( 1 ) THIS plaintiff-appellant filed three civil suit Nos. 295 to 297 of 1972 challenging assessment for three separate years ending on 31. 3. 69, 31. 3. 69 and 31. 3. 68 respectively and pralyed for grant of perpetual injunction restraining the respondent MCD from recovering and realising from the appellant property tax levied on the remaining part of the land except Block E of Greater Kailash II. The suits were dismissd by a common judgment and decree dated 23. 4. 73. The appellant filed three separate appeals which were also dismissed by a common judgment and decree dated 18. 2. 75. Aggrieved against the aforesaid judgments and decrees the appellant has come up in second appeal.

( 2 ) THE facts common to all the three suits are that the appellant is a colonising Company. It submitted a lay out plan of Greater Kailash II to the Corporation under Section 313 of the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act (in short "act") for sanction. The lay out plan was sanctioned vide resolution No. 24 dated 1. 7. 1959. One of the terms and conditions of sanction was that no land covered by the sanctioned lay out plan will be sold, leased or built upon until the services covered by the lay out plan had been laid to the satisfaction of the Commissioner of the Corporation. Another important condition was that the sanction will lapse unless the services were provided within 12 months, which period could be further extended by another 12 months by the Commissioner for reasons to be recorded. Street lights and distribution mains were to be provided by the DESU according to the sanction. The appellant had to pay its share of the cost of the said street lighting but the electricity was not provided till the date of the filing of the suit with the result that building activites were sanctioned only in Block E of the colony while in the remaining part of the colony, sanction of building activities was not granted. As a necessary consequence, the plots of land in the remaining part of the colony remained incapable of being built upon. Since neither any building activities could be carried on such plots nor the same could be sold or leased out without the development of services covered by the lay out plan to the satisfaction of the Commissioner, it was alleged, property tax in respect of such vacant land could not be imposed. Despite that various amounts of property tax ending for the periods 31. 3. 68 and 31. 3. 69 were imposed illegally, hence the suits.

( 3 ) THE Corporation contested the suits raising various preliminary objections as well objections on merits. Following issues were framed:

1. WHETHER the imposition of the tax is ultravires and not granted by law? 2. Whether the suit has been properly valued for purposes of court fees and jurisdiction? 3. Whether the suit is barred under Section 41 of the Specific Relief Act? 4. Whether the D. E. S. U. is a necessary party? 5. Whether the suit is bad for misjoinder of cause of action, 6. Relief.

( 4 ) BOTH the courts below answered issues I and 3 against the plaintiff whilethe remaining three issues i. e. issues 2. 4, and 5 against the defendant.

( 5 ) I have heard arguments advanced by learned counsel for the parties. The contention of the learned counsel for the appellant is that according to Section 116 (2) of the ct. rateable value of any land which is not built upon but is capable of being built upon and of any land on which a building is in process of erection only is Liabl. to property lax. Learned counsel says that great significance is. attached to the words, "capable of. being built upon" as used in Section 116 (2) of the Act and, therefore, unless a particular piece of land is. capable of being built upon, the argument goes property tax on such land connot be imposed. Since permission to the apellant to carry out building activity on the disputed land was granted only in March, 1972, and prior to (hat this land was not capable of being built upon because various services had