148 (2008) DELHI LAW TIMES 590
DELHI HIGH COURT
Sanjiv Khanna, J.
KlRAN KOHLI -Petitioner
Versus
D.D.A. -Respondent
W.P. (C) 2422 of 2005
Decided on 30.1.2008
DDA - Property Conversion - II.6(a), II.6(b) - The court discussed the violation of clauses II.6(a) and II.6(b) of the sub-lease deed, the DDA's conversion scheme, and the distinction between transfers by Will and other documents. The court held that the DDA's distinction was discriminatory and arbitrary, and that the petitioner was liable to pay conversion costs and penalty for the violation of the sub-lease deed.
Fact of the Case:
The petitioner filed a writ petition to convert a property from lease hold to free hold, which was originally allotted to Mr. Amrik Singh and bequeathed to the petitioner through a registered Will. The DDA suspended the mutation due to the violation of clauses II.6(a) and II.6(b) of the sub-lease deed.
Finding of the Court:
The court found that the DDA's distinction between transfers by Will and other documents was discriminatory and arbitrary. The petitioner was held liable to pay conversion costs and penalty for the violation of the sub-lease deed.
Issues: Violation of sub-lease deed clauses, DDA's conversion scheme, Distinction between transfers by Will and other documents
Ratio Decidendi: The court held that the DDA's distinction between transfers by Will and other documents was discriminatory and arbitrary, and that the petitioner was liable to pay conversion costs and penalty for the violation of the sub-lease deed.
Final Decision: The writ petition was disposed of, and the petitioner was directed to file a fresh application for conversion, pay the entire conversion amount with penalty, and comply with all formalities.
1. Smt. Kiran Kohli, hereinafter referred to as the petitioner, has filed the present writ petition for directing DDA to convert property No. D-945, New Friends Colony, New Delhi from lease hold to free hold in her name.
2. The property mentioned above was originally allotted to one Mr. Amrik Singh by execution of a sub-lease dated 18.1.1973. Mr. Amrik Singh executed a registered Will dated 14.10.1977 and bequeathed the said property to the petitioner. Mr. Amrik Singh expired on 12.1.1982. On the basis of the Will, DDA by an order dated 2.9.1982, mutated the property in its record in the name of the petitioner.
3. After waiting for about four years, DDA by another letter doted 14A.1986 Informed the petitioner that the mutation granted in favour of the petitioner by the letter dated 2.9.1982 shall remain suspended because there was contravention of Clause II 6(a) and 6(b) of the sub-lease deed which reads as under:
II.6 (a) The sub-lessee shall not sell, transfer, assign or otherwise part with the possession of the whole or any part of the residential plot in any form or manner, benl11/li or otherwise, to a person who is not a member of the Lessee.
II.(b) The sub-lessee shall not sell, transfer, assign or otherwise part with the possession of the whole or any part of the residential plot to any other member of the lessee except with the previous consent in writing of the Lessor which he shall be entitled to refuse in his absolute discretion:
Provided that, in the event of the consent being given, the Lessor may impose such terms and conditions as he thinks fit and the Lessor shall be entitled to claim and recover a portion of the unearned increase in the value (i.e., the difference between the premium paid and the market value) of the residential plot at the time of sale, transfer, assignment, or parting with the possession, the amount to be recovered being fifty per cent of the unearned increase and the decision of the Lessor in respect of the market value shall be final and binding:
Provided further that the Lessor shall have the pre-emptive right to purchase the property after deducting fifty per cent of the unearned increase as aforesaid."
4. The stand of DDA was that the petitioner had purchased rights and interest of Mr. Amrik Singh and the Will executed by Mr. Amrik Singh in favour of the petitioner was not executed out of natural love and affection. The case of DDA was that above Clause of the sub-lease was violated. A reference in this regard can be made to the case of Delhi Development Authority v. Vijaya C. Gurshaney, V (2003) SLT 104=106 (2006) DLT 181 (SC)=(2003) 7 SCC 301, wherein it was held as under:
"10. The rationale behind the formulation of its policies and guidelines issued by DDA is to curb illegal transactions in favour of persons not of blood relation of the allottee, being practised rampantly and the property being transferred by an underhand sale in the garb of Will and power of attorney, etc. DDA has formulated a policy that in such cases the Department would ask for 50% of unearned increase in the value of property. It is always open to the appellants to enquire whether an alleged Will is in actuality a sale in the garb of Will in total disregard of the policy decision of the authority. Merely because probate/letters of administration are granted, would not preclude DDA from so enquiring.1t must be grasped that DDA has been given no notice of the testamentary proceedings. Therefore, it would have no right to appear or oppose such proceedings. As already said, DDA is a creature of the statute and any policy decision or guidelines formulated by such Authority will have a binding effect on the parties, in absence of rules to the contrary.
11. Furthermore, Clauses 4, 5 and 8 of the lease deed, as extracted, envisage that the lessee cannot sell, transfer or part with the possession of the whole or any part of the commercial plot except with the previous consent of the lessor in writing, with a rider that th
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