SupremeToday Landscape Ad
Back
Next
Judicial Analysis Court Copy Headnote Facts Arguments Court observation
Listen Audio Icon Pause Audio Icon
judgment-img

1964 Supreme(SC) 253

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
P.B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, C.J.I., K.N. WANCHOO, M. HIDAYATULLAH, RAGHUBAR DAYAL AND J.R. MUDHOLKAR, JJ.
Devilal Modi, Appellant
Versus
Sales Tax Officer, Ratlam and others, Respondents.
Civil Appeal No. 249 of 1964,
7th October, 1964
Advocates appeared
Mr. U. M. Trivedi, Senior Advocate, (M/s. R. C. Koohatta, S. G. Dafria, S.S. Khanduja, S K. Manchanda and Ganpat Rai, Advocates with him), for Appellant; Mr. B. Sen, Senior Advocate (Mr. I. N. Shroff Advocate, with him), for Respondents.

Advocates:
B.SEN, GANPAT RAI, I.M.SHROFF, R.C.KUHATTA, S.G.Dafria, S.K.Manchanda, S.S.Khanduja, U.M.TRIVEDI

Headnote:(1) Constitution of India - Arts. 226 & 227 - principle of res-judicata applies to writ petitions for upholding fundamental rights – taxation - orders of assessment for different years - questions decided in relation to assessment of previous year - may not be res judicata when assessment of subsequent year challenged.

       (2) Civil P.C., 1908 - S. 11 - doctrine of res-judicata - what is - object behind the principle.

       An assessee challenged the assessment for a particular year on certain grounds in a writ petition. The petition was dismissed on those grounds. Some other grounds were not allowed to be raised by the petitioner before the Supreme Court on the ground that they were not raised before the High Court. The petitioner again challenged the same assessment on the additional grounds.

       Held: The general principle underlying the doctrine of res-judicata is ultimately based on considerations of public policy. One important consideration of public policy is that the decisions pronounced by Courts of competent jurisdiction should be final, unless they are modified or reversed by appellate authorities; and the other principle is that no one should be made to face the same kind of litigation twice over, because such a process would be contrary to considerations of fair play and justice. (1962) 1 SCR 574 relied on. [Para 7]

       In regard to orders of assessment for different years, the position may be different. Even if the said orders are passed under the same provisions of law, it may theoretically be open to the party to contend that the liability being recurring from year to year, the cause of action is not the same; and so, even if a citizen's petition challenging the order of assessment passed against him for one year is rejected, it may be open to him to challenge a similar assessment order passed for the next year. In that case, the Court may ultimately adopt the same view which had been adopted on the earlier occasion; but if a new ground is urged, the Court may have to consider it on the merits, because, strictly speaking, the principle of res-judicata may not apply to such a case. 1964 JLJ 404 (SC), relied on. [Para 9]

       Though the Courts dealing with the questions of the infringement of fundamental rights must consistently endeavour to sustain the said rights and should strike down their unconstitutional invasion, it would not be right to ignore the principle of res-judicata altogether in dealing with writ petitions filed by citizens alleging the contravention of their fundamental rights. Considerations of public policy cannot be ignored in such cases, and the basic doctrine that judgments pronounced by this Court are binding and must be regarded as final between the parties in respect of matter covered by them must receive due consideration. 1964 JLJ 404, explained. [Para 10]

Judgement Key Points

The Court emphasized that it is not permissible for a party to seek a second opportunity to challenge an order on a ground that was available but not raised in the initial proceeding. This principle is rooted in the need to uphold the finality and conclusiveness of judicial decisions, thereby preventing unnecessary harassment of litigants and conserving judicial resources. Allowing multiple challenges on the same order, especially with the introduction of new grounds that could have been raised earlier, would undermine the stability of legal proceedings and erode public confidence in the finality of judgments. The Court underscored that adherence to this principle promotes fairness, consistency, and the efficient functioning of the judicial system.


Judgment

GAJENDRAGADKAR, C.J.I. : The short question which this appeal raises for our decision is whether the principle of constructive res judicata can be invoked against a writ petition filed by the appellant Devilal Modi, who is the Proprietor of M/s. Daluram Pannalal Modi, under Art. 226 of the Constitution. The appellant has been assessed to sales-tax for the year 1957-58 under the Madhya Bharat Sales Tax Act, 1950. He challenged the validity of the said order of assessment by a writ petition filed by him (No.114/1961) in the High Court of Madhya Pradesh on the 25th April, 1961. The High Court dismissed his writ petition and by special leave, the appellant came to this Court in appeal against the said decision of the High Court. On the 8th March, 1963, the appellant s appeal by special leave was dismissed by this Court.

2. Thereafter, the appellant filed the present writ petition in the same High Court on the 23rd April, 1963 (No.129/1963). By this writ petition the appellant challenges the validity of the same order of assessment. The High Court has considered the merits of the additional grounds urged by the appellant on this occasion and has rejected them. In the result, this second writ petition filed by the appellant has been dismissed by the High Court on the 29th April, 1963. It is against this decision that the appellant has come to this Court by special leave; and that raises the question as to whether it is open to the appellant to challenge the validity of the same order of assessment twice by two consecutive writ petitions under Art. 226.

3. It appears that the Madhya Bharat Sales Tax Act, 1950, under which the impugned: order of assessment against the appellant to pay sales-tax for the year 1957-58 has been passed, was repealed by the Madhya Pradesh General Sales Tax Act, 1958 on the 1st April, 1959. It was on the 31st December, 1960 that a notice was issued to the appellant by the Assistant Commissioner of Sales Tax under the 1958 Act. This notice recited that the Assistant Commissioner was satisfied that the appellant s sales during the period from 1st April, 1957 to 31st March, 1958 had escaped assessment and thereby the appellant had rendered himself liable to be reassessed under S. 19(1) of the Act. Pursuant to this notice, fresh assessment proceedings were started against the appellant in respect of the sales in the year 1957-58, and as a result of the said proceedings, an order was passed on the 31st March, 1961, imposing an additional tax on the appellant to the extent of Rs. 31,250 for the year in question and a penalty of Rs. 15,000. It is this order which is the subject-matter of both the writ petitions.

3-A. In his first writ petition, the appellant had substantially raised two contentions. He had urged that though S. 30 of the Act had made provision for the delegation of the duties of the Commissioner, in fact by his order passed by the Commissioner in pursuance of the said authority, he had delegated to the Assistant Commissioner his power under S.19, but not his duties; and the said delegation, therefore, made the proceedings taken by the Assistant Commissioner invalid in law. The other contention raised by the appellant against the validity of the said order was that it was in respect of sales which had been assessed earlier under the Act of 1950 and the same could not be reassessed under the subsequent Act. It is true that the said earlier assessment had been subsequently cancelled by an order made under S. 39(2) of the Act of 19581 but it was argued that the said order of cancellation was itself invalid. Both these contentions were rejected by this Court, with the result that the appeal preferred by the appellant was dismissed with costs.

4. It appears that at the hearing of the appeal before this Court, Mr. Trivedi for the appellant sought to raise two additional points, but he was not permitted to do so on the ground hat they had not been specified in the writ petition filed before the High Cou











Click Here to Read the rest of this document
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
SupremeToday Portrait Ad
supreme today icon
logo-black

An indispensable Tool for Legal Professionals, Endorsed by Various High Court and Judicial Officers

Please visit our Training & Support
Center or Contact Us for assistance

qr

Scan Me!

India’s Legal research and Law Firm App, Download now!

For Daily Legal Updates, Join us on :

whatsapp-icon Back to top