RAJIV SAHAI ENDLAW, J.

1. Execution was sought of an arbitral award dated 27th October, 2005 stated to be having force of a decree, under the Arbitration Act, 1996. Notice of the execution petition was issued to the judgment debtor. On 21 April, 2009 it was reported that upon the notice being tendered to the person available at the address of the judgment debtor, the said person after talking to the Managing Director of the judgment debtor on telephone, refused to accept the notice for the reason of the same bearing a different address of the judgment debtor. This court finding the judgment debtor to have avoided service, issued warrants of attachment of the monies lying in the bank account of the judgment debtor to the extent of Rs 6,10,000/- claimed in the execution petition. The said attachment was effected and a cheque for Rs 6,10,000/- received in this court. However, the judgment debtor thereafter preferred OMP under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act 1996 with respect to the arbitral award under execution.

2. The OMP was instituted in this court first on 10th August, 2009. The institution thereof, calculated from the date of the award i.e., 3rd July, 2008 was barred by time. However, it is the plea of the judgment debtor in the said OMP that signed copy of the arbitral award was never delivered to it and it learnt of the award only on inspection of a copy thereof filed in the execution petition.

3. The judgment debtor having denied service of the arbitral award, this court on 12th August, 2009 when the OMP came up first before the court called for the arbitral record. The arbitral record has been received.

4. The arbitral record reveals that the arbitrator under cover of his letter dated 3rd July, 2008 forwarded to both the parties the signed copy of the award. The said letter alongwith the signed copy of the award was dispatched to both the parties by speed post and the arbitral record also contains the speed post postal receipt evidencing dispatch of the award to both the parties. The address of the judgment debtor at which the said letter was dispatched is the same as the address of the judgment debtor before the arbitrator. The arbitral record does not contain any envelope containing the letter and award returned from the address of the judgment debtor to the arbitrator.

5. The counsel for the judgment debtor(petitioner in the OMP) has contended that the limitation for preferring a petition under Section 34(3) of the Act commences from the date when the party making the petition has received the arbitral award; similarly the word used in Section 31(5) is of delivery of the arbitral award to the parties. It is contended that what was envisaged by the Act was actual delivery of the award; in the present case there is nothing to show that the award was actually delivered to the petitioner and hence the limitation period for the petitioner to institute the petition under Section 34 of the Act with respect to the award cannot be said to have commenced. Reliance in this regard is placed on Union of India Vs Tecco Trichy Engineers and Contractors (2005) 4 SCC 239.

6. On query as to why the words “received” and “delivery” in Section 34(3) and 31(5) (supra) be not interpreted as deemed receipt and deemed delivery, the counsel has relied upon R.K. Vashisht Vs Union of India 1993 supp (1) SCC 431.

7. In my view the words “delivered” and “received” cannot be interpreted in a pedantic fashion i.e. of requiring or insisting upon actual delivery of the award to the parties. The practical view of the existing realities and practices has to be taken in this regard. The arbitral tribunal has no machinery of ensuring the actual delivery of the award to the parties. The parties/party by avoiding delivery/receipt of the award cannot be permitted to hold in abeyance the enforcement thereof against himself/itself. The award is rarely published immediately after the last hearing before the arbitrator, to enable t