The failure to provide notice under a registered caveat does not render the order a nullity, and an alternate remedy under Section 10F of the Companies Act, 1956 is equally efficacious.

S. Ravindra Bhat, J.

1. This a review petition filed against the order and judgment of this Court in WP(C) No. 5889/2013, dated 1.10.2013. In this writ petition, directions were sought, inter alia, to the Company Law Board to frame regulations in respect of lodging caveats before that body (hereafter “the CLB”) as well as to this Court, to regulate filing of caveats, under Section 148-A of the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC). More specifically, a direction was sought that some orders of the CLB made are a nullity, and therefore, liable to be quashed.

2. Briefly, the petitioners had filed the above writ petition, praying, inter alia, for declaring that the impugned order of the Bench Officer ‘reviewing’ his decision to register a caveat (leading thus to an order dated 12.9.2013) is a nullity in law. The petitioners claimed to have filed a caveat before the CLB on 10.9.13 in Vikram Bakshi v. Connaught Plaza Restaurants for notice of any hearings scheduled to take place in the matter, and for the provision of all documents tendered by the parties to the CLB. In the caveat application under Section 148A, CPC, at paragraphs 4-14, the caveat petitioners also sought to establish their interest in the matter, as also indicating an intention to request from impleadment as an intervenor. In addition, the petitioners also requested the Court to issue guidelines for the issuance of caveats generally, as it was argued that the practice was largely incoherent and inconsistent. With regard to the matter in Vikram Bakshi, the writ petition had claimed that the CLB heard the matter and made orders without the requisite papers being served or made available to the caveators. It is argued that on 11.9.2013, one of the parties before the CLB indicated refusal to serve a copy of the petition to caveators on saying that they were not respondents. Subsequent to this, it is argued that a judicial member of the CLB, who is also arrayed as a respondent in his personal capacity in the present writ petition, noted in open court that the petition would not be served upon the caveators. This, contend the caveator petitioners, amounted to an impermissible review of the earlier decision of the Bench Officer to register the caveat, which carried with it the requirement that the petition be served (upon the caveator).

3. The petitioners argued that this amounted to the orders of the CLB being a nullity and consequently without force of law. It was specifically urged that upon the caveat being filed on 09.09.2013, the Bench Officer indicated acceptance, and thus, the Chairman could not have then assigned the matter to a CLB member, and neither could the Bench Officer have reviewed this decision subsequently. Rather, in the writ petition, as again in the present review petition, reference was made to Regulation 32 of the Company Law Board regulations to say that in such circumstances, if anyone had a grievance, an appeal under Regulation 32 (2) had to be preferred by the other party.

4. After considering the arguments advanced by the petitioner, this Court dismissed the writ petition inter alia, holding:

“7. The question as to whether an order of stay made without hearing the caveator is unenforceable or is a nulllity was considered by the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Reserve Bank of India Employees Association v. The Reserve Bank of India, AIR 1981 AP 246, where the court held as follows:

“It follows, therefore, that the order passed by a Court without giving a notice to the caveator cannot be treated as a nullity. If a statute intends to demolish the ordinary powers of a Civil Court, it is well settled proposition of law that it can only be done by a direct piece of legislation enacted for that purpose and not by the effect of an indirect legislation as if it were by a side wind. The powers of a Civil Court are too sacrosanct to be allowed to be diluted or to be curtailed by a mere remote implication. I, therefore, hold that as there is no specific provision