( 1 ) THIS appeal has been filed by the appellant against the order dated 27th May, 1992, of Shri G. SJugti, Additional District Judge, Delhi, whereby the application of the petitioner Under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure for reinstatement as Company Secretary has been dismissed.

( 2 ) THE brief facts are that the appellant was discharged from services by respondent No. 1 vide Resolution dated 26th July, 1991. According to him the Resolution of the Board of Directors dated 26th July, 1991, which purports to have discharged the petitioner from service is contrary to law and without jurisdiction and that the meeting was not convened according to the law and that the Board of Directors were not even served. Therefore, the said Resolution dated 26th July, 1991, according to him is a nullity in the eyes of law. According to the appellant/ plaintiff another resolution dated 24th August, 1991 has been passed by Board of Directors nullifying the earlier resolution dated 26th July, 1991, and as such he is entitled to continue as Company Secretary. Under these circumstances, the petitioner/appellant has filed the suit for declaration to the effect that the meeting of the Board of Directors dated 26thjuly, 1991, is a nullity and void and termination of the appellant from the office of the Company Secretary is illegal.

( 3 ) MR. P. P. Malhotra, learned counsel for the appellant, has vehemently argued the case and time and again he has stressed that since the Board of Directors were not served and the Resolution has been passed in contravention of the provisions of law, such Resolution dated 27th July, 1991 terminating the services of the petitioner is a nullity in the eyes of law. The trial court in such circumstances should have given Finding to the effect that the petitioner has a prima facie case in his favour and granted of injunction. On the other hand, the trial court has observed that at this stage, it cannot be known that the resolution dated 26th July, 1991 is legal and valid or the resolution dated 24th August, 1991 is legal and valid. It is pre mature to test it what is right or wrong. The issues have not been framed and no evidence recorded so far. The case is at the initial stage. Since the trial court has not examined the case whether the petitioner has prima facie case in his favour, his order cannot be legally sustained.

( 4 ) IT is no doubt true that, in matter of injunction the trial court should have examined the case whether the plaintiff has a prima facie case; that the balance of convenience lies in his favour and that irreparable loss and injury would be caused to the plaintiff which cannot be compensated in terms of money in case the interim injunction is not granted.

( 5 ) IN this case, we may notice that the order of discharge/termination of services has been implemented and that the plaintiff/appellant has been conveyed this order. In the face of this, whether the interim injunction can be granted or not by applying the above mentioned tests. .

( 6 ) SIMILAR questions arose before a Full Bench of this Court in a case Sim Hari Krishan Shannav. Municipal Corporation of Delhi, decided on 14. 8. 1987, wherein it was held that no hard and fast rules can be laid down as to when stay should be granted or refused. However, it is well settled that the main factors to be considered for granting or refusing interim relief are (1) prima facie case; (2) balance of convenience and (3) irreparable loss.

( 7 ) IN that case, the appellant was shown to have prima facie case in his favour. However, the order of compulsory retirement was already implemented. It was further laid down that:-

"the grant of interim relief would amount to allowing the writ petition itself. The court would be extremely show to grant interim stay in such cases when injury to the respondent is likely to remain uncompensated but injury to the petitioner even, without the interm stay can be compensated by award of da