Procedural defects that do not go to the root of the matter should not defeat a just cause, and substantive rights should not be defeated by procedural irregularities.

NAVIN CHAWLA, J.

1. This appeal under Section 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (in short ‘the Act’) has been filed by the appellant Shabnam Gulati challenging the order dated 29.07.2016 passed by the learned Single Judge dismissing her objection under Section 34 of the Act in OMP No.1062/2013. The appellant had challenged the Arbitration Award dated 27.04.2013 passed by the sole arbitrator against the appellant and her husband late Sunil Dhakamvik Gulati, inter-alia awarding a sum of Rs.2,88,78,504.23 along with interest @ 18% p.a. w.e.f. 14.08.2012 and cost.

2. The dispute between the parties arose out of a loan agreement bearing XMORGHT00029775 (Application ID-564783), wherein an amount of Rs.2.90 crores was advanced by the respondent to the appellant and her late husband for a period of 120 months, repayable in monthly installments of Rs.4,50,273/- each. As the appellant and her late husband had failed to pay the due installments and certain cheques issued by them had also been returned unpaid for want of funds in the account, the respondent, after due notice, had invoked arbitration.

3. As stated above, the sole arbitrator passed the award dated 27.04.2013 in favour of the respondent and against the appellant. The said award was passed ex-parte against the appellant.

4. The primary challenge to the award as also the order passed by the learned Single Judge is on the following two grounds:

(i) There was no proper authorization by the respondent to initiate the arbitration proceedings inasmuch as the proceedings were initiated through Mukesh Kumar Choudhary, however, the power of attorney dated 25.04.2011 filed on record in support of such authority to file, did not expressly authorize Mukesh Kumar Choudhary to initiate arbitration proceedings against the appellant;

(ii) The appellant had been wrongly proceeded against ex-parte as initial notice regarding arbitration proceedings sent by the arbitrator were addressed to an incorrect address and on the second occasion, though addressed to the correct address, the notice had been returned “unclaimed”.

5. In support of the first contention, the appellant has drawn our attention to the Power of Attorney dated 25.04.2011 to assert that there was no delegation of power in favour of Mukesh Kumar Choudhary to initiate arbitration proceedings against the appellant. The appellant has also referred to judgment dated 30.01.2015 passed by a learned Single Judge of this Court in OMP No.1038/2014, titled as Aditya Ganapa & Anr. v. Religare Finvest Ltd., wherein the learned Single Judge, after examining the Power of Attorney had held that the claim filed therein was not filed by a person who was authorized to do so.

6. We, however, are not persuaded by the above argument of the appellant. In the case of Aditya Ganapa (supra) the objector had questioned the authority of Mukesh Kumar Choudhary and Ashutosh Sharma in his reply statement before the arbitrator. The Court found that even after being put to notice of such objection, Religare Finvest Ltd. made no attempt to file the original Power of Attorney, if any, before the arbitrator, which authorized Mukesh Kumar Choudhary to file the claim before the arbitrator. We hereunder quote paragraph 12 of the order dated 30.01.2015:

“12. The failure of a duly authorised person to act on behalf of the company goes to the root of the matter. It vitiates the entire proceedings. Besides, the Petitioner put RFL on notice by raising this point in their reply. Yet no attempt was made by RFL to file original of the POA, if any, before the learned Arbitrator which authorised Mr. Choudhary to file the claim before the learned Arbitrator. Secondly, the learned Arbitrator obviously overlooked the above preliminary objection and failed to deal with it. On this short ground, the impugned Award of the learned Arbitrator becomes wholly unsustainable in law under Section 34 (2) (b) (ii) of the Act and deserves to be set aside.

7. In the present case h