IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
R.K. GAUBA, J.
Meenakshi - Petitioner
Versus
Praveen Rajora - Respondent
CRL.M.C. 4705 of 2016
Decided On : 23-08-2018
Domestic Violence Act - Limitation - Section 12, 18, 19, 20, 22 - Section 468 Cr. PC - Rule 15(6) of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Rules, 2006 - Inderjit Singh Grewal vs. State of Punjab and Anr., (2011) 12 SCC 588 - Krishna Bhatacharjee vs. Sarathi Choudhury and Anr., (2016) 2 SCC 705
Fact of the Case:
The petitioner sought relief under the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 after leaving the matrimonial home due to alleged domestic violence. The respondent moved an application seeking dismissal on the ground of limitation, which was upheld by the first appellate court.
Finding of the Court:
The first appellate court's decision was found to be erroneous as the nature of reliefs claimed by the petitioner constituted a continuing cause of action, and the proceedings were revived by the court.
Issues: The main issue was whether the petition under the Domestic Violence Act was barred by limitation.
Ratio Decidendi: The court relied on the interpretation of Section 468 Cr. PC and Rule 15(6) of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Rules, 2006, as well as previous judgments to determine that the nature of the reliefs claimed constituted a continuing cause of action and were not barred by limitation.
Final Decision: The impugned order of the first appellate court was set aside, and the proceedings in the case of the petitioner against the respondent under Section 12 of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 were revived before the court of the Metropolitan Magistrate.
1. The petitioner was married to the first respondent on 31.10.2009. From out of their cohabitation, a child took birth on 30.11.2011. It is stated that the petitioner was constrained to leave the matrimonial home with her child on 13.02.2012. The first respondent (husband) sued for divorce sometime in 2013-2014. Subsequent to that event, the petitioner (wife) presented a complaint (CC no.178/6/14) in the court of the Metropolitan Magistrate invoking Section 12 read with Sections 18, 19, 20 and 22 of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 (for short, Domestic Violence Act) seeking various reliefs.
2. The respondent (husband), who had been called by the process issued on the said complaint moved an application seeking its dismissal primarily on the ground that it was barred by limitation. The Metropolitan Magistrate dismissed the said application by her order dated 12.08.2015 observing that the issue of limitation required inquiry and evidence to be called for.
3. The above-said order was challenged by the respondent by appeal (Crl. A. no.35/15 – new no.54855/16) in the court of the Sessions. The first appellate court, by its judgment dated 30.09.2016, upheld the contention of the respondent and held that the petition under Domestic Violence Act was barred by limitation referring in this context to Section 468 Cr. PC. The said order has been challenged by the petitioner/wife before this court invoking the inherent power and jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr. PC.
4. Upon perusal, it is found that the first appellate court has primarily gone by the ruling of the Supreme Court in judgment reported as Inderjit Singh Grewal vs. State of Punjab and Anr., (2011) 12 SCC 588 wherein the following observations were recorded :-
“32. Submissions made by Shri Ranjit Kumar on the issue of limitation, in view of the provisions of Section 468 CrPC, that the complaint could be filed only within a period of one year from the date of the incident seem to be preponderous in view of the provisions of Sections 28 and 32 of the 2005 Act read with Rule 15(6) of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Rules, 2006 which make the provisions of CrPC applicable and stand fortified by the judgments of this Court in Japani Sahoo v. Chandra Sekhar Mohanty [(2007) 7 SCC 394 : (2007) 3 SCC (Cri) 388 : AIR 2007 SC 2762] and NOIDA Entrepreneurs Assn. v. NOIDA [(2011) 6 SCC 508 : (2011) 2 SCC (Cri) 1015] .
33. In view of the above, we are of the considered opinion that permitting the Magistrate to proceed further with the complaint under the provisions of the 2005 Act is not compatible and in consonance with the decree of divorce which still subsists and thus, the process amounts to abuse of the process of the court. Undoubtedly, for quashing a complaint, the court has to take its contents on its face value and in case the same discloses an offence, the court generally does not interfere with the same. However, in the backdrop of the factual matrix of this case, permitting the court to proceed with the complaint would be travesty of justice. Thus, interest of justice warrants quashing of the same.”
5. Per contra, the petitioner places reliance on Krishna Bhatacharjee vs. Sarathi Choudhury and Anr., (2016) 2 SCC 705. It has been pointed out that in Krishna Bhatacharjee (supra), the Supreme Court took note of the earlier decision in Inderjit Singh Grewal (supra) and observed thus : -
“32. Regard being had to the aforesaid statement of law, we have to see whether retention of stridhan by the husband or any other family members is a continuing offence or not. There can be no dispute that wife can file a suit for realisation of the stridhan but it does not debar her to lodge a criminal complaint for criminal breach of trust. We must state that was the situation before the 2005 Act came into force. In the 2005 Act, the definition of “aggrieved person” clearly postulates about the status of any woman who has been subjected to domestic violence as
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