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1972 Supreme(Del) 231

High Court Of Delhi
RAM PARKASH KAPUR - Appellant
Versus
BHAGWANTI - Respondent
SECOND APPEAL 306 of 1971
Decided On : 10/11/1972

Advocates Appeared:
Bahal Singh, V.M.ISSAR

The Controller has no jurisdiction to pass an order under section 15(1) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958, on the basis of prima facie evidence. The Controller must decide, before passing the order, whether the person against whom the order is to be made is a tenant in the premises within the meaning of the Act, i.e., whether rent is payable by him or on his account or behalf for the premises.

Headnote:

RENT CONTROL ACT - SECTION 15(1) - JURISDICTION OF CONTROLLER - DETERMINATION OF TENANCY - PRIMA FACIE EVIDENCE - SUBMISSION OF RENT - ADJUSTMENT OF DEPOSITS - LIMITATION FOR CLAIM OF ARREARS:

Fact of the Case:

The appellant, a tenant, challenged the order passed by the Rent Control Tribunal under section 15(1) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 (the Act), which directed him to deposit arrears of rent and future rent. The appellant contended that the Controller had no jurisdiction to pass the order based on prima facie evidence and that the claim for arrears of rent was barred by limitation.

Finding of the Court:

1. The Controller has no jurisdiction to pass an order under section 15(1) of the Act on the basis of prima facie evidence. The Controller must decide, before passing the order, whether the person against whom the order is to be made is a tenant in the premises within the meaning of the Act, i.e., whether rent is payable by him or on his account or behalf for the premises. 2. The claim for arrears of rent was not barred by limitation as the cause of action arose only when the standard rent was finally determined by the court.

Issues: 1. Whether the Controller had jurisdiction to pass an order under section 15(1) of the Act on the basis of prima facie evidence? 2. Whether the claim for arrears of rent was barred by limitation? 3. Whether the appellant was entitled to claim adjustment of deposits made by him under section 27 of the Act?

Ratio Decidendi: 1. The language of section 15(1) of the Act requires the Controller to give the parties an opportunity of being heard before passing an order. This indicates that the Controller must decide the facts necessary to give him jurisdiction to pass the order, including whether the person against whom the order is to be made is a tenant within the meaning of the Act. 2. The claim for arrears of rent was not barred by limitation as the cause of action arose only when the standard rent was finally determined by the court. The respondent was barred by section 50 of the Act from claiming rent from the appellant at a rate more than the interim rent fixed by the Controller from May 8, 1959, until the standard rent was determined on October 3, 1969.

Final Decision: 1. The order of the Additional Rent Controller requiring deposit of arrears and future rent will be considered to be an order under section 15(4) and not under section 15(1) of the Act. 2. The appeal challenging the finding that the appellant could not claim adjustment of deposits made by him under section 27 of the Act is dismissed.

S. N. SHANKAR,j.

( 1 ) AGGRIEVED from the decision of the Rent Control Tribunal dated November 24, 1971 that an order under sub-section (1) of section 15 of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958, hereafter called "the Act", could be passed by the Controller on the basis of prima fade evidence indicating the existence of relationship of landlord and tenant, the tenant Ram Parkash Kapur, hereafter called "the appellant" filed second appeal No: 306 of 1971 in this Court. The learned single Judge, before whom this appeal came for hearing, having regard to the fact that the question affected a large number of cases, REFERRED TO the appeal for decision by a larger Bench. By the same order, the Tribunal also held that in the facts of this case rent for the period claimed by the respondent, Bhagwanti Devi was not barred by time. This finding has also been assailed in this appeal. It appears that Bhagwanti Devi had also filed an appeal before the Tribunal which the Tribunal accepted by the same order. Aggrieved from this part of the order. Ram Parkash Kapur filed a separate appeal in this Court (S. A. O. 67 of 1972 ). The subject matter of the two appeals being the common order, both S. A. O. s 306/71 and 67/72 have, therefore, come up for decision before us.

( 2 ) THE appeals have arisen in the following circumstances :- The appellant occupied portion of the property bearing No: 6, Original Road, Karol Bagh, New Delhi with effect from October 8, 1956 at an agreed rent of Rs. 100. 00 per month. The property was let to him by one Chuni Lal Sabharwal. In the year 1959 the appellant applied for fixation of standard rent of the premises let to him. Chuni Lal Sabharwal applied for eviction of the appellant on the ground of non-payment of rent. On January 11, 1960 Rent Controller passed an order under section 15 (1) of the Act requiring the appellant to deposit arrears of rent with effect from May 8, 1959 at the rate of Rs. 80. 00 per month. The appellant deposited the arrears then due at this rate and the eviction case was, for this reason, consigned to record room and the application for fixation of standard rent alone remained pending. On January 4, 1961, the Controller fixed the standard rent of the premises at RS. 100. 00 per month. Aggrieved from this the appellant went up in appeal before the Tribunal. The Tribunal accepted the appeal and remanded the case. The landlord filed a second appeal in the High Court against this order. During the pendency of the appeal, the landlord Chuni Lal Sabharwal died on July, 4, 1968. His widow, the present respondent in both the appeals, applied for being impleaded as the appellant in place of her deceased husband in the appeal then pending in the High Court. Her case in the application was that Chuni Lal Sabharwal had been managing the property for and on her behalf as she was an illiterate person and that he had left behind the applicant as the widow and four sons and four daughters but she alone was entitled to be impleaded as appellant in place of the deceased and that the other four sons and four daughters may be impleaded as respondents 2 to 9. Notice of the application was sent to the appellant. The appellant resisted the application and filed a reply. He contended that he knew only Chuni Lal Sabharwal as the owner and landlord of the premises and that the applicant alone was not entitled to continue the proceedings. After filing this reply, he, however, did not appar to contest the application. By order dated February 17, 1969, the application was accepted and the respondent was substituted in the appeal in place of the deceased Chuni Lal Sahbarwal and the four sons and four daughters of the deceased were impleaded as respondents 2 to 9. On October, 3, 1969 the appeal was finally dismissed by this Court on merits so that Rs. 100. 00 remained to be the standard rent of the premises.

( 3 ) ON May 30, 1970, the respondent filed an application for eviction of the appellant out of which these two appea

































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