tenants prior to the sale in 1973, and even if they had, the principle of lis pendens would apply, preventing them from resisting the auction purchaser’s right to possession (!) (!) (!) .
-
As a result, the court granted the application of the auction purchaser, issued warrants of possession, and directed the eviction of the respondents from the premises, including demolishing any structures raised later by the respondents (!) .
-
The application against certain other individuals, who had settled out of court, was dismissed, and costs were awarded to the auction purchaser (!) (!) .
-
Overall, the court concluded that the auction purchaser is entitled to possession of the property, and the respondents' claims of tenancy or prior possession are not supported by credible evidence. The possession of the auction purchaser should be restored by dispossessing the respondents and demolishing any unauthorized constructions (!) .
Please let me know if you need further analysis or assistance with this case.
( 1 ) THIS is an application under Order 21, Rule 95 Civil Procedure Code filed by the auction purchaser, M/s Delhi Packaging Pvt Ltd. praying for an order for delivery of posession.
( 2 ) THE facts giving rise to this application are that Shri Bhag Mal Jain, deceased, who is now represented by his legal representatives as judgment debtors, was the owner/lessee of plots Nos. 226 and 227, Block l , Gali Nos. 2 and 3, Beadonpura, Karol Bagh, New Delhi which was mortgaged by him for Rs. 94,000 with Shri Balkishan Dass, deceased, who is now represented by his legal representatives as decree holders by means of a mortgage deed dated 19. 9. 1958 registered on 24. 9. 1958. In the suit Filed by Balkishan Dass, on the basis of this mortgage deed, a preliminary decree was passed under Order 34 Civil Procedure Code by the Subordinate Judge, Delhi, but all the reliefs claimed by the plaintiff were not granted. He,therefore, filed a first appeal in this Court (RFANo. 172-D/63) which was accepted and a preliminary decree under Order 34, Rule 4 Civil Procedure Code was passed on 31. 8. 1970 by this Court granting four months time to the judgment debtor to pay the decretal amount. lt was further ordered that in case of his failure to do so. the decree holder would be entitled to apply for the final decree and obtain a direction for sale of the mortgaged property or a sufficient part thereof and recover the decretal amount. The judgment debtor did not make the payment as per theudgment and Decree dated 31. 8. 1970. The decree holder, therefore, filed O. M. P. No. 13/71 on 29. 1. 1971 claiming that a sum of Rs. 1,76,718. 88 besides interest from 1. 1. 1971 up to the date of realisation was still due to him and that the preliminary decree passed by this Court on 31. 8. 1970 be made final and the mortgaged property be directed to be sold and the sale proceeds be applied for satisfaction and payment of the decretal amount.
( 3 ) THERE has been a protracted litigation regarding this property since 1971 but after dismissal of various applications/objections filed by Sh. Harbans Lal Naseem and others, the mortgaged property was auctioned on 25. 6. 1973 and it was purchased by M/s Delhi Packaging Pvt Ltd for a consideration of Rs. 1,40,000 in the court auction. Sh. Harbans Lal Naseem had filed objections on the plea that he had purchased this property in a court auction held on 14th December, 1964 in execution of a decree in the case of Jatinder Prakash vs. bhag Mal Jain and Ors. for Rs. 54,000; the sale was confirmed on 14. 1. 1966 and a sale certificate was issued in his favour on 6. 10. 1966. The objections filed by Sh. Harbans Lal Naseem were dismissed holding that Harbans Lal had only purchased the right and the interest of the judgment debtor, Sh. Bhag Mal Jain i. e. he purchased the right to redeem the mortgaged property. It was further held that the suit property stood mortgaged with Shri Balkishan Dass, the decree holder, earlier to its sale in the case of Jatinder Prakash vs. Bhag Maljain and others. The appeal filed against those judgments dismissing the objections filed by Sh. Harbans Lal Naseem and Sh. Vidya Sagar were also dismissed. The preliminary decree dated 31. 10. 1970 passed in favour of the decree holder was made final on 12. 8. 1971 and the property was auctioned on 25. 6. 1973 and purchased by M/s Delhi Packaging Pvt. Ltd, being the highest bidder and it deposited the entire sale proceeds. The sale was confirmed and the sale certificate was issued. Possession of the property could not, however, be obtained due to various objections filed by Mr. Harbans Lal and others. In February,1981 the auction purchaser filed this application under Order 21, Rule 95 Civil Procedure Code seeking the relief of recovery of possession from Shri Kanahya Lal Mittal and Shri Kishan Kumar Mittal , Shri Anand Parkash Gupta, Shri A. S. Pathak, Shri Bhagwan Dass and Shri Parma Nand. It has, however, been averred by the learned counsel fo
