The main legal point established is the importance of finality of judgments, barring of laches, and abuse of process in re-litigation.

RAJIV SAHAI ENDLAW, J.

1. The petition i) seeks de-sealing of industrial plot bearing No.92, Block No.S, Functional Industrial Estate for Electronics, Okhla Industrial Area Phase-II, New Delhi by quashing of the order dated 30th September, 2003 of eviction with respect thereto, by declaring that Sh. C.B. Mehsram who as Estate Officer passed the said order was not notified under Section 3 of the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 (PP Act) and thus the order of eviction and consequential order dated 30th October, 2009 of sealing are illegal and void; ii) impugns the order dated 24th January, 2014 of the respondents Delhi Administration and Delhi State Industrial & Infrastructure Development Corporation (DSIIDC), and iii) seeks restoration of the lease of the land underneath the aforesaid property in favour of the petitioners.

2. The petition came up first before this court on 1st May, 2015 when on the counsel for the petitioners citing the order dated 31st October, 2012 in W.P.(C) No.6832/2012 notice of the petition was issued. Thereafter on 16th July, 2015 when the matter was listed, the following order was passed:

“1. After the counsel for the petitioners has been heard to an extent and after he is unable to satisfy this Court as to how this proceeding is not clearly an abuse of the process of the Court inasmuch as the petitioners have invoked writ jurisdiction after allowing the judgment in a suit with the same cause of action and grievance has attained finality, the counsel for the petitioners states that he is not prepared for arguments because on 1st May, 2015 notice of the petition was issued for today.

2. No such adjournment at this stage can be granted.

3. The counsel is at liberty to file written arguments by 20th July, 2015.

4. Now the counsel for the petitioner requests that the time for filing the written arguments be extended till 21st July, 2015.

5. Allowed.

6. The counsels for the respondents have also been heard.

7. Judgment reserved.”

3. The counsel for the petitioners has filed written synopsis and which has been perused.

4. The undisputed facts are:

(i) The President of India vide perpetual lease dated 19th April, 1984 leased unto the petitioner No.2 Gulshan Lal, industrial plot bearing No.92, ad-measuring 307 sq. yds. in the layout of Functional Industrial Estate for Electronics, Okhla Industrial Area Phase-II, New Delhi and on the terms and conditions contained therein. One of the terms of the said lease deed was that the lessee shall within a period of two years from 19th April, 1984 and which time was specified to be the essence of the contract, after obtaining sanction to the building plan, at his own expense, erect upon the industrial plot and complete in a substantial workman like manner an industrial building for carrying on the approved manufacturing process or industry with the requisite and proper walls, sewers and drains and other conveniences in accordance with the sanctioned building plan and to the satisfaction of the municipal or other body;

(ii) The office of the Commissioner of Industries, Delhi Administration vide order dated 24th February, 1992 cancelled the allotment of the aforesaid plot of land in favour of the petitioner no.2 Sh. Gulshan Lal and determined the perpetual lease in his favour and directed the petitioner no.2 Sh. Gulshan Lal to handover vacant possession of the plot within 30 days of the order failing which he was threatened with proceedings under the PP Act. It was recorded in the said order:

(a) That the aforesaid plot was leased in favour of the petitioner no.2 Sh. Gulshan Lal for manufacturing of transistor, radio and P.A. equipments;

(b) As per the departmental Guidelines framed under the provisions of Clause III of the perpetual lease deed, construction of industrial building was to be completed within maximum permissible period of seven years from the date of execution of the lease deed on payment of composition charges;

(c) That the petitioner