Mukta Gupta, J.

1. By this application the Appellant seeks condonation of delay of 166 days in filing the present appeal.

2. The Foreign Exchange Appellate Tribunal (in short The Tribunal) vide its order dated 2nd February, 2007 in Appeal No. 121/1999 directed the Appellant to deposit a sum of Rs. 7,00,50,000/- as pre-deposit failing which the appeal would not be entertained. Against the said order dated 2nd February, 2007 of the Tribunal the Appellant filed a writ petition before the High Court of Gujarat which was returned for want of territorial jurisdiction on 7th December, 2007 to be presented before the appropriate forum. Consequently, the Appellant preferred writ petition (civil) No. 7260/2007 before this Court on 29th September, 2007 wherein this Court issued notice and stayed further proceedings before the Learned Tribunal. Vide order dated 30th July, 2010 this Court disposed of the writ petition in view of the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Raj Kumar Shivhare Vs. Assistant Director, Directorate of Enforcement (2010) 4 SCC 772 holding that appropriate remedy would be by way of filing an appeal. On 2nd August, 2010 the Appellant applied for a certified copy of the order which was delivered on 9th August, 2010. The Appellant filed the present appeal on the 10th February, 2011. The reasons for delay in filing the present appeal as stated on affidavit are that the Appellant is a resident outside Delhi and has limited means. It took some time for the Appellant to arrange necessary funds for the purpose of filing the appeal. Further, due to shifting of the Advocate’s office, the file of the writ petition could not be traced and so there was some delay in tracing out the file. Thus, it is prayed that the delay of 166 days in filing the appeal be condoned.

3. Learned counsel for the Appellant relying upon Kailash Vs. Nanhku and Ors. (2005) 4 SCC 480 and Thirumalai Chemicals Limited Vs. Union of India & Ors. (2011) 6 SCC 739 canvassed that the right of appeal is a substantive right whereas the law of limitation is a procedural law and thus the procedural law cannot override the substantive right. If there is sufficient cause for condoning the delay, this Court will exercise its powers and ensure that substantive justice is assured to the parties.

4. Learned counsel for the Respondent on the other hand relies upon the decisions in Singh Enterprises Vs. Commissioner of Central Excise, Jamshedpur & Ors. (2008) 3 SCC 70; Goodearth Steels Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Commissioner of Central Excise, Kanpur (2008) 3 SCC 77 and Commissioner of Customs, Central Excise, Noida Vs. Punjab Fibres Ltd., Noida (2008) 3 SCC 73 to contend that proviso to sub-Section 1 of Section 35 Foreign Exchange Management Act (in short FEMA) clearly provide that after the expiry of the period of 60 days, the Court has no power to condone the delay and that there is a complete exclusion of Section 5 of the Limitation Act.

5. Heard learned counsel for the parties. Section 35 of the Foreign Exchange Management Act 1999 (in short FEMA) provides as under:

“Appeal to High Court.

35. Any person aggrieved by any decision or order of the Appellate Tribunal may file an appeal to the High Court within sixty days from the date of communication of the decision or order of the Appellate Tribunal on any question of law arising out of such order:

Provided that the High Court may, if it is satisfied that the appellant was prevented by sufficient cause from filing the appeal within the said period, allow it to be filed within a further period not exceeding sixty days.

Explanation.—In this section "High Court" means— (a) the High Court within the jurisdiction of which the aggrieved party ordinarily resides or carries on business or personally works for gain; and

(b) where the Central Government is the aggrieved party, the High Court within the jurisdiction of which the respondent, or in a case where there are more than one respondent, any of the respondents, ordinarily resides o