The statutory provisions governing the limitation period and condonation of delay under Section 34(3) of the Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996 are absolute and unextendible by the court, emphasizing the importance of timely action in arbitration proceedings and the limitations on judicial intervention under the Act.

Gita Mittal, J.

1. The petitioner has filed objections under Section 34 of the Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996 challenging the arbitration award dated 25th July, 2005 passed by the sole arbitrator in favor of the claimant/respondent. This petition was beyond the limitation prescribed under Section 34 of the Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996. Consequently, the petitioner has filed I.A. No. 9821/2005 under Section 34(3) of the Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996 praying for condensation of the delay. The respondent/claimant in the arbitration proceedings has vehemently opposed this application pointing out that the objections have been filed beyond the period which is permissible for condensation of delay and for this reason, the same have to be rejected.

2. Such a prayer has also been made by the respondent by way of I.A. No. 1759/2006 which has been filed under Order 7 Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

3. Inasmuch as the two aforesaid applications entail consideration of the same facts, the same have been taken up together for hearing and are being disposed of by this common order.

4. From the facts ultimately emerging on record, there is no dispute to the material facts relating to the date on which the award dated 25th July, 2005 was served upon the petitioner. The admitted position is that the award was received in the office of Chief Engineer, Delhi Zone on the 28th of July, 2005. The objections were filed by the petitioner in this Court on 28th November, 2005 under Section 34 of the Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996 being O.M.P. No. 448/2005.

5. Apart from these facts, there is dispute on all issues between the parties to the manner in which the delay has to be condoned.

6. According to Mr. R.V. Sinha, learned Counsel for the petitioner, the award has to be held to have been received by it only on 3rd August, 2005. He further contended that assuming that even if it was received on 30th July, 2005, on calculations from this date, the period of 3 months expired on 29th October, 2005. According to the petitioner, the petitioner was entitled to condensation of delay for further period of 30 days. It is further submitted that as 27th November, 2005 was a Sunday, the objections were filed on 28th November, 2005 and are thereforee within the period from which condensation of delay is permissible.

7. Mr. R.V. Sinha, learned Counsel for the petitioner has contended that even if it is held that the petitioner was served on 28th July, 2005, still as per Section 9(1) of the General Clauses Act, the date on which service was effected cannot be counted and as such, the objections would be within limitation.

8. Further urging that the Union of India has to explain only the delay after expiry of the period of 3 months and for the circumstances explained, in the light of the principles laid down by the Apex Court in: 2002(143)ELT249 (SC) State of Haryana v. Chandra Mani and Ors. and: AIR1996SC2750 (Special Tehsildar, Land Acquisition, Kerala v. K.V. Ayisumma, the delay merits condensation. The submission is that there is no benefit to the petitioner by the delay and that condensation of the delay does not prejudice the respondent inasmuch as it can be adequately compensated for the same by costs.

9. In support of the contention that limitation has to be counted from the date the award was seen by the Garrisson Engineer, reliance has been placed on the pronouncement of the Apex Court in: AIR2005SC1832 Union of India v. Tecco Trichy Engineers & Contractors (Para 6-11)

10. On the other hand, Mr. Harish Malhotra, learned senior counsel for the respondent has contended that the limitation has to be construed from 28th July, 2005 when the award was received in the office of Chief Engineer. It has been contended that on 26th November, 2005, even the 30 days period prescribed by Section 34(3) of the Arbitration & Conciliation Act lapsed. It has been submitted that in the light of the clear mandate of Section 34(3) of