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2018 Supreme(Del) 3014
IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
S. MURALIDHAR, VINOD GOEL, JJ.
Lalit Singh - Petitioner
Versus
The State of NCT of Delhi - Respondent
CRL.A. 915 of 2002, CRL.A. 517 of 2003
Decided On : 26-07-2018
For the Petitioner: Mr. M.L. Yadav
For the Respondents: Mr. Hirein Sharma
The main legal point established in the judgment is the applicability of the Juvenile Justice Act and the benefit of juvenility to a person below 18 years at the time of the incident, as clarified by the Supreme Court.
Headnote:
Juvenile Justice Act - Criminal Law - Indian Penal Code - Section 302, Section 324, Section 34, Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000, Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Rules, 2007 - The judgment discusses the applicability of the Juvenile Justice Act and the legal position regarding the benefit of juvenility to a person below 18 years at the time of the incident. It also highlights the interpretation of the Act by the Supreme Court and its impact on the trial court's decision.
Fact of the Case:
The appeals were against the conviction of the appellants under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code. The trial court declined to grant the benefit of the Juvenile Justice Act to one of the accused, leading to an appeal. The case involved a fatal injury inflicted by one of the appellants on the deceased during a quarrel.
Finding of the Court:
The trial court erred in not extending the benefit of the Juvenile Justice Act to the accused who was below 18 years at the time of the incident. The Supreme Court clarified the legal position regarding juvenility and the benefit available to a person undergoing sentence if below 18 at the time of the occurrence. The court set aside the judgment against the accused and discharged the bail bond and surety bond.
Issues: The main issue was the applicability of the Juvenile Justice Act to an accused who was below 18 years at the time of the incident but above 18 years when the Act came into force.
Ratio Decidendi: The court held that the benefit of the Juvenile Justice Act should have been extended to the accused as he was below 18 at the time of the incident, in line with the legal position clarified by the Supreme Court.
Final Decision: The judgment against the accused was set aside, and the bail bond and surety bond were discharged.
S. Muralidhar, J.
1. These two appeals are directed against the impugned judgment dated 9th September 2002 passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Delhi in Sessions case No. 69/1998 arising out of FIR No. 210/1999 registered at Police Station (PS) Patel Nagar convicting both the Appellants under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code (‘IPC’) and additionally the Appellant Balbir Singh (Appellant in Crl.A.517/2003) of the offence under Section 324 read with Section 34 IPC and the order on sentence dated 27th September 2002 whereby for the offence under Section 302 read with Section 34 IPC both accused were sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment (RI) for life with a fine of Rs.5,000/- and in default of payment of fine to undergo simple imprisonment for three months and for the offence under Section 324 read with Section 34 IPC to RI for 1 year each. Both sentences were directed to run concurrently.
Appeal by Lalit Singh
2. As far as the appeal filed by Lalit Singh (Accused No.1-A-1) is concerned, it is seen that the trial Court in the order on sentence dated 27th September 2002 noticed that an inquiry had been conducted into the age of the said accused. After considering the medical evidence (ossification test) as well as the school record, the trial Court concluded that the date of birth of accused Balbir Singh (A-2) was 27th November 1978 and that of the accused Lalit Singh (A-1) was 18th March 1983. The date of the offence being 24th March 1999, the trial Court concluded that the A-2 was about 21 years of age whereas A-1 was less than 18 years at the time of commission of the offence. He was, in fact, just 16 years of age.
3. The trial Court, however, declined the grant the benefit of Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000 (‘JJ Act’) which defined, with effect from 1st April 2001, anyone who has not attained 18 years of age to be a juvenile. This was only because A-1 was above 18 years as on 1st April 2001 when the JJ Act came into force.
4. The Supreme Court has in Abdul Razzaq v. State of U.P. AIR 2015 SC 1770 clarified as the well settled legal position that a person below 18 years at the time of incident can claim the benefit of JJ Act at any time. In coming to the said conclusion, the Supreme Court discussed Section 7-A and 20 of the JJ Act and Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Rules, 2007 (‘JJ Rules’) and concluded as under :
“10. The above provisions clearly show that even if a person was not entitled to the benefit of juvenilities under the 1986 Act or the present Act prior to its amendment in 2006, such benefit is available to a person undergoing sentence if he was below 18 on the date of the occurrence. Such relief can be claimed even if a matter has been finally decided, as in the present case”
5. The Supreme Court inter alia referred to its earlier decisions in Abuzar Hossain @ Gulam Hossain v. State of West Bengal (2012) 10 SCC 489 and Jitendra Singh @ Babboo Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh (2013) 11 SCC 193.
6. In that view of the matter, the trial Court, in the present case, was in error in not extending to A-1 the benefit of JJ Act which came into force with effect from 1st April 2001. A-1 could not have been tried in the regular criminal Court but should have been sent for trial before the Juvenile Justice Board (‘JJB’).
7. It is not in dispute that pursuant to the judgment of the trial Court and the order on sentence, A-1 has already served over 8 years of judicial custody. Accordingly, there would be no purpose in now sending A-1 before the JJB as he has already served well over the maximum sentence that could have been awarded to him even if he would have been found guilty by the JJB. The impugned judgment dated 9th September 2002 qua Lalit Singh, A-1 is accordingly set aside. Crl.A.915/2002 is allowed. The bail bond and the surety bond furnished by A-1 is hereby discharged.
Appeal by Balbir Singh
8. Now coming to the appeal of Balbir Si
