An order passed by a High Court is not a final order within the meaning of Article 134 (1) (c) of the Constitution of India if it does not finally determine the rights and obligations of the parties in a criminal proceeding.

( 1 ) THIS Order will dispose of Cr. Misc. (SCA) 23 and 24 of 1973 also. All these three Applications have been filed by P. S. Puri under Article 134 (l) (c) of the Constitution of India for a certificate of fitness to appeal to the Supreme Court.

( 2 ) A criminal prosecution is pending against Puri. The concerned Judicial Magistrate framed a charge against him under Section 468 I. P. C. in the matter or obtaining delivery of Passport No. 1-454020 as alleged therein.

( 3 ) AS against the framing of the said charge Puri filed Cr. Revision 224 of 1972 to quash the said charge; the State had filed another Criminal Revision 265 of 1972 urging that the learned Magistrate ought to have framed charges under Sections 420, 467 and 471 1. P. C. also. Subsequently Puri filed Cr. writ 20 of 1972 under Articles 226 (1), 21 and 22 of the Constitution for a writ in the nature of habeas corpus or other appropria writ, directions or orders. By our common order, against which appeals are sought to be filed in the Supreme Court, we allowed the Revision filed by the State and dismissed the Revision as well as the Cr. Writ filed by Puri. The Revision Petitions and the Cr. Writ were placed before a Division Bench on a reference made by one of us (Ansari, J.) having regard to the importance of the questions raised.

( 4 ) SHRI R. L. Mehta, learned counsel for the State has opposed these applications on the only ground that the order passed by us is neither a judgement nor a final order within the meaning of Article 134 (1) (c) of the Constitution. For this he relied on the decision of the Supreme Court in Tarapore and Co. v. Tractors Export (A. 1. R. 1970 S. C. 1168) in which it was held that an interlocutory order passed without finally determining the rights and obligations of the parties in a civil proceeding was not a final order within the meaning of Article 133 (1) (a) and (b) of the Constitution, the language of which is similar. The previous decision in Mohanlal Maganlal v. State of Gujarat (A. 1. R. 1968 S. C. 733) was relied upon as having superseded the view taken in the earlier cases. Repelling this contention Shah, J. (as his lordship then was), who spoke for the Supreme Court, observed that in Mohanlal Maganlal v. State of Gujarat the Supreme Court was only concerned with the filing of a complaint under Section 476 Criminal Procedure Code. , which was a self-contained proceeding which had been finally disposed of by an order directing the filing of a complaint under Section 205 read with Section 114 1. P. C. Shah, J. further pointed out that the previous dicisions rendered by the Supreme Court (Syedna Tahar Saifuddin Saheb v. State of Bombay (A. 1. R. 1958 S. C. 253 and S. Kuppusami Rao v. The King (A. I. R. 1949 F. C. 1) had only been distinguished (in Tarapore case) as cases where orders had been passed in appeals and revisions and that it was specifically observed that different tests are applied to orders made in proceedings independence of the original or the main proceeding. A Division Bench of this Court consisting of Hardy, J. (as he then was) and Jagjit Singh, J. (in Ram Nath Aggarwal v. Delhi Administration, Cr. M. (SCA) 462 of 1969 in Cr. A. 45-D of 1964, decided on 5-11-1969) distinguished Mohanlal Maganlal s case and held that where the proceeding taken in a High Court did not dispose of the whole proceedings which were pending in the subordinate court the decision of the High Court cannot be regarded as final for the purpose of a appeal under Article 134 (1) (c) of the Constitution. This view gains further support from the later decision of the Supreme Court in Tarapore s case.

( 5 ) SHRI R. L. Mehta has also drawn our attention to a decision of the Division Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Kudapa Subbannd v. Chitturi Gandhi (A. 1. R. 1972 A. P. 261) where the case law has been discussed. It was held, inter alia, that the test of finality of a judgement, decree or order is whether the order final