The court clarified the requirements for representation of parties under Section 36 of the ID Act and upheld the bar on representation by a legal practitioner.

Mukta Gupta, J.

1. By these petitions, the Petitioner impugns the identical orders dated 11th March, 2011 whereby the applications of the Petitioner under Section 36 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (in short, ‘ID Act’) was dismissed whereas the applications of the Respondents under Section 36 of the ID Act were allowed.

2. The brief facts giving rise to the filing of the present petitions are that the Respondents filed their claim before the Industrial Tribunal alleging illegal termination by the Petitioner. The claims of the Respondents were filed through Universal Proutist Labour Federation (Registered) (in short, ‘UPLF’). The Petitioner took the objection that the Federation was not competent to espouse the cause of the Respondents in the written statement and also filed an application under Section 36 of the ID Act claiming that the Federation was not registered with the Labour Department. It was not a registered trade union and nothing has been placed on record regarding the subscription of the membership by the workmen to the union and that the workmen have not disclosed when they became members of the said Federation. Applications were also filed by the Respondents under Section 36 of the ID Act contending that the management could not be represented through an Advocate. The learned trial court held that in view of the bar under Section 36(3) of the ID Act, the Petitioner could not be represented by a legal practitioner or an Advocate and thus allowed the applications of the Respondents and held that the Advocate was not entitled to appear for and on behalf of the management in the present case. As regards the applications of the Respondents, it was held that it was not necessary that the workman should be a member of the union and any member of the executive or the office bearer of any trade union may be authorized under Section 36(1)(c) of the ID Act to represent the workman.

3. Learned counsel for the Petitioner has strenuously contended that in terms of Section 36(1), the workman can be represented either through a trade union or a federation of which he is a member in which case Section 36(1)(a) and (b) would apply. In the present case, the impugned order has been passed under Section 36(1)(c) of the ID Act, however, a major factor which has been ignored by the learned trial court is that even in a case where a worker is not a member of any trade union, then he can be represented by any trade union which is connected with or by any other workman employed in the industry in which the worker is employed and duly authorized. The learned trial court did not consider this requirement. The Respondents have not even placed on record any evidence that the UPLF was a trade union connected with the industry in which the Respondents were working. Further, even if it is assumed that the order was passed under Section 36(1)(a) and (b), the documents relied upon by the Respondents did not show that they are the members of UPLF. The two documents relied upon are the Registration Certificate of the Federation and the application dated 2nd December, 2008. It is the case of the Petitioner that the application dated 2nd December, 2008 seeking subscription of UPLF by the workmen is a fabricated document on the face of it, as the application is dated 2nd December, 2008 whereas it mentions about the date of removal as 4th April, 2009. Thus, on either count, the learned trial court erred in dismissing the applications of the Petitioner and that the Respondents were duly represented by UPLF.

4. Learned counsel for the Respondents, on the other hand, contends that there is no infirmity in the impugned order in view of the law laid down by the Supreme Court in Pradip Port Trust vs. Their Workmen, AIR 1977 SC 36; and Siemens Limited vs. K.K. Gupta & Anr. 125 (2005) DLT 85 and in view of the bar under Section 36(3) of the ID Act, the Petitioner could not be represented through an Advocate. The contention of the Petitioner that the