Mahinder Narain, J.

( 1 ) THE award in this case was passed on 4th August, 1982.

( 2 ) SECTION 17b of the Industrial Disputes Act was inserted by way of an amendment by the Industrial Disputes (Amendment) Act, 1982 (Act No. 46 of 1982 ). The amending Act received the assent of the President on 31st August, 1982. and the Central Government appointed 21 st August, 1984, as the "appointed dale" on which the amended provision came into force.

( 3 ) THE question before me is whether the amended Section 17b which came into force on 21-8-1984, would apply to the award dated 4th August 1982.

( 4 ) BY a judgment reported as AIR 1986 Supreme Court 842 (Bharat Singh v. Management of New Delhi Tuberculosis Centre, New Delhi and others ). The Supreme Court has said that "section 17b on its terms does not say that it would bind awards passed before the dale when it came into force. The respondents contention is that a Section which imposes an obligation for the first time cannot be made retrospective. Such section should always be made considered prospective. In our view, if this submission is accepted, we will be defeating the very purpose for which this Section has been enacted. It is here that the Court has to evolve the concept of purposive interpretation which has found acceptance whenever a progressive social beneficial legislation is under review. We share the view that where the words of a statute are plain and unambiguous effect must be given to them. Plain words have to be accepted as such but where the intention of the legislature is not clear from the words or where two constructions are possible, it is the Court s duty to discern the intention in the context of the background in which a particular Section is enacted. Once such an intention is ascertained the Courts have necessarily to give the statute a purposeful or a functional interpretation. Now, it is trite to say that acts aimed at social amelioration giving benefits for the have-nots should receive liberal construction. It is always the duty of the Court to give such a construction to a statute as would promote the purpose of object of the Act. A construction that promotes the purpose of the legislation should be preferred TO to a literal construction. A construction which would defeat the rights of the have-nots and the underdog and which would lead to injustice should always be avoided. This Section was intended to benefit the workmen in certain cases. It would be doing injustice to the Section if we were to say that it would not apply to awards passed a day or two before it came into force. "

( 5 ) IN this view of the matter, the award dated 4th August, 1982 having been challenged in the proceedings before me, the instant case is fully covered by Section 17b of the Industrial Disputes Act, as amended. In view of the judgment of the Supreme Court, above cited, the work man is entitled to the full wages last drawn by him inclusive of any maintenance allowances admissible to him under any rule, from the date of the award.

( 6 ) MR. B. S. Charya says that in terms of the order of this Court dated 10th January, 1983, the payment was ordered to be made at the rate of Rs. 400. 00 per month for the purpose of back wages and for future payments. Back wages were directed to be paid within one month from the date of the order and the monthly payments were ordered to be paid by 10th of each month. Mr. Viney Bhasin says that the back wages at the rate of Rs. 400. 00 per month and the future wages at the rate of Rs. 400. 00 per month have been paid in pursuance of the order dated 10th January, 1983.

( 7 ) MR. B. S. Charya says that a difference of Rs. 215. 00 should also be paid in the similar manner. In view of the judgment of the Supreme Court, I agree, and I direct payment of Rs. 215. 00 per month, being the balance of the back wages, to be made to the respondent from the date when Rs. 400. 00 have been paid as back wages, as also balance of the sum of Rs. 215. 00 for the period

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