( 20 ) IN State of Uttar Pradesh V. Akbar All Khan, A. I. R. 1966 Supreme Court 1842, there was a specific rule allowing period of probation to be extended and confirmation was to be on passing a departmental examination and reports about fitness for, confirmation. This decision therefore, is not very relevant for the propositions mooted before us.

( 21 ) IN SMe of Punjab v. Dharain Singh, 1968 (2) S. L. R. 247 Rule 6 (3) of the relevant Rules prohibited extension of period of probation beyond three years, ft was held in this situation that if an employee appointed or promoted to a post on probation is allowed to continue in that post after completion of the maximum period of probation without ,an express order of confirmation, he cannot be deemed to continue in that post as a probationer by implication. The reason for this rule was that extension of probation by implication is negatived by the service rules forbidding extension of the probationary period beyond the maximum period fixed by it. In such a ease, it was held, it is permissible to draw the inference that the employee allowed to continue in the post on completion of the maximum period of probation has been confirmed in the post by implication. Dealing with the specific rules in question, namely. Rules 6 (1) and (3) it was observed that "the employees REFERRED TO to in that rule held their post in the first instance on probation for one year commencing from October 1, 1957. On completion of the one year period of probation by the employee four courses of action were open to the appointing authority under rule 6 (3 ). The authority could either (a) extend the period of probation provided the total period of probation including extensions would not exceed three years, or (b) revert the employee to his former post if he was promoted from some lower post, or (c) dispense with his services if his work or conduct during the period of probation was unsatisfactory, or (d) confirm him in his appointment. It could pass one of these orders in respect of the respondents on completion of their one year period of probation. But the. authority allowed them to continue in their posts thereafter without passing any order in writing under rule 6 (3 ). In the absence of any formal order, the question arose whether by necessary implication from the proved facts of these cases, the autority should be presumed to have passed some order under rule 6 (3) in respect of the respondents, and if so, what order should be presumed to have been passed. "sub-rule (3) or rule 6 laid down that on completion of the period ot probation the authority competent to make appoinlment may confirm the employee in his appointment or if his work or conduct during the period of probation has been in his opinion unsatisfactory he may dispense with his services or may extend his period of probation by such period as he may deem fit or revert him to his former post if he was promoted from some lower post, provided that the total period of probation including extensions shall not exceed three years. It was in the context of this rule and inasmuch as the maximum period of probation allowed by the rule had expired that the inference of confirmation by implication was held attracted. In terms the ra,tio of the judgment is not attracted to the facts of the present petitions. However, it may be advantageous to note certain observations in paragraph 2 and 3 of the report which have been relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioners.

( 22 ) A contention had been made in the alternative, that on comp letion of three years' period of probation, inasmuch as no orders confirming the employees had been passed nor were their services terminated, they must be deemed to have been discharged from service and re-employed as temporary employees. This contention was negatived. Bachawat, J. then went on the observe that the Supreme Court had consistently held that when a first appointment or promotion is made on probation for

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