Key Points: - The judgment holds that a decree of divorce obtained by mutual consent cannot be declared null and void in collateral (criminal) proceedings; such declaration must be obtained from the competent civil court (!) , (!) , (!) . - The High Court’s dismissal of the Section 482 Cr.P.C. petition was set aside; quashing of the complaint under the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act is permitted when proceeding would be incompatible with a subsisting civil decree (!) , (!) , (!) . - Respondent 2 was found to be party to the alleged fraud and disentitled to equitable relief; aiding or abetting fraud affects proportional relief sought in related proceedings (!) , (!) . - The Court emphasized that even void orders/decrees cannot be collaterally proclaimed void without setting them aside in the appropriate forum; a void order may still require a competent court to declare it void in appropriate proceedings (!) , (!) . - The appellate court permitted quashing of the criminal complaint when continuation would amount to abuse of process and contradict a subsisting divorce decree (!) , (!) . - The judgment clarifies that the criminal court cannot sit in appeal against a civil court’s judgment/decree, especially across territorial lines, while such civil decree subsists (!) , (!) .

How to determine whether a criminal complaint under the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 can proceed where a civil decree of divorce obtained by mutual consent still subsists?

What is the effect of a decree of divorce obtained by mutual consent on subsequent criminal proceedings alleging fraud in obtaining that decree?

What are the limits on collateral challenges to a civil court decree when a criminal court is asked to adjudicate related issues?