2011 Supreme(Del) 222
IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI
Dipak Misra, C.J. and Sanjiv Khanna, J.
Esab India Limited
Vs.
Special Diriector of Enforcement and Anr.
Writ Petition (Civil) No. 1138/2010
Decided On: 08.03.2011
For Appellant/Petitioner/Plaintiff: Mathews J. Nedumpara, Robin Majumdar and K. Lingaraja, Advs.
For Respondents/Defendant: Sachin Datta, Standing Counsel for UOI
The reasonable restrictions imposed by Section 24 of the Right to Information Act, 2005 in the interest of the security of the State, integrity of India, and public order, and the distinction between national security and other matters, were central legal points established in the judgment.
Headnote:
Right to Information - Constitutionality of Section 24 of the Right to Information Act, 2005 - [FERA, RTI Act] - The court discussed the constitutional proposition enunciated by the U.S. Supreme Court, the presumption of constitutionality of an enactment, and the burden of proof on the party challenging it. The court also considered the necessity to exclude matters causing serious prejudice to the State, the distinction between national security and other matters, and the reasonable restrictions on the right to freedom of speech and expression.
Fact of the Case:
The petitioner, Esab India Limited, challenged the constitutionality of Section 24 read with Second Schedule of the Right to Information Act, 2005, and sought a writ of certiorari for quashment of an order passed by the Central Information Commission. The petitioner contended that the provision infringed the fundamental right to information and was arbitrary and without guidance.
Finding of the Court:
The court found that the restrictions imposed by Section 24 were reasonable and in the interest of the security of the State, integrity of India, and public order. It held that the provision was not arbitrary and unreasonable, and it did not violate Article 14 of the Constitution of India. The writ petition was dismissed.
Issues: The issues involved the constitutionality of Section 24 of the Right to Information Act, 2005, and the petitioner's contention that the provision infringed the fundamental right to information and was arbitrary and without guidance.
Ratio Decidendi: The court's decision was based on the reasonable restrictions imposed by Section 24 in the interest of the security of the State, integrity of India, and public order. It also considered the distinction between national security and other matters, and the reasonable restrictions on the right to freedom of speech and expression.
Final Decision: The writ petition challenging the constitutionality of Section 24 of the Right to Information Act, 2005 was dismissed without any order as to costs.
Dipak Misra, C.J.
1. Before we proceed to state the facts, we may profitably refer to a paragraph from the decision rendered in the case of R.S. Joshi, Sales Tax Officer, Gujarat and Ors. v. Ajit Mills Ltd. and Anr. (1977) 4 SCC 98, wherein Krishna Iyer, J., in his inimitable style expressed thus:
2. A prefactory caveat.- When examining a legislation from the angle of its vires, the Court has to be resilient, not rigid, forward-looking, not static, liberal, not verbal in interpreting the organic law of the nation. We must also remember the constitutional proposition enunciated by the U.S. Supreme Court in Munn v. Illinois viz, "that Courts do not substitute their social and economic beliefs for the judgment of legislative bodies". Moreover, while trespasses will not be forgiven, a presumption of constitutionality must colour judicial construction. These factors, recognized our Court, are essential to the modus vivendi between the judicial and legislative branches of the State, both working beneath the canopy of the Constitution.
2. That apart, in the case of Charanjit Lal Chowdhary v. Union of India AIR 1951 SC 41, it has been held thus:
It is the accepted doctrine of American Courts, which I consider to be well founded on principle, that the presumption is always in favour of the constitutionality of an enactment, and the burden is upon him who attacks it to show that there has been a clear transgression of the constitutional principles.
3. In Ram Krishna Dalmia and Ors. v. Justice S.R. Tendolkar and Ors. AIR 1958 SC 538, the Apex Court ruled that there is always a presumption in favour of the constitutionality of an enactment and the burden is on him who challenges the same to show that there has been a clear transgression of the constitutional principles and it is the duty of the Court to sustain that there is a presumption of constitutionality and in doing so, the Court may take into consideration, the matters of common knowledge, matters of common report, the history of the times and may assume every state of facts which can be conceived existing at the time of legislation.
4. In State of Bihar and Ors. v. Bihar Distillery Limited AIR 1997 SC 1511, the said principle was reiterated.
5. We have referred to the aforesaid authorities for the sanguine and sacrosanct reason as in this writ petition the Petitioner, Esab India Limited, invoking the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, has prayed for declaring Section 24 read with Second Schedule of the Right to Information Act, 2005 (for brevity, "the Act") as unconstitutional and also for issuing a writ of certiorari for quashment of the order dated 11th May, 2009, Annexure-P7, passed by the Central Information Commission. We are disposed to think that the seemly cogitation is to be done in the backdrop of the "caveat". The modus vivendi which requires a purposive and constructive ratiocination while engaged in viceration of the provision, a legislative one, though may draw strength and stimulus in all its variation from the greatest instrument, i.e., the Constitution, in a given case and in a particular factual situation if the provisions trespass the quintessential characteristic of Organic Law or Judge made law should not be allowed to stand.
6. Presently to the factual matrix: The essential facts which are imperative to be unfurled are that the Petitioner, a limited company, is engaged in the business of welding equipments, building infrastructure, etc. On 15th April, 2008, a notice was issued to the Petitioner demanding a sum of Rs. 6,79,28,975/- pursuant to a recovery certificate issued by the Special Director of Enforcement Directorate, the first Respondent herein. After receipt of the said demand notice, the Petitioner came to know that an adjudication order dated 24th February, 2004 imposing the penalty has been passed under Section 8(3) and 8(4) of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973 (for short, "FERA"). After