The court emphasized the importance of candidates having a working knowledge of relevant legal provisions and upheld the examining body's discretion in setting examination questions.

S. RAVINDRA BHAT, J.

1. The petitioners, who were candidates to the Delhi Judicial Service Examination held on 06.05.2018, contend that the answer keys to five questions i.e. Question Nos. 48, 99, 130, 139 and 184 (of Booklet ‘D’), were incorrect and that appropriate credit ought to be given to them. The Delhi High Court Establishment which is arrayed as the respondent resisted the proceedings. At the advanced stage, the court had required the ld. counsel for the respondent to obtain instructions. The court was informed during the proceedings that the concerned Committee has considered the overall circumstances and decided to contest these proceedings. Accordingly, the respondent filed its counter affidavit.

2. Arguing on behalf of the petitioners, ld. counsel submitted that the first issue i.e. question pertaining to proof of age under the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015 pre-supposes the basic knowledge of that enactment and that the examinations syllabi as prescribed and put on the public domain did not spell out knowledge in this area. Besides, it is argued that in the case of question connected with provisions of the Transfer of Property Act, when the candidates had objected to, the examining authorities deleted it accepting the objections on the ground that the question was out of syllabus. Besides, it is also urged that apart from the petitioners, a large number of other candidates have objected to this question, as it was out of syllabus. Ld. counsel for the respondent contended that unless the candidate or the student concerned had read or was acquainted with Section 94 of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015, the sequence of acceptable evidence, in terms of priority etc. would never be correctly answered.

3. The second question i.e. Q.No.99 pertained to use of appropriate expressions (from amongst 4 words i.e. “curtails, proscribes, prevents and punishes”) which were to be used to fill the blank in an incomplete sentence that reads as follows :

“Section 144 of the Indian Penal Code _______ the gathering of more than 4 people in an area.”

4. It is submitted that the answer key provided that the correct answer was “proscribes” whereas the 4th choice i.e. “punishes” is also another possibility. Ld. counsel, therefore, submitted that in view of this confusion, the petitioners are entitled to credit for this mark as well.

5. The third question pertains to an example of a contract, emanating from a written agreement between the fathers of ‘A’ and ‘B’. The two fathers by a written agreement agreed that their children ‘A’ and ‘B’ would get married on becoming majors. The choices were as to whether the contract was “voidable”, “void”, “valid” or “valid in case 'A' and 'B' have agreed to be bound by the said agreement on becoming major”. The answer key stated that the correct option was option (2). Ld. counsel for the petitioners contended that a close reading of the case law, particularly, Rose Fernandez v. Joseph Gonsalves, (1924) ILR 48 BOM 673 and Tulshiram s/o Maroti Kohad v. Roopchand s/o Laxman Ninawe, AIR 2006 Bom 183 would show that the agreement is valid and that the correct option would be option No.3. Ld. counsel has explained that in the event of breach of such a contract, i.e. when upon attainment of majority of either the son or the daughter, if one of them did not wish to honour the contract which he or her father had entered into, then damages would be forthcoming and could be claimed.

6. The fourth disputed answer pertains to Q.No.130. This asked the candidates : whether a suit dismissed in default can be restored without notice to the defendant or his counsel, if the defendant or his counsel was not present on the date of dismissal of the suit in default. The options were that : (i) the suit once dismissed cannot be restored; (ii) such restoration was permissible without notice to the defendant or his counsel; (iii) principles of natural justice requ