( 51 ) THIRDLY the decision in Sham Rao's case was further explained and distinguished in Devi Das v. State of Punjab (1967) 3 SCR 557 by the same Constitution Bench, this time unanimously. Law grows from precedent to precedent. Just as a later statute impliedly repeals an earlier one to the extent of the repugnancy between the two, a later precedent modifies an earlier one by developing the law. In Sham Rao's case, the contention of Shri S. T. Desai for the petitioner at page 661-G was that the Principal Act being void, the Amendment Act could not resuscitate it. This was a noval contention not supported by any previous authority. The learned counsel relied on the decisions in Deep Chand and Mahendra Lal Jaini cases. But none of them had decided that a void Act could not be revived by an amendment of the said Act itself. Secondly, learned counsel's argument was self-contradictory inasmuch as he had bracketed the decision in Deep Chand's case with the decision in Mahendra Lal Jaini's case. Actually, as shown above, the decision in Mahendra Lal Jaini's case was contrary to the decision in Deep Chand's case in holding that there was no distinction between Articles 13 (1) and 13 (2) as to the meaning of the word "void" though in Deep Chand's case, a sharp distinction in this respect was drawn between the two clauses of Article 13. At page 662 of the majority judgment in Sham Rao's case, it was stated that an amendment could be made only of a valid Act which was still on the statute book. With great respect, their Lordships' attention does not seem to have been invited to the fact that even a void Act could continue to be on the statute book and this position was established by the meaning given to the expression "void" by the Supreme Court in Mahendra Lal Jaini's case. It was further held that only an independent Act could revive the void Act and that the Amending Act was not an independent Act. In the minority judgment, however, the decisions in Deep Chand's and Mahendra Lal Jaini's cases were distinguished as being under Article 13 (2) of the Constitution from Sham Rao's case which was a case of excessive delegation. According to the minority judgment, the Principal Act was clearly within the competence of the Pondicherry Legislature and there was nothing in the Constitution which prohibits the substitution of a defective law by a law which is not subject to any infirmity. The Amending Act effectively cured the defect in the Principal Act the whole of which was not void. It is the same Constitution Bench which was so divided that came to hear Devi Das's case.

( 52 ) THE majority of the Court in Sham Rao's case had approved of an extreme contention that a void law could not be amended at all though as respectfully pointed above, this proposition was not supported by any previous authority. In effect, this was new law established by Sham Rao's case. A rigid adherence to the new legal position could unsettle the division of functions between the Legislature and the Courts enshrined in the Constitution. For, whenever only a comparatively small part of a statute was open to a Constitutional objection, the legislative practice was to amend the Act to remove this defect. Such amendment was concerned only with the unconstitutional portion of the Act. The rest of the Act was not reenacted inasmuch as it was free from any defect. One recent instance of such legislative practice would be sufficient to bring out this point. In Union of India v. Kamala Bai (1968) I SCR 463, the-Supreme Court held section 8 (3) (b) of the Requisitioning and Acquisition of Immovable Property Act, 1952 to be void as being ultra vires Article 31 (2) of the Constitution. The whole purpose of the Act was to requisition and acquire property for a public purpose. According to Article 31 (2) of the Constitution, no such acquisition could be made except on payment of compensation which had to be a just equivalent prior to the Fourth Amendment of the Constitution. The

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