The main legal point established in the judgment is that the scope of revision under section 25B(8) of the Delhi Rent Control Act is limited to orders of recovery of possession and does not extend to all orders made under that section.

( 1 ) THIS revision raises the question whether an order passed by the Controller under subsection (4) of section 25b of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958, granting leave to the tenant to contest the application for eviction is subject to a revision by this Court under the proviso to sub-section (8) thereof. In a decision of this Court reported in Devi Singh v Chaman Lal. 1977 Raj. L R. 566, it was held that subsection (8) and its proviso read together prohibit appeal or second appeal against an order of the recovery of possession, but permit a revision only against such order and no other. The same view was endorsed by this Court in Bhagwati Parshad v. Om Parkash 1979. Raj. L. R. 26.

( 2 ) THE learned counsel for the petitioner submits that tae view taken in these decisions deserved to be reconsidered by a larger bench. T he proviso to sub-section (8) of section 25 B provides that the High Court may for the purpose of satisfying itself whether an order made by the Controller under this section" is according to law, call for the records of the case and pass such order in respect thereto as it think fit. It is contended that the proviso does not say "an order for the recovery of possession", or even "such order as aforesaid", but instead employs the word "an order made "by the Controller under this section" which will obviously cover the order to grant leave to contest eviction application, which is an order made under this section. There is no warrant for restricting the scope of revision which the Parliament has allowed not only against an order of eviction but against all orders made under that section.

( 3 ) SACHAR, J. , in Devi Singh s case (supra) has noticed the wide phraseolygy of the proviso and yet he was of the view that the very setting of the proviso suggested that revision would lie only against an order allowing and dismissing an application for eviction, because the proviso was an exception to the main part i. e. final disposal of the application for eviction ; and it would be anomalous to hold that the revision should be against all orders. That would defeat the very object of expeditious disposal. Power of revision would cover only cases under subsection (4), not really against the order refusing leave, but because as a consequence of refusal to give leave, the application for eviction is allowed. Section 25 B (8) does not cover interim orders like the granting of leave which do not conclude the proceedings. It was urged that section 38 provided for an appeal from every order of the Controller which led to so many appeals that the progress in eviction cases was being stalled and it was in order to stem such appeals that subsection (8) was introduced in section 25 B. Now after careful reflection, it appears to me that the interpretation adopted by two learned single Judges of this Court does not call for any reconsideration. I am in respectful agreement with their view that the proviso in question being in the nature of an exception to the main provision will apply only to the orders of recovery of possession. Sub-sections (4) and (5) speak specifically either of an order for eviction or an order for the recovery of possession. The section makes no specific mention of any order. Though whatever direction the court makes such an order granting ieave to contest, is in a larger sense an order, yet since sub-section (8) of section 25b is mainly concerned with a remedy against an order of eviction, the proviso has to be construed in a limited sense to refer only to such an order.