MANMOHAN, J : (Oral)

Caveat No. 203/2008

1. Since the caveator has put in appearance, caveat petition stands disposed of.

C.M. No.15667/2008 (for exemption)

2. Exemption allowed, subject to all just exceptions.

The application stands disposed of.

RC.REV. 92/2008 & CM No.15668/08

3. Present revision petition has been filed for setting aside eviction order dated 12th September, 2008 passed in a petition filed under Section 14D of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 (hereinafter referred to as “DRC Act”) whereby petitioner’s application for leave to defend has been dismissed.

4. Learned Counsel for petitioner urged that adoption of daughter by respondent-landlord was not in accord with law and, therefore, respondent daughter’s and son-in-law’s requirement could not be considered as respondent’s requirement. However, on a perusal of leave to defend application, I find that this ground has not been taken by petitioner-tenant before the Additional Rent Controller.The Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in “J. Chatterjee v. Mohinder Kaur Uppal” reported in AIR 2000 Supreme Court 3076 has that proceedings under Section 14D should not be allowed to be dragged on by granting leave to defend to tenant unless real and substantial case is made out in the affidavit filed by tenant. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the said judgment has highlighted the intent and import of Section 14D by pointing out that widow landladies are a special class of landlords entitled to recover possession for self occupation. Consequently, I am of the view this new ground cannot be urged in a revision petition.

5. In fact on a perusal of leave to defend application, I find that the following grounds had been urged by petitioner to deny respondent-landlady possession of tenanted premises:

.(i) Suit property had been let out to petitioner for commercial purpose and is not capable of being used for a residential purpose.

.(ii) Petitioner has filed a suit for permanent injunction in which she has claimed protection from dispossession of suit premises.

(iii) Petitioner does not bona fide require the tenanted premises as she was carrying on the shop of Kiryana in portion of the property and has now closed the same.

(iv) Petitioner has filed an incorrect site plan.

6. Before I deal with petitioner’s submissions, I would like to refer to Section 14D of DRC Act, which reads as

under:

“14D. Right to recover immediate possession of premises to accrue to a widow. –

.(1) Where the landlord is a widow and the premises let out by her, or by her husband, are required by her for her own

residence, she may apply to the Controller for recovering the immediate possession of such premises.

.(2) Where the landlord referred to in sub-section (1) has let out more than one premises, it shall be open to her to make

an application under that sub-section in respect of any one of the premises chosen by her.”

7. Since the present eviction petition has been filed by respondent-landlady on the ground of Section 14-D of

DRC Act, she has to prove only the following three requirements:

.(i) She is a widow;

.(ii) She is a landlady;

(iii) She requires the premises for her own residence.

8. In the present case, the first two requirements are not disputed. As far as the third requirement is concerned, I find that petitioner-tenant has primarily taken two defences namely, that premises was let out for commercial purpose and further by virtue of closure of Kiryana shop, respondent has enough space available to her for residential purpose.

9. As far as letting of premises for commercial use is concerned, the issue is squarely covered by a recent judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court in Satyawati Sharma v. Union of India reported in 148 (2008) DLT 705 (SC). The observations of Hon’ble Supreme Court are reproduced hereinbelow for ready reference:

“38. In view of the above discussion, we hold that Section 14(1)(e) of the 1958 Act is violative of the doctrine of equality embodied in Article 14 of the Constitution of

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