2013 Supreme(Del) 1108

HIGH COURT OF DELHI
MANMOHAN SINGH, J.

The Punjab State Co-Operative Supply & Marketing Federation Limited (M/s. Markfed)
Versus
Amit Goel & Another
RC. Rev. No. 247 of 2013 & C.M. No. 10716 of 2013 (for stay)
Decided on: 03-09-2013

The Court held that a co-operative society, which has been declared to be falling under the ambit of the expression “other authorities” appearing in Article 12 of the Constitution of India, would not be deemed to be “Government” for the purposes of Section 3 (b) of the DRCA.

Headnote:

DRC ACT - SECTION 3 - APPLICABILITY - GOVERNMENT BODY - CO-OPERATIVE SOCIETY - BONAFIDE REQUIREMENT - LANDLORD-TENANT RELATIONSHIP - LEAVE TO DEFEND APPLICATION - REVISION PETITION - JURISDICTION - HIGH COURT - SCOPE OF INTERFERENCE - SECTION 25B(8) - MATERIAL IRREGULARITY - GROSS ILLEGALITY - RE-APPRAISAL OF EVIDENCE - REASONABLE CONCLUSION - STANDARD OF PROOF - PRESUMPTION OF GENUINENESS - BURDEN OF PROOF - TENANT'S OBJECTION - RELEVANT FACTORS - SUITABILITY - CONVENIENCE - LIFESTYLE - HABITS - BACKGROUND - SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITIES - ADDITIONAL EVIDENCE - SUBSEQUENT EVENTS - PERMISSION OF COURT - STRICT PROCEDURE - SUMMARY TRIAL - MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING - SECTION 19 - RESTITUTION OF PREMISES - ABUSE OF PROCESS - COMMERCIAL ACTIVITY - GUEST HOUSE - TRANSIT ACCOMMODATION - SERIOUS ILLNESS - REASONABLE ACCOMMODATION - UNDERTAKING - VACANT POSSESSION - SUB-LETTING - THIRD PARTY INTEREST.

Fact of the Case:

The petitioner, an Apex Co-operative Society of the State of Punjab, challenged the impugned order passed by the Additional Rent Controller (04), South, New Delhi, dismissing its leave to defend application in an eviction petition filed by the respondents (petitioners therein) for the suit property in Defence Colony, New Delhi. The petitioner claimed that it was a Government body and hence protected under Section 3 of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 (DRC Act), and that the eviction petition was not maintainable for want of prior notice under Section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC). The respondents contended that the petitioner was not a Government body and that the suit property was required for their bonafide need due to the serious illness of their father and sister.

Finding of the Court:

The Court held that the petitioner, being a co-operative society, could not be considered a Government body for the purposes of Section 3 of the DRC Act. The Court further held that the eviction petition was maintainable as the provisions of Section 80 CPC were not applicable to eviction petitions filed under Section 14(1)(e) of the DRC Act, which provided for a special summary procedure for eviction on the ground of bonafide requirement. The Court also found that the respondents had established a prima facie case of bonafide requirement, considering the serious illness of their father and sister, and that the petitioner had failed to raise any triable issue that would disentitle the respondents from obtaining an order of eviction.

Issues: 1. Whether the petitioner, being an Apex Co-operative Society of the State of Punjab, was a Government body and hence protected under Section 3 of the DRC Act? 2. Whether the eviction petition was maintainable for want of prior notice under Section 80 CPC? 3. Whether the respondents had established a prima facie case of bonafide requirement? 4. Whether the petitioner had raised any triable issue that would disentitle the respondents from obtaining an order of eviction?

Ratio Decidendi: 1. The Court held that the petitioner, being a co-operative society, could not be considered a Government body for the purposes of Section 3 of the DRC Act. The Court relied on the decision of the Punjab & Haryana High Court in Chiman Lal Gupta (dead) through LR’s vs. Punjab State Co-operative Supplies and Marketing Federation Limited, Chandigarh, wherein it was held that the petitioner was an agency and instrumentality of the State that falls within the ambit of the expression “other authorities” appearing under Article 12 of the Constitution of India. The Court further observed that the scope of the protection under Section 3 of the DRC Act was limited to premises belonging to the Government or premises taken on a grant from the Government, and that the petitioner did not fall within either of these categories. 2. The Court held that the eviction petition was maintainable as the provisions of Section 80 CPC were not applicable to eviction petitions filed under Section 14(1)(e) of the DRC Act, which provided for a special summary procedure for eviction on the ground of bonafide requirement. The Court relied on the decision of the Supreme Court in Prithipal Singh vs. Satpal Singh (dead) Through Its Legal Representatives, wherein it was held that Section 25B of the DRC Act was a special code and that the eviction petition had to be dealt with as per the specific provisions of Section 25B. The Court also observed that Rule 23 of the Delhi Rent Control Rules did not confer any power on the Rent Controller to follow the provisions of the CPC in special classes of landlords. 3. The Court held that the respondents had established a prima facie case of bonafide requirement, considering the serious illness of their father and sister. The Court relied on the documents filed by the respondents, including medical bills and discharge summaries, to show the extent of their father’s illness and the need for specialized medical care. The Court also noted that the respondents had undertaken to use the suit property by themselves and not to sub-let or create any third party interest. 4. The Court held that the petitioner had failed to raise any triable issue that would disentitle the respondents from obtaining an order of eviction. The Court observed that the petitioner had merely disputed the bonafide requirement of the respondents without providing any substantial evidence to support its claim. The Court also noted that the petitioner had not raised any triable issue with regard to the landlord-tenant relationship or the applicability of Section 3 of the DRC Act.

Final Decision: The Court dismissed the petition and granted the petitioner six months’ time to vacate the suit property. The Court also directed the petitioner to hand over vacant and peaceful possession of the suit property to the respondents after the expiry of the said period and not to sub-let or create any third party interest in the suit premises during this period.