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1968 Supreme(Del) 84

High Court Of Delhi
BEGUM AFTAB ZAMANI - Appellant
Versus
LAL CHAND KHANNA - Respondent
REGULAR FIRST APPEAL 10 of 1968
Decided On : 05/31/1968

Advocates Appeared:
A.B.LAL, A.B.SAHARIA, F.C.Bedi, Prakash Narain, S.P.AGARWAL

The word "judgment" in Section 10 of the Delhi High Court Act, 1966, should be construed broadly to include both final and interlocutory judgments that materially affect the rights of the parties.

Headnote:

COURT FEES ACT - ARTICLE 1, SCHEDULE I - ARTICLE 11, SCHEDULE II - INTERPRETATION OF JUDGMENT - COURT FEE PAYABLE ON APPEAL - DELHI HIGH COURT ACT, SECTION 10 - MEANING OF JUDGMENT IN SECTION 10 - DISTINCTION BETWEEN JUDGMENT AND DECREE - SCOPE OF ARTICLE 1, SCHEDULE I AND ARTICLE 11, SCHEDULE II - AD VALOREM COURT FEE.

Fact of the Case:

The issue before the Full Bench was to determine the amount of court fee payable on an appeal filed under Section 10 of the Delhi High Court Act, 1966, against the judgment of a Single Judge of the High Court.

Finding of the Court:

The Court held that the word "judgment" in Section 10 of the Delhi High Court Act, 1966, should be construed broadly to include both final and interlocutory judgments that materially affect the rights of the parties. The Court further held that the present appeal, which was from a judgment that disposed of the suit finally, fell within the purview of Article 1, Schedule I of the Court Fees Act, 1870, and was subject to payment of ad valorem court fee.

Issues: 1. Whether the word "judgment" in Section 10 of the Delhi High Court Act, 1966, should be construed narrowly to include only final judgments or broadly to include both final and interlocutory judgments that materially affect the rights of the parties? 2. Whether the present appeal, which was from a judgment that disposed of the suit finally, fell within the purview of Article 1, Schedule I of the Court Fees Act, 1870, and was subject to payment of ad valorem court fee.

Ratio Decidendi: 1. The Court interpreted the word "judgment" in Section 10 of the Delhi High Court Act, 1966, in the context of the statutory scheme and held that it should be construed broadly to include both final and interlocutory judgments that materially affect the rights of the parties. 2. The Court held that the present appeal, which was from a judgment that disposed of the suit finally, fell within the purview of Article 1, Schedule I of the Court Fees Act, 1870, and was subject to payment of ad valorem court fee.

Final Decision: The Court held that the memorandum of appeal was liable to payment of ad valorem court-fee under Article I, Schedule I of the Court Fees Act.

Inder Dev Dua, J.

( 1 ) THE question which this Full Bench is called upon to decide relates to the amount of court-fee payable on appeal presented by an aggrieved party under section 10 of the Delhi High Court Act (hereafter called the Act) against the judgment of a learned Single Judge of this High Court given in the exercise of ordinary original civil jurisdiction conferred by the Act, to a Division Court thereof. Section l0 may now be read:

"10. Powers of Judges.- (1) Where a Single Judge of the High Court of Delhi exercises ordinary Original civil jurisdiction conferred by sub-section (2) of section 5 of that Court, an appeal shall lie from the judgement of the single Judge to a Division Court of that High Court. (2) Subject to the provisions of sub-section (l) law in force immediately before the appnted day relating to the powers of the Chief Justice, single Judges and Division Courts of the High Court of Punjab and with respect to all matters ancillary to the exercise of those powers shall, with the necessary modifications, apply in relation to the High Court of Delhi. "

( 2 ) THE distinctive features of this provision is that it provides for an appeal from a judgment and not from a decree and the appeal lies from the judgment of a Single Judge to a Division Court of the same High Court. It is worth noting that the judgement of a Single Judge, as also that of the Division Court on appeal, acting within their respective jurisdictions, are both considered to be judgments of the High Court. The controversy, we may point out, centres round a very narrow point. It is agreed, and is common case of the parties, that if court fee is not payable in accordance with Article 11, Schedule II of the Court Fees Act, then it would indisputably fall within the purview of Article 1 of Schedule I, which provides for payment of ad valorem court fee computed on the amount or value of the subject matter in dispute on appeal. We are, therefore, only confined to the scope and effect of these two Articles. These articles, so far as relevant may now be read:

"court FEES ACT SCHEDULE I

AD valorem fees

( 3 ) IT is not necessary to reproduce the remaining contents of columns 2 and 3 because it is only the contents of column 1 which require construction.

SCHEDULE II

11. Memorandum (a) to any civil Court of appeal when the other than a High appeal is not from Court, or to any Readecree or an order venue Court or having the force of Executive Officer adecree, and is pre- other than the High seated- Court or Chief controlling Revenue or Executive Authority;

(B) To a High Court or Chief Commissioner, or other Chief Controlling Executive or Revenue Authority. "

( 4 ) IN this case also, it is not necessary to reproduce the contents of column 3. Suffice it to say that the court-fee is a fixed amount. The short argument on behalf of the appellant is that the present appeal is not from a decree or from an order having the force of a decree and, therefore, it falls within Article II of Schedule II and not within Article 1, Schedule I. which, for our purpose, is a residuary Article. It is added that reading these two Articles together it must follow that Article 1, Schedule I, so far as appeals are concerned, is confined only to appeals from decrees and orders having the force of decrees. The cogency of this argument depends on the meaning of the word judgment" used in section 10 of the Act. No decision directly covering the construction of this section has been brought to our notice, but by way of analogy, reference has been made to the decisions constructing the meaning of the word judgment occurring in clause 10 of the Letters Patent of the High Court of Judicature at Lahore and in clause 15 of the Letters Patent constituting the High Courts of Judicature at Calcutta and Bombay. Reference has also been made to the definitions of the words "judgment" and "decree" contained in section 2 (9) and (2) respectively of the Civil P. C. We shall have to see, among other t














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