2015 Supreme(Del) 747
High Court of Delhi
VALMIKI J. MEHTA, J.
M. Murugesan – Appellant
Versus
Bharat Heavy Electricals Ltd. & Others – Respondents
W.P.(C) No. 5450 of 2002
Decided On : 06-05-2015
Advocate Appeared:
For the Petitioner:Manish K. Bishnoi, Advocate
The court emphasized the limited grounds for interference with the selection process and highlighted the administrative nature of the selection committee's function.
Headnote:
Appointment - Hindi Officer - 1. SCC 305, 2008 14 SCC 306 - The court discussed the legal provisions related to the appointment process, the role of the selection committee, and the limitations of the court in interfering with the selection process. The court emphasized that it cannot substitute its view for that of the selection committee and can only interfere on limited grounds such as illegality, irregularity, or mala fides. It also highlighted that the function of the selection committee is administrative and need not provide reasons for its decisions unless bound by rules or regulations. The judgment also addressed the appointment of Assistant Hindi Officers and the administrative exigencies involved in the selection process.
Fact of the Case:
The petitioner sought to quash the appointments made by Bharat Heavy Electricals Ltd to the posts of Hindi Officer and Assistant Hindi Officer, alleging bias and illegality in the selection process.
Finding of the Court:
The court found that the petitioner was duly considered for the appointment but was rejected, and it cannot substitute its views for that of the selection committee. The court also rejected the petitioner's contention regarding the appointment of Assistant Hindi Officers, citing administrative exigencies and lack of prejudice to the petitioner.
Issues: 1. Whether the petitioner was wrongly denied appointment to the post of Hindi Officer. 2. Whether there was any illegality in the selection process and the appointment of Assistant Hindi Officers.
Ratio Decidendi: The court emphasized the limited grounds for interference with the selection process and highlighted the administrative nature of the selection committee's function. It also considered the administrative exigencies involved in the appointment of Assistant Hindi Officers.
Final Decision: The petition was dismissed, and no costs were awarded.
1. By this writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the petitioner seeks the relief of quashing the appointments made by the respondent no.1/Bharat Heavy Electricals Ltd to the posts of Hindi Officer and Assistant Hindi Officer and which process was initiated by the circulars dated 20.9.2000 and 28.10.2000.
2. The case of the petitioner is that since he has the necessary qualifications of a graduation degree and a post graduation degree in Hindi subject, he had therefore applied for appointment to one of the ten posts of Hindi Officer in terms of the aforesaid circulars. Petitioner contends that he was eminently suitable for the post but he was not appointed and others were appointed. Petitioner alleges bias of the Selection Committee in having made selection of persons only from a particular area/office. Petitioner also questions the action of the respondent no.1 in using the selection process for appointment to the posts of Hindi Officer for appointing instead of 10 Hindi Officers, 5 Hindi Officers and 10 Assistant Hindi Officers, on the ground that the posts of Assistant Hindi Officers were not advertised.
3. Therefore, two issues have to be decided by this Court as to whether petitioner has wrongly been denied appointment to the post of Hindi Officer and that whether there was any illegality in the selection process. Second issue to be decided is whether respondent no.1 could have used the selection process for appointment to the post of Hindi Officers for appointing 10 Assistant Hindi Officers.
4. So far as the first issue is concerned, law in this regard is stated by the Supreme Court in its judgment in the case of Dalpat Abasaheb Solunke and Others Vs. Dr. B.S. Mahajan and Others (1990) 1 SCC 305 wherein the Supreme Court has categorically held that courts do not sit as appellate court over the decisions of the selection committee because it is the selection committee which scrutinizes the relevant merits of the candidates and decides whether a candidate is fit or not to be appointed to a particular post. It has been further observed in this judgment that a court has no expertise to substitute the expertise of the selection committee in scrutinizing and appointing candidates. Relevant observations in this judgment are contained in para 12 of this judgment and which para 12 reads as under:-
“12. It will thus appear that apart from the fact that the High Court has rolled the cases of the two appointees in one, though their appointments are not assailable on the same grounds, the Court has also found it necessary to sit in appeal over the decision of the Selection Committee and to embark upon deciding the relative merits of the candidates. It is needless to emphasise that it is not the function of the Court to hear appeals over the decisions of the Selection Committees and to scrutinize the relative merits of the Candidates. Whether a candidate is fit for a particular post or not has to be decided by the duly constituted Selection Committee which has the expertise on the subject. The Court has no such expertise. The decision of the Selection Committee can be interfered with only on limited grounds, such as illegality or patent material irregularity in the Constitution of the Committee or its procedure vitiating the selection, or proved mala fides affecting the selection etc. It is not disputed that in the present case the University had constituted the Committee in due compliance with the relevant statutes. The Committee consisted of experts and it selected the candidates after going through all the relevant material before it. In sitting in appeal over the selection so made and in setting it aside on the ground of the so called comparative merits of the candidates as assessed by the Court, the High Court went wrong and exceeded its jurisdiction.”
5. The aforesaid proposition of law has