S. Ravindra Bhat, J.

1. In the present appeal, the judgment and order of 19.09.2012, dismissing CS 1085/1991, has been impugned.

2. The plaintiff – which has filed the present appeal (and is hereafter referred to as “DCM” or “the plaintiff” variously), claimed a declaration and decree for permanent injunction in respect of land situated at Baghraoji, Delhi. The DCM contended that some of its other lands were taken-over by the Delhi Improvement Trust as it was required for realignment of drain known as “Daryai Nala” and in exchange it was allotted the suit land. The plaintiff also stated that physical possession of the land allotted and made over to it was given sometime in 1942-1943 and ever since it was in continuous, exclusive and uninterrupted possession and enjoyment as the owner. The DDA initiated the proceeding under the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, [hereafter referred to as “the 1971 Act”]. The notice under the 1971 Act was issued sometime in 1990 and proceedings were commenced by the DDA, the defendant thereafter. The Estate Officer proceeded with the matter. During the pendency of those proceedings, the DCM filed CS 1085/1991 claiming declaration that it was the owner in possession and seeking a decree of declaration restraining the defendant DDA from dispossessing it. The DDA filed written statement urging various contentions. It also averred that the suit was not maintainable on the ground that notice in terms of Section 53A of the Delhi Development Authority Act had not been issued. The DDA objected to the maintainability of the suit, however, on the ground that it was barred by Section 15 of the Public Premises Act. The DDA filed an application, I.A. No. 11206/1992, in terms of the provisions of Order VII Rule 11 Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) for rejection of the suit, on the ground that notice under Section 53B had not been served. It also pleaded that DCM’s argument that it was the owner and entitled to a declaration, was not made-out because of Section 15 and further that in the absence of any title document, such a plea was untenable.

3. By a judgment and order dated 08.08.1995, a learned Single Judge of this Court accepted the application for rejection of the suit only on the ground that the provisions of Section 53B had not been complied with. However, the other ground for rejection of the suit was not accepted. It was observed that:

“In the suit the plaintiff is seeking declaration of its title also on the basis of having acquired the same by adverse possession for which prima facie, on the basis of the averments made in the plaint it cannot be said that the jurisdiction of the civil court would stand ousted. Ultimately on evidence being led, in case it is found that plaintiff had acquired no title by adverse possession, it might be held that the property falls under the definition of public premises and in that eventuality Civil Court will have no jurisdiction. The Court at this stage has to look only at the averments made in the plaint and nothing else. Defendant must be taken to admit, for the sake of arguments, the allegations as made in the plaint that are true in the manner and form in which those are made. In case allegations in the plaint are taken as a whole, it would be seen that plaintiff’s claim is that it has remained in continuous possession of the suit property without any interruption, openly, peacefully and in assertion of its right as an owner for a period of more than 12 years before proceedings were commenced under the Public Premises Act. Since title has been acquired by holding adversely, its possession cannot be disturbed. This objection also is not sufficient to reject the plaint.”

4. Though DCM’s argument was that the suit could not be rejected at the threshold and, therefore, required a trial, was accepted, the Court proceeded to reject the plaint on the ground of non-compliance with the provisions of Section 53B. Consequently, the DCM preferr