A landlord is entitled to an order of eviction under Section 14 (1) (h) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958, if the tenant has built, acquired vacant possession of, or been allotted a residence.

( 1 ) THIS appeal by the tenant, Mr. Rup Carnd, isdirected against the judgment and order of the Rent Control Tribunal dated 27/02/1985 confirming the order of the additional Rent Controllerdated 8/07/1985.

( 2 ) THE main question in issue before me is whether the tenant hasacquired "vacant possession of, or been allotted, a residence".

( 3 ) ON 26/05/1976, landlady, Ms. Shanti Devi filed a petition undersection 14 (1) (a) and (h) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 (hereinafterreferred to as the "act") to eject Rup Chand. Thereafter, on 27/07/1976,rup Chand filed his written statement.

( 4 ) THE following facts, pertaining to section 14 (1) (. h) of the Act, havebeen pleaded in the petition. In paragraph 18 (a) (iii) of the petition, itis stated, "that the Respondent has acquired vacant alternative accommodation situated opposite Nagar Nigam Middle School, Circular Road, Jwalanagar, Delhi". In paragraph 4 of the said petition, it is mentioned that thedisputed premises being H. No. 591/24, Ram Gali, Block No. 3, Vishwas Nagar,shahdara, Delhi are residential.

( 5 ) IN the written statement, Rup Chand has admitted that the disputedpremises are residential. However, he has asserted that paragraph 18 (a) (iii)of the petition is :

"absolutely wrong, baseless and therefore denied. The respondenthas not acquired any vacant alternative accommodation situated atnagar Nigam Middle School, Circular Road, Jwala Nagar, Delhi. The said allegation is baseless and the same has been alleged toharrass the respondent. ".

( 6 ) IT appears that Rup Chand s wife purchased a plot of land in 1971and completed construction of a building on the said plot in 1975. She nowalleges that she is running a school there, known as Sarva Hitakari Shikshakendra.

( 7 ) THOUGH the point had been raised by the tenant that acquisition ofpremises by the wife would not amount to acquisition by the husband, Mr. Andley did not press this point, in view of the settled position, as indicatedin the decisions of the Supreme Court and this Court in Prem Chand andanother v. Sher Singh, 1981 (2) DRJ 287. and V. K. Malhotra and others v. Smt. Ranjit Kaur, 1985 (1) RLJ 250, respectively.

( 8 ) MR. Andley mainly contended that the petition should have been, rejected under Order VII Rule II, Civil Procedure Code, as it did nodisclose any cause of action since the essential ingredients of section 14 (l) (hof the Act had not been pleaded in the petition. He submitted that thlandlady had not pleaded that the tenant had acquired vacant possession o"residential" premises and consequently the petition had to be rejected.

( 9 ) LEARNED counsel relied on a decision of Mr. justice S. Rangaranjan in Abdul Hamid and another v. Nur Mohammad,a. I. R. 1976 Delhi 328. In thesaid decision while dealing with the question of eviction undersection 14 (1) (e)of the Act-it has been observed that the landlord has a duty not only to allege and prove that he needs premises for his own use but also to aver and provthat he is not in possession of any other reasonably suitable residentsaccommodation. The learned Judge observed that the tenant expected tmake a research and since the necessary ingredients had not been stated, nground had been made out to order eviction.

( 10 ) THE other dicision relied on by learned counsel for the appellantis in Banke Ram v. Shrimati Sarasti Devi 1977r. C. J. 332. There the Fullbench of the Punjab and Haryana High Court held that it is a well establishedand salutary principle of law that in any civil proceedings it is essential fora party to plead all the ingredients on which he wants to rely and in proof ofwhich he may produce evidence.

( 11 ) IN Mr Edwin Brave v. Hari Chand, 1982 (1) R. C. R. 172, Mr Justicesultan Singh observed that since the petition for ejectment did not disclosethat the Tenses were let out for residential purposes, all the essentialin gredients on under section 14 (l) (e) of the Act had not been pleadedconsequently he held that under th