Vikramajit Sen, J.

.1. At the threshold, a preliminary objection has been raised by Mr.Rajiv Nayyar, learned Senior Counsel for the Respondent, to the effect that the present Appeal is not maintainable. The Appeal assails the Judgment of the learned Single Judge enforcing a Foreign Award bearing No.12031A dated 29th July, 1997, passed by London Rice Brokers” Association and further holding that by virtue of Section 49 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (A&C Act for short) the Award shall be deemed to be a decree of this Court. The impugned Judgment further declares that the Plaintiff/Respondent is entitled to the Award amount together with interest till the date of the Award along with future interest at the same rate, till realisation. Reliance has been placed on Section 50 of the A&C Act which prescribes that an Appeal shall lie from the Order refusing to - (a) refer the parties to arbitration under Section 45; and (b) enforce a foreign award under Section 48, to the Court authorised by law to hear appeals from such order. It proscribes the filing of appeals in all other matters.

2. It is in this context that Section 10(1) of the Delhi High Court Act, 1966 (“DHC Act” for short) assumes some significance in that it ordains that where a single Judge exercises ordinary original civil jurisdiction conferred by the preceding Section 5(2) an appeal shall lie from that judgment to the Division Bench. The first sub-section of Section 5 preserves to the Delhi High Court all original appellate and other jurisdiction as were exercisable by the erstwhile High Court of Punjab. The second sub-section bestows jurisdiction upon the Delhi High Court in respect of every suit the value of which exceeds Rupees twenty lakhs. By this provision the Delhi High Court exercises ordinary original civil jurisdiction which its precursor, namely, the Punjab High Court, did not possesses.

.3. It is jurisprudentially considered expedient to provide one opportunity to assail a verdict of a judge and it is palpably in furtherance of this that an appeal to a Division Bench is provided for by the DHC Act. This is manifestly clear once we bear in mind that the Supreme Court exercises appellate jurisdiction either on Certificate by the High Court or upon special leave being granted by it (see Shiu-Etsu Chemical Co. Ltd. –vs-Vidhya Telelinks Ltd., JT 2009(4) SC 537). A Five Judge Bench of this Court in Union of India –vs-A.S. Dhupia, AIR 1972 Delhi 108 had ruled that Section 10(1) of the DHC Act does not confer a right of appeal even against those orders which are not covered under Section 39(1) of the Arbitration Act, 1940 which was a specific code indicating the orders which alone are appealable. The Five Judge Bench had clarified that Section 10 of the DHC Act only provides for a forum of Appeal but not provide the right to Appeal. This distinction is more often than not lost sight of. We need not advert further to Section 39 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 beyond noting that the orders that were

.postulated to be appealable were greater in number than those prescribed under the A&C Act.

4. Almost half a century ago, the Supreme Court in Union of India –vs- Mohindra Supply Co., AIR 1962 Supreme Court 256 had clarified that the question before them was whether the right to appeal under Letters Patent was in any manner regulated by Section 39 of the Indian Arbitration Act, 1940. Their Lordships opinion can be discerned from these paragraphs:

5. The problem to which attention must then be directed is whether the right to appeal under the Letters Patent is at all restricted by section 39, sub-sections. (1) and (2). Clause 10 of the Letters Patent of the High Court, in so far as it is material, provides:

"And we do further ordain that an appeal shall lie to the said High Court...... from the judgment (not being a judgment passed in exercise of appellate jurisdiction in respect of a decree or order made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction by