M.L. Mehta, J.

1. By this common order the aforementioned two revision petitions under Section 25B(8) of the Delhi Rent Control Act (for short ‘the Act’) are being disposed as common questions of law and fact are arising out of two separate orders, both dated 10.02.2012, of Additional Rent Controller.

2. The petitioners are tenants under the respondents. Petitioner Kishore is a tenant in respect of Shop No.33-E, whereas petitioner Trilok Singh is a tenant in respect of Shop No. 33-D, South Patel Nagar Market, New Delhi. Their evictions are sought from the tenanted shops on the ground of bonafide requirement thereof by the respondents for their commercial requirements. Respondent No. 1 Prabodh Kumar is stated to be running a confectionary business at Shop No. 33-C, which is adjoining the tenanted shops. The case as set up by the respondents is that the tenanted shops are required for expanding the confectionary business as the space available with the respondent No. 1 is not sufficient it is also their case that he wants to set up an eating joint for his grown up son, and that they have no other suitable commercial space.

3. The petitioners filed leave to defend application on various grounds. They denied the respondent No. 1 to be requiring the tenanted shops for expanding his confectionary business or for his son to set up business of eating joint. It is alleged that the present shop available with the respondent No. 1 is quite spacious for his business and that his son is a school going boy, and not grown up enough to set up his own business.

4. The learned ARC vide his separate impugned orders declined leave to defend to the petitioners. These orders are challenged by the petitioners in the instant petitions.

5. Being mindful of the nature and scope of the revisional power of this court under Section 25-B(8), it may be reiterated that when, from the averments as set up in the leave to defend application, as also the reply filed by the landlord thereto, there appears something on record, requiring to see as to whether the Controller passed the order according to law, this court may peruse the records to ascertain whether any illegality has been committed by the Controller in Passing the order under Section 25-B of the Act. There is no dispute to the submissions, which are made by the learned counsel for the respondent/landlord that the landlord is the best judge to decide about his requirement and choice of the place, and neither the tenant nor this Court can dictate to him as to how else he can adjust himself, without getting possession of the tenanted premises. But, at the same time, it is also settled law that mere assertion that landlord requires the premises, occupied by the tenant, for his personal occupation, is not decisive and it is for the Court to determine the truth of the claim and also to see as to whether the claim is bonafide. Further, in determining as to whether the claim is bonafide or not, the Court is entitled and indeed bound to consider whether it is reasonable. A claim founded on abnormal predilections of the landlord may not be regarded as bonafide.

6. It is also repeatedly reiterated by the Supreme Court and reference can be have to the case of Shiv Sarup Gupta Vs. Dr. Mahesh Chand Gupta, (1999) 6 SCC 222 wherein the Apex Court held thus:

“Thus the term bonafide genuinely refers to a state of mind. Requirement is not a mere desire. The degree of intensity contemplated by 'requires' is much more, higher than in mere desire. The phrase 'required bonafide' is suggestive of legislative intent that a mere desire which is outcome of whim or fancy is not taken note of by the Rent Control Legislation. A requirement in the sense of felt need which is an outcome of a sincere, honest desire, in contra-distinction with a mere pretence or pretext to evict a tenant, on the part of the landlord claiming to occupy the premises for himself or for any member of the family would entitle him to seek ejectment of the