MANMOHAN, J : (Oral) 1. Present objection petition has been filed under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 challenging the arbitral award dated 05th December, 2002 passed by Shri M.P. Sinha, Sole Arbitrator.

2. At the outset, Mr. Arvind Kumar Gupta, learned counsel for respondent has submitted that in a similar award, identical objections had been dismissed by Hon’ble Justice Sanjay Kishan Kaul and even appeals before the Division Bench as well as the Supreme Court had also been dismissed. In this context, Mr. Gupta referred to Hon’ble Justice Sanjay Kishan Kaul’s judgment dated 28th November, 2005 and two orders dated 30th August, 2007 and 16th November, 2007 passed in the present case by this Court. The relevant portion of the judgment rendered by Hon’ble Justice Sanjay Kishan Kaul in M/s. Shree Vinayak Cement Clearing Agency Vs. M/s. Cement Corporation of India Ltd., OMP No. 106/2003 decided on 28th November, 2005 is reproduced hereinbelow:-

“2) Learned counsel for the petitioner attempted to take the Court through the complete records of what transpired before the Arbitrator and to reappraise the material including the evidence and facts, but it was pointed to the learned counsel that such a course was impermissible in law in view of the clear provisions of Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (hereinafter to be referred to as, the said Act). Thus, the petitioner was required to point out under which clause of sub-section (2) of Section 34, would the case of the petitioner fall. Learned counsel submitted that this aspect should be considered taking into consideration the judgment of the Apex Court in Oil and Natural Gas Corporation Ltd. v. Saw Pipes Ltd., AIR 2003 SC 2629. The findings were, thus, sought to be challenged on the following parameters :-

(1) The Award had absence of reasons and did not decide the matter in issue. In this behalf, learned counsel referred to the provisions of sub-section (3) of Section 31 requiring the reasons to be set out in the arbitral award. Learned counsel also referred to the provisions of Section 28, more specifically Section 28(1)(a), 28(2) and Section 28(3) of the said Act to contend that dispute between the parties was not really decided and the Arbitrator was required to decide only disputes raised before the Arbitrator and in accordance with the terms and conditions of the contract. (2) The second aspect of the challenge is the plea that the Award is patently illegal and would be, thus, hit by the provisions of clause (b)(ii) of sub-section (2) of Section 34 of the said Act providing that no Award should be contrary to the public policy. In this behalf, learned counsel referred to para 32 of the judgment of Oil and Natural Gas Corporation Ltd. v. Saw Pipes Ltd.s case (supra) to contend that one of the conditions is that if the award is patently illegal, the same is liable to be set aside.

Insofar as the principles of law are concerned, there is really no dispute. However, the question arises as to whether the same would apply to the facts of the present case. A perusal of the Award shows that the plea of the petitioner that the Award is devoid of any reasoning is misconceived. There is detailed reasoning given in the Award, though it may not be palatable to the petitioner. In this behalf, learned counsel referred to the discussion on claim No. A(1) to A(11) to contend that the Arbitrator had drawn conclusions which were not sustainable. This plea arises from the fact that during the course of hearing, the petitioner for the first time on 02.09.2002 took a stand by saying that no amount was payable to the respondent. The direction of the Arbitrator to jointly reconcile the accounts was declined by the petitioner. The Arbitrator passed an Order on the said date directing the petitioner to scrutinize the Statement of Account submitted by the respondent vide its letter dated 28.07.2002 for ascertaining the outstanding amount payable to