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2013 Supreme(SC) 620

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
Madan B. Lokur and T.S. Thakur, JJ.
Jitendra Singh @ Babboo Singh & Anr. - Appellants
Versus
State of U.P. - Respondent
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 763 OF 2003
Decided on: 10-07-2013

IMPORTANT POINTS
1. If it found that the juvenile is guilty of the offence alleged to have been committed, he simply cannot go unpunished. However, as the law stands, the punishment to be awarded to him or her must be left to the Juvenile Justice Board constituted under the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000.
2. Whenever an accused, who physically appears to be a juvenile, is produced before a Magistrate, he or she should form a prima facie opinion on the juvenility of the accused and record it. If any doubt persists, the Magistrate should conduct an age inquiry as required by Section 7A of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000 to determine the juvenility or otherwise of the accused person. 1. There is no provision suggesting, leave alone making it obligatory for the Court before whom the claim for juvenility is made, to set aside the conviction of the juvenile on the ground that on the date of commission of the offence he was a juvenile, and hence not triable by an ordinary criminal court.
2. In all such cases where the accused was above 16 years but below 18 years of age on the date of occurrence, the proceedings pending in the Court concerned will continue and be taken to their logical end except that the Court upon finding the juvenile guilty would not pass an order of sentence against him. Instead he shall be referred to the Board for appropriate orders under the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000.

Headnote:As per Madan B. Lokur, J.

        Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000-Section 2(k) - Death of appellant’s wife by burn injuries in matrimonial home-Conviction of appellant under Section 304-B and Section 498-A of IPC-Appeal-Dismissed by High Court-Appeal-Plea of appellant that on the date of commission of the offence, he was a juvenile or child-Documentary evidence to show from school admission register which had not been tampered with that date of birth of appellant was 31.08. 1974- That apart, medical examination of appellant conducted less than two months after incident, also showed his age to be about 17 years- On the basis of material before him, Additional Sessions Judge accepted the claim of appellant that he was younger than his wife at the time of marriage and that his date of birth was 31.8. 1974- No reason to reject report of Additional Sessions Judge -Hence held that appellant was a juvenile or a child within the meaning of that expression as defined in Section 2(k) of the Act (Para 21)

        Dowry death-Appeal against conviction- Both the Trial Court as well as the High Court concurrently found that appellant had demanded dowry from Deceased and that she had been set on fire for not having complied with the demands for dowry- Before her demise, deceased had written a letter to her father about beating and harassment given to her due to the inability to meet dowry demands- The letter was proved by the prosecution and was relied on by the Trial Court as well as the High Court in accepting the version of the prosecution- Hence held that ingredients of Section 304-B of the IPC were made out- No apparent reason to disturb the concurrent findings of fact arrived at by the Trial Court and the High Court (Paras 22 to 27)

        Dowry death -Sentence to be awarded to Appellant convict who was a juvenile when he committed the offence- A perusal of ’punishments’ provided for under the Juvenile Justice Act, 1986 indicate that given the nature of the offence committed by appellant, advising or admonishing him was hardly a ’punishment’ that could be awarded since it was not at all commensurate with the gravity of the crime-Again, considering his age of about 40 years, it was completely illusory to expect the appellant to be released on probation of good conduct, to be placed under the care of any parent, guardian or fit person - The only realistic punishment that could possibly be awarded to appellant on the facts of the case was to require him to pay a fine - Matter remanded to jurisdictional Juvenile Justice Board for determining appropriate quantum of fine to be levied on appellant-Appeal partly allowed (Paras 44 to 46)

       Facts of the Case :

        Principal issues that arose for consideration in present appeal were whether the appellant was a juvenile or a child as defined by Section 2(k) of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000 on the date of occurrence of the offence he was charged with and whether the conviction of the appellant could be sustained on merits and, if so, the sentence to be awarded to the appellant.

       Findings of the Court :

        On the basis of material before him, Additional Sessions Judge accepted the claim of appellant that he was younger than his wife at the time of marriage and that his date of birth was 31.8. 1974.Held that there was no reason to reject report of Additional Sessions Judge .Hence held that appellant was a juvenile or a child within the meaning of that expression as defined in Section 2(k) of the Act.

        B. Both the Trial Court as well as the High Court concurrently found that appellant had demanded dowry from Deceased and that she had been set on fire for not having complied with the demands for dowry. No apparent reason to disturb the concurrent findings of fact arrived at by the Trial Court and the High Court. The only realistic punishment that could possibly be awarded to appellant on the facts of the case was to require him to pay a fine . Matter was remanded to jurisdictional Juvenile Justice Board for determining appropriate quantum of fine to be levied on appellant. Appeal was partly allowed

       Result : Appeal partly allowed

       As per T.S. Thakur, J.

        Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000-Section 2(k) - Death of appellant’s wife by burn injuries in matrimonial home-Conviction of appellant under Section 304-B and Section 498-A of IPC-Appeal-Dismissed by High Court-Appeal-Plea of appellant that on the date of commission of the offence, he was a juvenile or child-Held that there was no reason why the conviction of appellant should be interfered with, simply because he was under the 2000 Act a juvenile entitled to the benefit of being referred to the Board for an order under Section 15 of the said Act- Even if the appellant had been less than sixteen years of age, on the date of the occurrence, he would have been referred for trial to the Juvenile Court in terms of Section 8 of the 1986 Act- The Juvenile Court would then hold a trial and record a conviction or acquittal depending upon the evidence adduced before it- In an ideal situation a case filed before an ordinary Criminal Court when referred to the Board or Juvenile Court may culminate in a conviction at the hands of the Board also- But law does not countenance a situation where a full-fledged trial and even an appeal ends in a conviction of the accused but the same is set aside without providing for a trial by the Board (Paras 23, 24)

       Facts of the Case :

        Issue that arose for consideration in present appeal was whether the appellant was a juvenile or a child as defined by Section 2(k) of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000 on the date of occurrence of the offence he was charged with and whether the conviction of the appellant could be sustained on merits and, if so, the sentence to be awarded to the appellant.

       Findings of the Court :

        The Apex Court held that there was no reason why the conviction of appellant should be interfered with, simply because he was under the 2000 Act a juvenile entitled to the benefit of being referred to the Board for an order under Section 15 of the said Act. Even if the appellant had been less than sixteen years of age, on the date of the occurrence, he would have been referred for trial to the Juvenile Court in terms of Section 8 of the 1986 Act. The Juvenile Court would then hold a trial and record a conviction or acquittal depending upon the evidence adduced before it. In an ideal situation a case filed before an ordinary Criminal Court when referred to the Board or Juvenile Court may culminate in a conviction at the hands of the Board also. But law does not countenance a situation where a full-fledged trial and even an appeal ends in a conviction of the accused but the same is set aside without providing for a trial by the Board.

       Result : Appeal partly allowed

JUDGMENT

Madan B. Lokur, J.

1. Three principal issues arise for consideration in this appeal. The first is whether the appellant was a juvenile or a child as defined by Section 2(k) of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000 on the date of occurrence of the offence he was charged with. On a consideration of the Report called for by this Court on this question, the issue must be answered in the affirmative.

2. The second is whether the conviction of the appellant can be sustained on merits and, if so, the sentence to be awarded to the appellant. In our opinion the conviction of the appellant must be upheld and on the quantum of sentence, he ought to be dealt with in accordance with the provisions of Section 20 of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000 read with Section 15 thereof.

3. The third question is whether any appropriate measures can be taken to prevent the recurrence of a situation, such as the present, where an accused is subjected to a trial by a regular Court having criminal jurisdiction but he or she is later found to be a juvenile. In this regard, we propose to give appropriate directions to all Magistrates which, we hope, will prevent such a situation from arising again.

The facts:

4. On the midnight of 23rd / 24th May 1988 it is alleged that Asha Devi was set on fire by the appellants and two other persons. A demand for dowry, which she was unable to meet, resulted in the unfortunate incident.

5. On 24th May 1988 at about 5 a.m., Asha Devi’s uncle came to know of the incident and he lodged a complaint with the local police. In the meanwhile, Asha Devi had been taken to the District Hospital where she succumbed to the burns.

6. After completing the investigation, the local police filed a charge sheet on 10th July 1988 against the appellants and two other persons. The charge sheet alleged offences committed under Section 147, Section 302, Section 304-B and Section 498-A of the Indian Penal Code (for short the ‘IPC’).

7. Thereafter the case proceeded to trial and the Sessions Judge, Rae Bareli in S.T. No. 186 of 1988 delivered judgment on 30th August 1990 convicting the appellants and acquitting the other two persons. The appellants were convicted under Section 304-B of the IPC (dowry death) and sentenced to undergo 7 years rigorous imprisonment. They were also convicted under Section 498-A of the IPC (husband or relative of husband of a woman subjecting her to cruelty) and sentenced to undergo 2 years rigorous imprisonment and to pay a fine of Rs.100/- each.

8. Feeling aggrieved by their conviction and sentence, the appellants preferred Criminal Appeal No. 464 of 1990 in the Lucknow Bench of the Allahabad High Court. By its judgment and order dated 23rd May 2003 the High Court dismissed the Criminal Appeal. This is reported as 2003 (3) ACR 2431=MANU/UP/2115/2003.

9. Against the judgment and order passed by the Allahabad High Court the appellants came up in appeal to this Court. It may be mentioned that during the pendency of this appeal the second appellant (father of the first appellant) died and therefore only the appeal filed by the first appellant, the husband of Asha Devi, survives.

10. During the pendency of these proceedings the appellant filed Criminal Miscellaneous Petition No. 16974 of 2010 for raising additional grounds. He sought to contend that on the date of commission of the offence, he was a juvenile or child within the meaning of that expression as defined in Section 2(k) of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Act’). According to the appellant his date of birth was 31st August 1974 and therefore, when the offence is alleged to have been committed, he was about 14 years of age.

11. The application for urging additional grounds was considered by this Court and by an order dated 19th November 2010 it was held, while relying upon Pawan v. State of Uttaranchal, (2009) 15 SCC 259 that prima facie there






























































































































































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